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ABSTRACT 
 
LAUREN LANAHAN: The Multilevel Innovation Policy Mix:  
Three Essays On State SBIR Matching Programs 
(Under direction of Maryann P. Feldman) 
 
 
In an effort to extend our understanding of public R&D, this study presents three essays that 
focus on state government R&D investment in small business innovation. Too often public support for 
R&D is conflated with federal policies and programs when in fact multiple levels of government have 
vested interest in innovation policy to strengthen the competitiveness of the economy and increase 
societal welfare. Taken together, these myriad sources comprise a multilevel innovation policy mix. The 
first essay identifies and classifies the portfolio of state programs designed to complement the federal 
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. It then employs a diffusion model to assess the 
antecedent factors associated with states adopting and maintaining an SBIR State Match program, which 
provides matching funds to the pool of federal Phase I recipients competing for the larger federal Phase II 
award. The second essay examines the efficacy of the SBIR State Match program through a state-level 
fixed effects model. The results indicate that the matching funds increase the Phase II success rates for 
firms participating in the National Science Foundation SBIR program. The third essay employs a 
difference-in-difference research design, examining outcomes for SBIR projects in neighboring states 
with and without the match program. This essay’s analysis estimates the marginal effect of the matching 
funds on Phase II success rates by taking into account variations in the size of the state match. This study 
offers a new contribution to innovation policy by assessing the impact of R&D investments at the 
research project level rather than the firm. This study finds that the match is worth more when invested in 
projects whose firms have less experience with the SBIR program. The results point to a heterogeneous 
treatment effect; this suggests that states could be more strategic with their investments.  
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PREFACE 
 
 I vividly remember that exciting “ah-ha” moment when the topic for my dissertation materialized. 
Maryann and I were driving back from an interview in Chapel Hill – for another project focused on 
building a dataset of the entrepreneurial activity in the Research Triangle Region. A week or so prior to 
this meeting, John Hardin, the Executive Director of the Board of Science, Technology & Innovation, had 
shared the NC SBIR State Match data and we had finished pulling the award data for NC recipients of the 
federal SBIR program. As we stopped at a red light at the intersection of Estes and MLK, I asked 
Maryann if she knew of any other states with a comparable SBIR program. It immediately occurred to me 
that this type of program, placed within the context of the federal SBIR program, offered a solid 
framework for a strong research design. This was both in terms of defining the population of activity 
(federal SBIR recipients) and in defining a clear outcome measure (Phase II awards). She had heard of 
Kentucky’s program, but suggested I follow up with John. In a follow up conversation, John mentioned 
that, “there are maybe 10 or so.” There was no central repository for this information, but he emphasized 
that state governments were definitely showing greater interest in the SBIR program.  
 Having just taken Virginia Gray’s course that covered state policy diffusion theory and having 
worked on another project with Maryann and Iryna Lendel on state university R&D programs, this topic 
seemed fortuitous. With Maryann’s guidance, I hit the ground running and started searching online for 
other state SBIR activity and contacting state agencies (including SSTI) for more information. While the 
idea was very appealing to me, I quickly discovered why there is so little research on topic – notably, the 
non-standard, decentralized state data. Nevertheless, with every phone call, email and web search, I felt 
like a detective of sorts as I kept identifying more state SBIR interest. To my surprise, forty-five states 
had some type of formal program that complemented the SBIR program. This was just the starting point 
for this larger project; however, every time I sit at that intersection, I can’t help but think about SBIR.   
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CHAPTER ONE: PUBLIC R&D AND INNOVATION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
It is well understood that innovation is a crucial driver of economic growth; this dissertation 
research is an effort toward determining what institutions and reward structures are most efficient at 
producing innovation in a particular context. A sizeable literature has examined federal investment in 
research and development (R&D), but there are disproportionately few studies evaluating the growing 
number of state government R&D initiatives. A recent National Science Foundation report estimates that 
state governments invested over $1.5 billion in 2011. Although the amount of federal investment in R&D 
exceeds this level of funding, the share of state R&D is increasing.1  
Public institutions are collectively taking on an expanded role within the innovation process 
(Block & Keller, 2009; Schrank & Whitford, 2009). While federal investment in R&D is well justified 
with attention directed towards spurring national competitiveness and economic prosperity (Bush, 1945), 
state government investments have recently stepped in (e.g. Berglund & Coburn, 1994; Plosila, 2004; 
Feldman et al., 2013). This interest is likely a function of the growing evidence that R&D activity is 
spatially proximate and maps out in a systematic manner via spillovers and agglomeration economies 
over geographically concentrated and industry-focused trajectories (Griliches, 1998; Jaffe et al. 1993; 
Audretsch & Feldman, 2004; Greenstone et al., 2010). The spatial nature of R&D places state 
governments in a fortuitous position to invest in local research capacity.  
Taken together, public support for R&D stems from multiple levels of government and agencies 
that comprise a multilevel innovation policy mix (Flanagan et al., 2010). The shared imperative of 
bolstering economic activity ties these multiple systems together. Nevertheless, our understanding of how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, Higher Education Research 
and Development Survey; NSF 14-303 Table 1. 
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these policies interact and overlap is lacking. A complete and clear understanding of the public’s myriad 
roles deserves more attention. This dissertation aims to contribute by paying particular attention to state 
and federal policy directed toward small business innovation – specifically the Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) programs. 
The U.S. federal SBIR program stands as one of the most well known public programs supporting 
early-stage R&D activity for small firms (e.g. Lerner, 1996; Wallsten, 2000; Audretsch, 2003; Toole & 
Czarnitski, 2007; Wessner, 2008). Established in 1982, the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
oversees an interagency consortium of eleven federal agencies2 that provide competitive extramural R&D 
funds in for small businesses to demonstrate proof-of-concept (Phase I), product development (Phase II) 
and ultimately commercialization (Phase III).3 Forty-five U.S. states have introduced one or more SBIR-
inspired programs designed to complement the federal program. These state programs can be broadly 
classified as either outreach efforts to increase participation with the federal SBIR program or more 
aggressive match efforts to improve the competitiveness and advance the project downstream toward 
development and commercialization. There is considerable scholarship on the federal SBIR program, but 
there are no studies that consider the broader SBIR policy context that include state programs. Among the 
portfolio of state SBIR programs, the State Match Phase I program (referred to herein as State Match) 
provides a unique opportunity to empirically examine the larger SBIR policy mix. This is the most diffuse 
of the state match programs with a common structure that offers noncompetitive awards to successful 
Phase I recipients.  
The central aims of this dissertation research are twofold. First, this project seeks to motivate the 
multilevel innovation policy mix as a framework for innovation policy analysis within a federalist system. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The eleven federal agencies that participate in the SBIR program include: Department of Agriculture, Department 
of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and National Institutes of Standards and 
Technology), Department of Defense, Department of Education, Department of Energy, Department of Health and 
Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection 
Agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and National Science Foundation. 
3 Federal SBIR funds are only available for Phase I and II.  
 
3 
In doing so, this research first brings greater attention to state innovation policies and then places state 
policy within a larger policy context. Second, drawing upon the portfolio of federal and state SBIR 
programs as an exemplar of a multilevel innovation policy mix, this project critically examines the set of 
complementary state policies. The structure of the State Match programs, moreover, provides a unique 
opportunity to assess variation in the size of R&D expenditures in innovative projects. This not only has 
policy implications for state and federal policymaking, but also more broadly for innovation-based policy.  
To achieve these aims, this dissertation is organized in a three-essay format. The first essay – 
Chapter Two – develops a theoretical framework for the multilevel innovation policy mix within a 
federalist structure. As an initial step toward understanding the broader policy context, this paper 
examines an illustrative case of the multilevel innovation policy mix drawing upon the federal and state 
SBIR policy context. In addition, an empirical analysis is presented to assess the antecedent factors that 
lead states to adopt the complementary State Match program. The second essay – Chapter Three – offers a 
comprehensive state-level analysis of the State Match program by considering dual advantages of the 
program – Phase II success rates and Phase I applications. Extending this, the third essay – Chapter Four 
– presents a narrower analysis of the State Match program at the project level. By viewing the 
noncompetitive state match as exogenous variation to the initial federal SBIR award, this study utilizes 
the variation in size of the state match and examines the differential and marginal effect of changes in 
R&D funding for innovative projects.  
The remainder of this chapter motivates the central topic of this project – policy analysis for the 
multilevel innovation policy mix. In doing so, this first chapter highlights the growing role of state 
innovation policies – an often-overlooked innovation policy actor. Next, this chapter considers the central 
challenges that face innovation policy analysis and highlights how multilevel innovation policy analysis 
within the context of the SBIR program offers a fortuitous opportunity to assess R&D activity. This 
chapter then concludes with a brief overview of each essay.  
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1.2 State Innovation Policy 
Public R&D is central to innovation given limited private financing. Moreover, this early-stage 
activity can be viewed as a public good given that it is a source for developing the skills required to 
translate knowledge into practice, enhancing the ability to solve complex technological problems and 
serving as an entry ticket for absorbing information (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962; Salter & Martin, 2001). 
These benefits have the capacity to reduce the barriers for firms in the market and in turn increase 
competition. 
Although federal investment in R&D outweighs state-level investment, over the past thirty years 
state R&D investment has notably increased. In the early 1980s, state governments started playing a 
greater role by providing early-stage R&D support to leverage economic benefits. This is largely 
attributed to the following events: (i) revenue sharing between the federal government with state and local 
governments (Vogel, 1979); (ii) the passage of the Bayh Dole Act of 1980, which granted researchers the 
rights to intellectual property that resulted from publicly funded research (Cozzens, 1997); and (iii) the 
concurrent decline and subsequent uncertainty of federal and industry support for university R&D (Teich, 
2009).  
Plosila’s review (2004) of state S&T programs offers the first critical examination of state 
innovation policies, which he documents in three stages – 1960s-70s, 1980s, and 1990s. The first was 
marked by an emphasis on bolstering S&T programs; the second was marked by a notable shift towards 
economic development policies; and the third was marked by an increased interest in forming technology 
alliances and trade associations. A more recent review of state-funded university R&D programs 
identifies a prominent link between state-based university R&D programs and economic development 
efforts (Feldman et al., 2014). The increased prevalence of these programs suggests that state policy 
makers have come to justify and sustain support of university R&D programs under the premise that 
R&D will stimulate innovation and thereby foster local entrepreneurship and economic activity. 
Technology-based economic development programs, science parks and incubators are among more recent 
and related state-initiatives to promote innovative and economic activity (Phan, Siegel & Wright, 2005). 
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Scholars have also found that the decentralizing shift of authority from the federal government to states, 
which took place most notably during the Reagan administration, has allowed them greater political 
freedom to administer a more customized set of R&D programs that better aligns to the state’s proximate 
economic and research climate (Bozeman, 2000). Expanding from Tiebout’s discussion of “feet voting,” 
this flexibility essentially allows state policy makers to allocate public goods such that they more closely 
reflect the preferences of the constituent population (1956).     
Improved understanding of state R&D investment is essential given the growing evidence that 
knowledge spillovers and agglomeration economies produced by R&D investments are spatially 
proximate. Research on knowledge spillovers has shown that the knowledge produced from R&D holds 
characteristics of a public, non-rival good that spills over and contributes to the work of other researchers 
and R&D initiatives producing “dynamic complementaries” (Cerulli, 2010; p. 424). The rate and success 
of these production externalities, however, depends on the relative level of absorptive capacity of the 
local economy to recognize, assimilate and apply the new scientific knowledge (Jaffe, 2000). Spatial 
benefits that range from increased levels of supply, proximity, pooling of demands for specialized labor, 
reduced transportation costs and knowledge spillovers explain why certain localities demonstrate 
heightened levels of innovative output and economic success.  
Although R&D benefits may extend beyond the local municipality or, in the longer-term, beyond 
the state bounds, there is convincing evidence to suggest that R&D activity has a geographically 
concentrated component. The knowledge spillovers and agglomeration economies that result from R&D 
activity have direct implications on bolstering economic activity. State policy makers, therefore, are in a 
fortuitous position to actively promote local economic activity by investing in R&D.  
Although a range of state-level policies have been implemented over the past thirty years, there is 
surprisingly scant research on and evaluation of this activity. Regrettably, state-level studies have been 
limited to descriptive overview or narrow case study analysis (e.g. Berglund & Coburn, 1995, Combes & 
Todd, 1996). The scarcity of comprehensive and systematic evaluations of state government programs 
can be explained by the myriad methodological challenges present in state-level analysis. The 
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multifaceted attributes of state innovation activity and extensive variation make systematic analysis a 
challenge. 
Despite these challenges, state-level evaluation of R&D investment is lacking. Outside the realm 
of academia, efforts toward better understanding state economies have gained considerable policy traction 
recently. This is most notably exemplified by Dave Heineman’s 2011-12 National Governor’s 
Association Initiative, “Growing State Economies,”4 a recent report issued by the Kauffman Foundation, 
“The State of Entrepreneurship: State and Local Governments Hold the Key to Accelerating Economic 
Growth in 2012,”5 and Taylor’s (2012) recent paper on the role of Governors as economic problem 
solvers. All three highlight the potential of state governments, especially in regards to promoting S&T 
activity and economic development. Despite this policy interest, scholarship has little to offer in terms of 
guidance. 
Improved understanding of state R&D initiatives offers a broader and more complete 
understanding of innovation policy within the U.S. context. While the significant financial demands and 
links to national competitiveness have placed the federal government at the forefront of innovation policy 
– both in terms of the levels of investment and in terms of setting policy agendas – state innovation 
policies deserve our attention. State innovation policy not only offers a more complete assessment of the 
policy context, the federalist structure promotes a process of trial and error that propels states to 
experiment and maximize their intended goals (Karch, 2007). Scholars and policy makers thus have an 
opportunity to evaluate the successes and failures of these state policies and arrive at more enlightened 
policy recommendations. 
1.3 Policy Analysis within a Multilevel Innovation Policy Mix 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Source: http://www.subnet.nga.org/ci/1112/ 
5  Source: http://www.kauffman.org/newsroom/the-state-of-entrepreneurship-state-and-local-governments-hold-the-
key-to-accelerating-economic-growth-in-2012.aspx 
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Both the increased level of involvement of the public sector in S&T activity and belief that 
scientific knowledge and technology innovation will foster societal benefits have placed program 
evaluation and accountability at the forefront of policy debates (Feller, 2007, Georghiou, 2000). This 
gained considerable attention with the passing of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, a 
congressional mandate centered on program transparency and accountability. Despite this mandate, 
federal R&D program evaluations remain at a nascent stage (Cozzens, 2003). Moreover, this mandate 
does not extend to states. As Osborne (1988) cogently noted, “clearly, state governments view their 
spending on technology development as an investment, yet they rarely measure the return they got on that 
investment” (p. 58). 
Accurately tracing public R&D investments – at the federal or state government levels – presents 
a notable challenge. Many agree that R&D investments in S&T spur economic activity and yield societal 
gain; however, the challenge remains of breaking down the R&D process from inputs to impacts over an 
extended time horizon. Collectively, this complex process comprises the infamous black box that is hard 
to illuminate (Feller, 2007; Glaeser, 2009; Campbell, 2009). Moreover, examination of a policy mix – one 
that includes multiple levels of government policy – presents an added hurdle given myriad factors 
including decentralization of data and programmatic fragmentation. In short, the innovation policy 
context is complex. Some have even argued for random R&D allocations to enable more rigorous 
research designs (Storey, 1994), not surprisingly, political support for this approach is lacking. Viewing 
innovation policy as a multilevel mix, nevertheless, more accurately reflects the public policy context and 
complete impact of policy investments.  
This dissertation draws upon the SBIR policy mix to illustrate the policy and analytical benefits 
of this approach. First, only those projects that secure a competitive federal Phase I award are eligible to 
compete for the Phase II award. Thus, the population of innovative projects considered for this analysis 
(Phase I recipients) has met a minimum level of competency. Recipients of the Phase I award are all 
subject to the federal SBIR review process, which evaluates projects based on the scientific, technical and 
commercial merits of the proposal. Importantly, the geography of the applicant is not taken into 
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consideration in the federal review. This addresses concerns about selection bias in defining the 
population for the study. Second, placing the State Match program within the context of the federal SBIR 
program offers a clearly defined outcome variable – Phase II awards. The definitive characteristic of the 
State Match program is the noncompetitive match for Phase I recipients as they progress to compete for 
Phase II funds. This stands in contrast to many other R&D analyses that seek to examine approximated 
and therefore more intangible outcomes related to innovation and economic development (Salter & 
Martin, 2001; Cerulli, 2010). Moreover for policy evaluation, use of the Phase II award offers a more 
immediate measure of progress towards commercialization. This helps to lessen concerns of confounding 
factors that are common with R&D analyses that measure relationships over longer time horizons. Third, 
state comparisons are feasible within this policy context given the common design of the State Match 
program. This is both in terms of assessing the antecedent factors that lead states to adopt the program 
and evaluating the benefits of the state program. Lastly, the SBIR program invests in innovative projects. 
Viewing the State Match as exogenous variation to the size of public investment in the innovative 
projects offers a unique opportunity to assess the effect of public R&D in projects rather than firms. With 
a firm level analysis the potential for confounding factors is greater. This policy context allows for critical 
analysis of direct investment in early-stage innovation on developmental progress. While this brings light 
to only a subsection of the infamous black box, it offers a more complete perspective of the policy context 
and greater insight into the role of public R&D on innovation. 
1.4 Overview of Dissertation 
Table 1.1 overviews the data and context, aims and policy implications for each essay. All three 
essays share a common theme by focusing on the multilevel innovation policy mix through the context of 
the federal and state SBIR programs. The first essay develops the conceptual framework of the policy mix 
and provides a foundational overview of the SBIR policy context. The second essay presents a 
comprehensive state-level analysis of the potential dual advantages of the State Match program. The third 
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essay narrows the analysis to a contiguous region and offers a project-level analysis of the differential and 
marginal impacts of the program. Each essay is briefly discussed in turn. 
1.4.1 First Essay – Multilevel Innovation Policy Mix: A Closer Look State Policies that Augment the 
Federal SBIR Program 
This chapter examines nested, multilevel innovation policies paying particular attention to U.S. 
federal and state small business innovation research programs. With 45 states offering a range of SBIR 
Outreach and SBIR Match programs specifically designed to enhance the federal SBIR program, such 
programs provide a useful lens for examining the nature of the multilevel innovation policy mix. The 
contributions of this essay are twofold. First, the study provides theoretical motivation for multilevel 
innovation policy responses placing emphasis on positive policy responses in which state policies 
enhance federal policies. Second, it provides an empirical analysis examining the multilevel factors 
associated with a state government response that augments the federal SBIR program. The results from 
this analysis indicate these state policy actions are associated with a confluence of multilevel factors 
driven not only from top-down federal actions, but also from bottom-up, internal state political and 
economic factors as well as from lateral pressures from peer states. 
1.4.2 Second Essay – Multilevel Funding for Small Business Innovation: A Critical Review of State 
SBIR Match Programs   
State governments invest in early-stage innovative activity as an economic development strategy. 
Nevertheless, attention directed at the public sector’s role in this capacity has been placed on federal 
policy actions overlooking the growing role of states. The primary aims of this essay are two-fold: (i) to 
articulate the motivations for multilevel public support for small business innovative activity, placing 
emphasis on state level incentives directed towards entrepreneurial activity; and (ii) to empirically 
evaluate the State Match program. This program is a diffuse state level policy designed to complement 
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the federal SBIR program by offering noncompetitive matching funds to the state’s successful SBIR 
Phase I recipients. This offers an opportunity to examine the marginal impact of public R&D given the 
state intervention. This study employs a state level fixed effects model and considers two outcome 
variables – Phase II success rates and Phase I application activity. To account for industrial heterogeneity, 
the data are stratified by the federal mission agencies. Results from the empirical analysis indicate that the 
state match increases the Phase II success rates for firms participating in the National Science Foundation 
SBIR program.  
1.4.3 Third Essay – Approximating Exogenous Variation in R&D: SBIR Projects and State 
Matching Funds 
The theoretical rationale for government investment in R&D is well established, but empirical 
studies clarifying the most effective means of investment are lacking. There is considerable research on 
the effect of government investment at the firm level; however, this paper takes a narrower look to 
consider the effect of government investment in R&D projects. This essay examines the differential effect 
of State Match programs that reward successful federal Phase I projects on securing the larger follow on 
Phase II award. This study presents a difference-in-difference (DD) research design, identifying projects 
from comparable neighboring states without the program. It also estimates the marginal effect of the 
matching funds on Phase II success rates by considering variations in size of the state match. Results 
suggest that the state match has an impact for projects proposed by firms with less previous SBIR 
success. These results offer compelling policy implications: rather than continuing with the current policy 
practice of providing an equal amount of state matching funds to the entire pool of SBIR Phase I 
recipients, states ought to consider channeling funds to firms with less experience in the federal program.  
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Table 1.1 Overview of Dissertation 
 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 
Data & 
Context 
Classification of the 
portfolio of State SBIR 
Outreach and Match policy 
activity 
Comprehensive state-level 
analysis of the State Match 
program  
Narrow project-level 
analysis of State Match 
program in a contiguous 
region spanning six states 
Central Aims • Articulate the 
multilevel innovation 
policy mix 
• Assess the antecedent 
factors associated with 
adoption of the State 
Match program 
• Motivate the policy 
implications for program 
evaluation of the 
multilevel innovation 
policy mix 
• Examine the dual 
advantages of the State 
Match program – Phase II 
success rates and Phase I 
application activity 
• Set up rigorous 
research design to 
examine exogenous 
variation of public 
R&D in innovative 
projects rather than 
firms 
Policy 
Implications 
• Present a framework 
for understanding 
innovation policy 
within a federalist 
context 
• Offer a foundational 
understanding of state 
R&D policy by 
assessing motivating 
factors  
Provide broad, empirical 
examination of a diffuse state 
program. Find evidence that 
presence of the State Match 
program increases 
competitiveness for NSF 
projects 
Marginal adjustments in 
public R&D on innovation 
are heterogeneous, 
suggesting that public 
policy could be more 
strategic. Moreover, the 
value of the dollar is worth 
more when invested in 
firms with less prior 
experience in the federal 
program.     
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CHAPTER 2: MULTILEVEL INNOVATION POLICY MIX  
A CLOSER LOOK AT STATE POLICIES THAT AUGMENT THE FEDERAL SBIR 
PROGRAM 
 
(With Maryann P. Feldman)1 
2.1 Introduction  
 Innovation policy is the outcome of multiple layers of programs and investments made by 
different jurisdictions with overlapping objectives, diverse mandates and different resource constraints. 
Given limited resources for early stage activity from the private sector, innovative projects undertaken by 
firms are commonly subject to national and subnational policies. Taken together, different levels of 
policies comprise a policy mix that involves significant complementary interactions and 
interdependencies that requires joint analysis (Flanagan et al., 2011). National policies are designed to 
spur international economic competitiveness and thereby increase aggregate societal welfare (Kuhlmann, 
2001: 954). Whereas subnational governments, recognizing that the locus on innovative activity occurs at 
a more concentrated geographic scale, enact policies to build or reinforce existing local innovative 
capacities and capture greater returns within their jurisdiction. Taken together the rationales, domains and 
instruments among different administrative units define a multilevel innovation policy mix (Magro & 
Wilson 2013: 1654). The policy mix is not static but represents the agenda-setting outcome of a 
policymaking process that involves learning and dissemination (Flanagan et al., 2011). The resulting 
multilevel policy mix is the product of differing motives, interacting incentives and diffusion. At a time 
when market fundamentalism guides policy debates, the full impact of multiple layers of the innovation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 At the time of submitting the dissertation to the UNC Graduate School, a version of this chapter was in the third 
round of revision (tentatively accepted) at Research Policy. 
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policy mix needs to be understood so that better policy options may be articulated and implemented 
(Whitford & Shrank 2011; Block & Keller, 2009; Schrank & Whitford, 2009).  
Federalist systems provide a context to understand the dynamic interaction between different 
levels of government. Policy actions may be conceptualized as a response to other policies: they are 
adopted in a pre-existing context and institutional framework that have been shaped by successive policy 
changes (Uyarra, 2010). Most examinations of the multilevel policy mix focus on the European context 
(e.g. Uyarra & Flanagan, 2010); however, the U.S. offers an example not only for theoretical 
development but also for empirical examination. Scholars have overwhelmingly focused attention on 
federal programs (Keller & Block, 2013; Link & Scott, 2012; Toole & Czarnitski, 2007; Wallsten, 2000; 
Lerner, 1996; and others). Yet states are actively engaged with innovation policies (e.g. Berglund & 
Coburn, 1995; Feldman et al., 2014; Plosila, 2004). This sets the stage for greater theoretical development 
of the dynamic temporal relationships that define the multilevel policy mix.  
This paper’s first contribution is to provide a theoretical framework that considers multilevel 
innovation policy responses within a federalist system. We consider innovation policy responses within a 
dynamic context highlighting that initiation can originate either from the centralized or decentralized 
levels to then yield a positive or null policy response. We then develop four archetypes – policy 
enhancement, experimentation, acquiescence and local exceptionalism. For the empirical context, we pay 
particular attention to policy enhancement, as states tend to respond to the greater resources for 
innovation at the federal level.  
 The U.S. Federal Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program2 provides an example of a 
national public program supporting early-stage R&D activity that has prompted a policy response by 
states. Established in 1982, the Small Business Administration (SBA) oversees an interagency consortium 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Although the SBIR and STTR (Small Business Technology Transfer) share similarities, this essay focuses on the 
former, which does not include the additional requirements of university collaboration.  
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of 11 federal agencies3 that provide competitive extramural R&D funds to small businesses for proof-of-
concept, demonstration and commercialization. Since 1984, all but five U.S. states4 have introduced 
formal programs specifically designed to enhance the federal SBIR program. The intentional design of 
these programs offers an ideal case for examining one archetype of multilevel policy responses – 
specifically state policies designed to enhance an existing federal policy. From a detailed analysis of state 
responses to the federal SBIR program, two different types of policy enhancement emerge. The first type 
offers information and consulting services that complement the federal program, while the second type 
provides more aggressive financial incentives that augment and extend the existing federal policy. Forty-
two states have enacted SBIR Outreach Programs that complement the federal SBIR program, and 17 
states have enacted more aggressive SBIR Match programs to augment.5 This paper’s second contribution 
is to provide an empirical analysis to understand the multilevel conditions that motivate state policy 
responses that become part of this policy mix. Specifically, we consider a range of top-down, bottom-up 
and lateral antecedent factors that influence the adoption of the SBIR State Match Phase I (SMP-I) 
program. This is the most broadly diffuse SBIR Match program and among the more aggressive state 
policy responses to the federal program.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The 11 federal agencies that participate in the SBIR program include: Department of Agriculture, Department of 
Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and National Institutes of Standards and 
Technology), Department of Defense, Department of Education, Department of Energy, Department of Health and 
Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection 
Agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and National Science Foundation. 
4 These include Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Texas. Interestingly, not all states have formal 
programs to complement the federal SBIR program. While this paper focuses on factors leading states to adopt these 
programs, future work could examine why some states opt not to establish formal programs. States are not required 
to have these programs; nevertheless, there is growing evidence to suggest that state interest in this policy realm is 
on the rise. 
5 This classification is the result of a careful study of the range of state programs designed to complement the federal 
SBIR program. The data collection methods are recorded in the Appendix A to encourage replication, and 
information on SBIR Outreach and SBIR Match programs are detailed for transparency. Despite the growing 
importance of state innovation policy and R&D funding, there is surprisingly little reliable, centralized 
documentation of these policies. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present the list of state policy responses; detailed information on 
these programs is available upon request from the authors. 
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 The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents a theoretical framework for multilevel 
innovation policy responses within a federalist system and develops the concept of policy enhancement – 
state government innovation policy responses that either complement or augment federal policy. Section 
three illustrates the concept of policy enhancement with a discussion of two broad types of state SBIR 
programs that have been implemented in response to the federal SBIR program. Section four presents the 
methods and empirical results of models that estimate multilevel factors associated with implementing 
and maintaining an SMP-I program. Section five discusses the empirical results, and section six offers 
concluding comments and directions for future research.  
2.2 Theoretical Framework: Multilevel Innovation Policy Mix  
Drawing from economic policy debates, Flanagan et al. (2011) place attention on the policy mix, 
highlighting the activity between different governance levels. Importantly, this offers a clearer framework 
not only for understanding the public sector’s complex and myriad roles but also for discerning how 
public policy goals are realized (Flanagan et al., 2011: 702). Multiple levels of governments have vested 
interests in innovation policy to strengthen the competitiveness of the economy (or selected sectors of an 
economy) and to increase societal welfare (Kuhlmann, 2001: 954).6 Considerable attention has focused on 
the evolution of objectives and the variety of instruments used in national, centralized innovation policy 
(Dosi & Nelson, 2010; Mytelka & Smith, 2003). However, the spatial concentration of the benefits of 
innovative activity offers strong incentives for decentralized innovation policies (Jenkins et al., 2008). 
Importantly, policies interact at the regional level; and outcomes are commonly felt in local jurisdictions 
(Uyarra & Flanagan, 2010). Nevertheless, less is known about motivations for the adoption of innovation 
policies between different jurisdictions or governance levels that comprise a policy mix.  
Policy implemented at one level of government may induce a response from other levels of 
government. While the literature has considered national systems of innovation (Nelson, Mowery, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Paraskevopoulou (2012: 1058) provide an overview and review of the intellectual development of the concept of 
innovation policy. 
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Fagerberg, 2006) and regional or subnational systems of innovation (Asheim & Cooke, 1999), Uyarra and 
Flanagan (2010: 683) find a tendency to overestimate the homogeneity among different levels and argue 
the need to compare roles. The national system, or centralized level, is the highest level of jurisdiction 
with the greatest command of resources and ability to direct broad agendas. Subnational, or decentralized, 
levels comprise smaller geographic jurisdictions and are in touch with local conditions, yet they have 
fewer resources. The shared imperative of bolstering economic activity among these innovation-based 
policies ties these multiple systems together into a policy mix. Where they vary are in terms of their 
capacity and approach; nevertheless, they share a common directive. Depending on the circumstances and 
context, actions from one level may solicit positive or null responses from other levels. Taken together 
these interactions form the policy mix. As Brickman (1979) notes this policy coordination is varied, 
ranging from centralized, top-down or vertical to bottom-up or horizontal.  
We conceptualize this phenomenon broadly within a federalist framework by considering policy 
actions in subsequent stages: initiated by a jurisdiction at one level and followed by a response from 
another jurisdiction at another level or at the same level of government. Within a multilevel governance 
structure, initiation can originate either from centralized or decentralized levels to then yield a positive or 
null policy response. A simple 2 X 2 matrix presents four archetypes: policy enhancement, 
experimentation, acquiescence and local exceptionalism (see Figure 2.1). Policy enhancement occurs 
when innovation policy is initiated at the centralized level and yields a positive policy response; 
experimentation occurs when the innovation policy is initiated at the decentralized level and yields a 
positive policy response; acquiescence occurs when the innovation policy is initiated at the centralized 
level yet yields a null policy response; and local exceptionalism occurs when the innovative policy is 
initiated at the decentralized level yet yields a null policy response. Each of these is discussed in turn, 
beginning with the latter two archetypes – acquiescence and local exceptionalism – followed by 
experimentation and policy enhancement. We place emphasis on policy enhancement, which considers 
potential complementarity in multilevel systems.  
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In some cases innovation policy is more efficiently offered at the federal level for the U.S. or the 
Union level for the E.U. For example, intellectual property (IP) protection is clearly reserved for the 
federal government by the U.S. constitution. Decentralized jurisdictions have little incentive to set their 
own standards for IP or incur the expense of setting up a patent examiner system. Indeed, the movement 
has been towards uniformity with patent treaties and the establishment of the European Patent Office and 
the World Intellectual Property Organization. In addition, E.U. innovation policy initiatives are officially 
restricted to benefitting the European economy as a whole, an objective that, on theoretical grounds, is 
most efficiently pursued at the Union level (Kuhlmann, 2001: 963).7 Decentralized policy units, such as 
states, have little incentive to respond and implement innovation policies with aspatial objectives and that 
would benefit from economies of scale, potentially increase transaction costs and subsequently decrease 
innovation.    
In other cases, innovation policies that are designed at the decentralized level and respond to local 
context are examples of local exceptionalism. These include programs with tailored objectives. 
Expanding from Tiebout’s (1956) discussion of “feet voting,” state policymakers have the discretion to 
allocate public goods such that they more closely reflect the preferences of their constituent population. 
While this is an efficient approach to address concerns with the local context, these narrow programs 
yield null responses given that they are at cross-purposes with other jurisdictions. Gray et al.’s (2010) and 
Lowery et al.’s (2011) examinations of state-level initiatives provide an illustrative example where 
decentralized policies fail to elicit a response from the federal level.  
The third archetype – experimentation – involves multilevel innovation policies that percolate 
from the bottom up and are designed to respond to more local conditions. This is the classic “laboratories 
of democracy” argument as first articulated by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in New State 
Ice Company v. Liebmann (1932) to describe how a “state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 We would like to highlight that the discussion on European Added Value is still in debate and therefore 
inconclusive. This pertains particularly to discussions surrounding the European Commission and the level of 
efficiency in overseeing administrative support for SMES. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for raising this 
issue.  
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laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” 
Essentially, the U.S.’s federalist structure naturally encourages experimentation in policymaking. This has 
been explored in a number of studies including Volden’s (2006) assessment of the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program, which argues that decentralized policymaking generates the adoption of more 
effective policies. Of course, state policies that are perceived as successful or as offering some advantage 
will diffuse widely and may be further adapted. In an earlier study, Glick and Hays (1991) find evidence 
of a non-uniform diffusion process as state living will laws are amended and refined as opposed to being 
directly emulated. The manner of the policy response may vary – from direct emulation to refinement – 
and the motivation may stem from competition, policy learning or socialization (Gray, 1994; Glick & 
Hays, 1991). As the literature on state policy diffusion and adoption suggests, both of these will vary by 
context and circumstance (e.g. Graham et al. 2008; Berry & Berry, 2007). Whitford and Schrank (2011: 
274) point out that experimentation by U.S. states can, if successful, not only diffuse to other state 
governments but also trickle up to the federal level.  
The fourth archetype – policy enhancement – comprises nested innovation policies where 
multiple levels of government implement reinforcing policies. This occurs when a policy activity at the 
centralized level yields a positive policy response from the decentralized level. The inherent nature of 
innovation demands substantial investment, placing centralized governments in a critical position to 
afford and therefore initiate policy responses (Elder & Georghiou, 2007). Considering this within the 
context of the U.S., federal R&D programs in contrast to state investments are larger in scale8 and aim to 
competitively fund R&D projects based on merit regardless of the location of the recipient. State 
innovation policies, in contrast, are smaller in size and target activity within their own political 
boundaries. State response to these federal actions can be viewed as an effort to garner a larger share of 
the federal funds and capture the resulting benefits. The role of state jurisdictions in innovation policy, 
nonetheless, is a question of the degree of involvement and mode of interaction (Fritsch & Stephan, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Sources: http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf13336/ and http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf14300/  
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2005). These policies might be as simple as complementing the initial program by providing information 
to applicants to encourage more participation and to produce proposals that conform to the expectations 
of the federal program. A more aggressive policy response would be programs designed to augment the 
federal program; these may provide a financial incentive that rewards successful applicants with 
additional funding. A state’s response is likely predicated on the nature of the national program and on the 
prevailing state context.  
 In sum, too often attention on public R&D conflates public investment as a single source when in 
fact public support comprises a multilevel policy mix. Policies are evaluated in isolation rather than 
considering the interplay and interdependencies between multiple policies enacted at different levels of 
government (Uyarra and Flanagan, 2010). The fourth archetype, policy enhancement, is the most 
prominent archetype for U.S. innovation-based policies given that the federal government has historically 
led in R&D efforts. While much of the literature is theoretical or uses illustrative case studies, the next 
section illustrates this archetype in greater detail with an empirical example: the federal SBIR program 
and supplemental state SBIR Outreach and SBIR Match programs.  
2.3 Case Study: U.S. Small Business Innovation Research Programs 
The U.S. portfolio of SBIR programs offers an example of a multilevel innovation policy mix in 
which states have reacted to the federal SBIR program by establishing a range of supplemental SBIR-
related programs. Created through the Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982, the federal 
legislation currently requires federal mission agencies with annual extramural R&D budgets in excess of 
$100 million to set aside 2.5 percent of their funds to provide financial resources for small businesses 
engaged in early-stage R&D activity.9 Competitive funding is available through two phases10 – Phase I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 2.5% was the set aside rate when the 2011 reauthorization was initially passed, though the amount is set to increase 
between 0.1% - 0.2% annually up to 3.2% in 2017. Source: 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/08/06/2012-18119/small-business-innovation-research-program-
policy-directive 
10 The Federal SBIR Program also defines a Phase III; however, federal funds are not available. 
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(the proof-of-concept demonstration phase) and Phase II (the product development stage); only those 
businesses that have been awarded a Phase I are eligible to apply for a much larger Phase II award.11 
Applications are evaluated solely on their scientific, technical and commercial merit. As of 2013, over 
$30 billion has been obligated by these federal agencies to support the program, making this the largest 
U.S. public effort to support R&D activity for small businesses.12  
Numerous academic studies have examined the federal SBIR program (e.g. Keller & Block, 
2013; Link & Scott, 2012; Audretsch et al., 2002; Wallsten, 2000; Lerner, 1996, others). While the 
academic evidence is mixed, from a policy perspective the program is widely regarded as a success 
(Keller & Block, 2013; Wessner, 2008). The program has been reauthorized in 1992, 2000 and 2011. 
Domestically, 45 states have adopted programs designed to leverage the federal SBIR program, and 
internationally, seven countries13 have adopted comparable programs.  
The methodology used to gather information on these state SBIR-related programs broadly 
follows the approach used in Feldman et al.’s (2014) study of state-funded university research programs. 
Information on state SBIR-related programs was gathered from the State Science and Technology 
Institute’s (SSTI) online archive of press releases, state legislative statutes, state program materials from 
individual states’ websites and via correspondence with state and federal economic development officials. 
Appendix A provides more detail on the data collection efforts for the range of state SBIR-related 
programs.14 
The state SBIR-related programs that have been implemented since the 1982 passing of the 
federal SBIR program can be classified into two broad categories – SBIR Outreach and SBIR Match 
programs. Viewed as a dichotomy, these responses can be viewed as efforts either to complement or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Phase I and Phase II awards are approximately $150,000 and $1,000,000, respectively. 
12 Source: www.sbir.gov  
13 These include Sweden, Russia, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (Wessner, 2008). 
14 An abbreviated synthesis of this search on the programs is available upon request from the authors. 
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augment the federal program, respectively. We define the former set of programs as SBIR Outreach 
programs, which provide information about the federal SBIR program to potential applicants that lower 
the costs of applying for federal funding. We define the latter set as SBIR Match programs, which more 
aggressively offer cash incentives in the form of prizes to firms that have successfully been awarded 
funding by the federal program.   
Table 2.1 provides a comprehensive list of state SBIR-related programmatic activity that aim to 
promote R&D activity by complementing the federal SBIR program.15 The SBIR Outreach programs can 
be further divided into three types – Phase 0, Phase 00, and Support Services. These state programs aim at 
increasing awareness of the federal SBIR program and supporting firms with federal SBIR proposal 
submissions. The SBIR Match programs are more aggressive state policies that provide matching funds 
for successful SBIR recipients to support technical aspects of their projects. These programs can be 
further divided into three types – SBIR State Match Phase I (SMP-I), SBIR State Match Phase II (SMP-
II), and SBIR Limited Match (LM) programs.  
2.3.1 Complementary Policy Responses: State SBIR Outreach Programs 
 As of 2013, all but eight states16 have established some form of SBIR Outreach program. Table 
2.2 lists the states and their respective outreach programs. Reliable data on the year of adoption or the 
budget for these programs was difficult to find. The majority of the state statutes clarify that a portion of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 We would like to note that the range of U.S. complementary SBIR programs extends beyond the Federal SBIR 
program and state SBIR Outreach and Match programs. Notably, at the federal level, there are a number of 
additional programs designed to complement the SBIR program – Department of Energy’s Clean Energy Alliance 
Partnership and the Industry and Growth Forum, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Space 
Alliance Technology Outreach Program (SATOP), the National Institutes of Standards and Technology’s “Nanofab” 
Lab, and the National Institute of Health’s Niche Assessment Program. In addition, there are numerous non-profit, 
for-profit, and quasi-governmental programs that provide complementary support for SBIR firms (eg. SC Launch). 
Overviewing the comprehensive list of nested policies and programs related to the SBIR program falls outside the 
scope of this research project. We introduce the concept of multilevel complementary policy looking at the federal 
SBIR program and all state government programs related to the SBIR program, rather than the broader set of 
programs that also include the federal government and private sector. Exploring these additional venues is an option 
for future research. 
16 These states include: Colorado, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and 
Texas. 
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the initial funding for the programs came from the SBA’s Federal and State Technology Partnerships 
(FAST) and Rural Outreach Programs (ROP) initiatives. With the first FAST and ROP competitions 
taking place in 1999 and 2001, respectively, these federal programs were designed to address variance in 
distribution of small high-technology firms across U.S. states. Recipients of these competitions – 
primarily state agencies – are required to provide a supplemental match.17 As of 2013, there have been a 
total of six FAST and three ROP competitions.   
In many cases, with the top-down stimulus of initial federal funds state governments have 
established their own Phase 0, Phase 00, and Support Service programs to improve the applicant base for 
the federal SBIR program. Nineteen states have established Phase 0 and/or Phase 00 programs that 
provide direct or in-kind funding to defray the costs of proposal writing for Phase I and Phase II grants, 
respectively. Grants typically have ranged from $1,50018 to  $10,00019 with the average size ranging from 
$3,000 to $5,000. In-kind funds are commonly used to cover consultant fees associated with proposal 
preparations.  
In addition to Phase 0/00 programs, 31 states have established Support Services programs. These 
programs offer a range of services for firms interested in applying for the federal SBIR program. These 
services include proposal review, workshops, access to business expertise and one-on-one mentoring. 
With each of the 11 federal mission agencies administering the SBIR competition, these programs are 
designed to assist prospective applicants in matching their project’s concepts with agency solicitations. 
The features of these support services have greater variety across states than the Phase 0/00 programs.  
2.3.2 Policy Augmentation: State SBIR Match Programs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The size of the state match is contingent on the relative SBIR performance of the state. Leading states require a 
larger match than those that lag.  
18 South Dakota SBIR Center provides $1,500 support.  
19 PA’s Innovation Partnership and Tennessee Technology Development Corporation provide up to $10,000 for the 
Phase 00 program. 
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 The state SBIR Match programs constitute a second category of state policies designed to 
augment the federal SBIR program by offering a financial reward or prize to firms that received a federal 
SBIR award. As of 2013, 17 states have adopted at least one of three state Match programs – the SMP-I, 
SMP-II, and LM programs. Table 2.3 lists the states, programs, program attributes and years of 
programmatic activity. This set of state policies is designed for successful SBIR applicants to bridge the 
funding gap from Phase I to Phase II or from Phase II to commercialization.20 The SMP-I classifies the 
former and the SMP-II defines the latter. These matching programs differ from Phase 0/00 programs in 
that they only support successful federal SBIR recipients; in addition, the funds are notably larger than the 
proposal writing grants and are intended to aid technical aspects of the project. State governments are in 
essence relying on the federal SBIR program to identify firms with promising early-stage R&D projects. 
The size of the match varies by state with Michigan’s Emerging Technologies Fund offering a 25 percent 
match on Phase I awards and Kentucky’s SBIR/STTR Matching Funds program and New York’s 
NYSTAR program offering dollar for dollar matches. 
 The SMP-I programs provide additional early-stage capital to successful Phase I SBIR recipients 
as they work to demonstrate proof-of-concept. More than a simple investment in a promising firm, this 
match can be viewed as a state investment aimed at increasing the chances for the firm to secure the 
larger Phase II award and thereby direct additional federal R&D funds to the state. Moreover, with an 
average time lapse of 14 months for successful Phase II recipients,21 the state match serves as a bridge 
from Phase I to Phase II funding. All successful Phase I applicants qualify for this funding although the 
size and number of awards are subject to the availability of state funds. It is worth noting that Virginia’s 
SMP-I is unique in limiting the matching funds only to firms that secure SBIR funds through the 
Department of Health of Human Services (DHHS). The state matching funds, however, are not 
competitive and are thus classified as an SMP-I. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The Federal SBIR program defines this point of the project as Phase III. 
21 This was derived using data from the population of SBIR awards (1983-2010) listed in the SBA TechNet 
database.  
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 The federal SBIR program was designed with the expectation that successful Phase II recipients 
would be able to secure non-federal funding as they move toward product commercialization. To assist 
firms in this effort, the SMP-II provides matching funds to successful Phase II SBIR recipients. Following 
in line with the structure of the federal SBIR program, the size of SMP-II matches is larger than the SMP-
I matches, ranging as high as $500,000 for KY-based firms. Of the states with an SMP-I program, only 
four states have an SMP-II program as well. These are the Kansas Bioscience Authority (KBA), 
Kentucky’s SBIR/STTR Matching Funds program, Michigan’s Emerging Technology Fund, and the 
Oklahoma Center for the Advancement of Science and Technology (OCAST). Again, all successful Phase 
II applicants qualify for this funding although the size and number of awards are subject to the availability 
of state funds. 
 SBIR Limited Matching (LM) programs, in contrast with the other two types of non-competitive 
state matching programs, offer competitive funds to only a selection of SBIR recipients. Four states have 
been identified as having LM programs. Florida’s High Tech Corridor Council Matching Funds Research 
Program has teamed up with three universities22 offering a range of competitive awards with the 
additional requirement that the firm secure external matching.23 Massachusetts has two programs that 
offer matching funds specifically for SBIR recipients. MassVentures’ START program is a three-stage 
program offering competitive funds up to $800,000 for early-stage R&D activity for SBIR Phase II 
recipient firms. The Massachusetts Life Science Center provides competitive matches for Phase II 
recipients focusing on life science research. Indiana’s 21st Century Research and Technology Fund 
provided $4.1 million of competitive funds in 2008 for 12 successful Phase I SBIR recipient firms. Lastly, 
Maryland’s Biotech SBIR and STTR Bridge Grant Program provides ten matching grants annually of up 
to $100,000.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 University of Central Florida (UCF), University of South Florida (USF), and University of Florida (UF) 
23 Source: http://www.floridahightech.com/research.php  
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Although there is commonality in the types of programs across states, the information in Table 
2.1 highlights the range in the combination of state programs available to small firms engaged in early-
stage R&D activity. Fourteen states24 notably have offered both Outreach and Match programs. Kentucky 
stands out as having one of the more aggressive portfolios of state programs, offering up to a 100% match 
through its SMP-I and SMP-II programs in addition to the support services offered through the Kentucky 
S&E Foundation. These programs reveal a proactive approach to foster early-stage R&D activity in firms 
within the state and attract firms from outside the state.25 North Carolina stands out as another proactive 
state with a slightly different portfolio of programs. These include the One NC Small Business Program 
(SMP-I), the NC SBIR-STTR Incentive Program offering up to $3,000 for proposal preparations (Phase 
0), and the NC SBTDC (Support Services), which provides a range of support services for firms 
interested in applying for the federal SBIR funds. Although NC’s SMP-I ended in 2011, the state program 
was reinstated as of 2014. Virginia is another state offering a large range of SBIR-related programs 
including matching funds for successful DHHS SBIR recipients (SMP-I), training programs for 
prospective SBIR applicants (Support Services), and funding assistance for proposal development (Phase 
0/00). Of the states that offer a more limited range of programs, three states (Massachusetts, Maryland, 
and Michigan) have only Match programs while 28 states have only Outreach programs.  
2.4 Empirical Analysis: Multilevel Motivations of State Responses  
We motivate examination of multilevel policy responses given the nature of innovative activity 
and its appeal to multiple levels of government. Moreover, the state SBIR policy responses reviewed 
above serves as an illustrative example of the multilevel innovation policy mix. While useful, our 
understanding of the policy mix at this point remains cursory without a stronger understanding of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia.  
25 It is worth noting that many state officials from states other than KY were aware of KY’s SBIR programs. 
Unprompted, many state officials mentioned that they looked to KY’s portfolio as an exemplar for state SBIR 
programmatic activity.  
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motivating factors that drive policy responses. In this section we focus on the most aggressive match 
program and empirically examine a range of motivating factors associated with this policy response.  
While SBIR Outreach programs are more prevalent across state governments, they are more 
heterogeneous in terms of services offered to complement the federal SBIR program. The SBIR Match 
programs, however, represent more uniform and aggressive state policy responses designed to augment 
the federal program.26 Of the 17 states with some form of match, 14 share the most common program – 
the SMP-I program. Not only is this the most diffuse among the Match programs, it continues to gain 
traction as three additional states – Alabama, Nevada, and Rhode Island – have publicly expressed 
interest in adopting the SMP-I program in the near future.27  
2.4.1 Institutional Overview 
By reviewing press releases from SSTI and legislative statutes related to these SMP-I program 
adoptions and reauthorizations and through follow-up correspondences with each of the state agencies 
administering the program, we were able to gain a preliminary understanding of the conditions that 
motivate states to adopt and maintain this program. This preliminary understanding, coupled with a 
review of the broad literatures on state policy diffusion and science policy, inform the design of the 
empirical model. Below, we first overview the qualitative information we gathered on each SMP-I 
program and then couch this information within the broader theoretical literature.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 It is worth emphasizing data limitations and methodological hurdles limit the analysis to the SMP-I program 
rather than the wider array of state SBIR Match and Outreach programs. Not only does the SMP-I programs have 
the feature of sharing a consistent structure across all states allowing for between state comparisons, the qualitative 
differences across the SBIR Outreach and even Limited Matching programs make such comparisons a notable 
empirical challenge. For example, the state of Washington oversees an internship program that matches graduate 
students or postdocs with companies to assist in the proposal writing process, while Utah’s SBIR/STTR Assistance 
Center offers more basic logistical support in terms of helping firms identify the most appropriate federal agency 
solicitation and assisting with proposal submissions. Different states’ Outreach or Limited Match programs might be 
compared in terms of the size of the program budgets; however, this information is not easily accessible and this 
approach would overlook important qualitative differences in the structure of these programs.   
27 Alabama: Accelerate Alabama  (http://www.madeinalabama.com/assets/2013/03/AccelerateAlabamaPlan.pdf); 
Nevada: Governor’s Office of Economic Development (GOED) 
(http://www.diversifynevada.com/documents/state_plan/2012_NVGOED_StatePlan_Full.pdf); Rhode Island: Sen. 
James Sheehan expressed interest in 2012 (http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/News/pr1.asp?prid=8509) 
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Three states – New York, Hawaii, and Oklahoma – were the earliest adopters, implementing an 
SMP-I program within the first few years of the federal SBIR program tenure. When NY adopted its 
SMP-I program in 1984, which offered a one-to-one match, it was already among the leading states in 
R&D activity.28 However, the program was only maintained for seven years. HI and OK, by contrast, 
have historically been less competitive on a series of R&D measures and have thus been identified as 
Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR) states.29 Their early adoptions of 
SMP-I programs might be understood as proactive efforts to improve the lagging R&D performance in 
their states. In contrast to NY, both of these states’ programs have been maintained to the present.  
The remaining 11 states, however, all adopted after the 2000 federal SBIR reauthorization. 
Indiana’s 21st Century Research and Technology Fund adopted the program in 2003 reportedly as a 
response to the state’s declining per capita income.30 Kansas followed in 2004 with the Kansas Bioscience 
Authority overseeing the program to leverage the state’s R&D base and by ensuring it is “considered a 
national leader among investment professionals.”31 New Jersey’s SBIR Bridge Grant Program, adopted in 
2005, reportedly aimed to sustain the funding gap for early stage activity, which they note as often 
crippling small firms.32 Kentucky, initially adopting the program in 2006, has one of the most aggressive 
programs offering a 1:1 match.33 Not only are recipients required to spend the majority of the match funds 
within the state boundaries, the state program notes its explicit intention to attract firms from outside the 
state to relocate to KY to expand the state’s innovative sectors. North Carolina’s One NC Small Business 
Program and Illinois’ Department of Commerce and Economic Activity adopted in 2006 and 2007, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Research by Feldman et al. (2014) on state university R&D programs shows that the state has been active by 
promoting economic activity via S&T programs.  
29 EPSCoR is a federal program designation that gives preferential treatment for low R&D performing states. 
30 Source: http://www.elevate-ventures.com/programs/sbir-sttr 
31 Source: http://www.kansasbioauthority.org/working-with-kba/funding-programs/ 
32 Source: http://www.state.nj.us/scitech/entassist/sbir/ 
33 Source: http://ksef.kstc.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=113&Itemid=205 
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respectively, with the explicit intention of moving their state economies toward the top tier for industrial 
R&D activity.34 Michigan adopted in 2008 and established the Emerging Technologies Fund to award 
exceptional research within the state. In 2011 and 2012, Nebraska, Connecticut, Montana and Virginia all 
adopted noting similar motivations.  
This institutional overview suggests that states have an implicit awareness of the spatially 
proximate benefits of innovative activity. This complements the broader themes and research findings 
within the literature (Greenstone et al., 2010; Hall et al., 2000; Jaffe et al. 2000; Lerner, 1996). It appears 
as though state interest in the program is likely attributable to a number of factors stemming from 
multiple levels of influence from national and state level conditions. At first glance, the timing of 
adoptions of the SMP-I – notably the upsurge in initial adoptions after 2000 – suggests that the federal 
program expansion in 2000 may have served as a catalyst for state interest. Additionally, state 
benchmarking, in terms of their innovative and economic capacity, appears to motivate a response; this 
suggests that motivations are multilevel, stemming both internally within the state and across borders 
(horizontally and vertically).  
2.4.2 Multilevel Motivations  
The large policy diffusion literature (Boushey, 2010; Graham et al., 2008; Berry & berry, 1990, 
Gray, 1973; Walker, 1969; others) offers a useful theoretical framework for identifying the range of 
factors that may influence this state response. Berry and Berry’s (1990; 2007) seminal work on state 
lottery adoptions examines three broad groups of antecedent factors that influence state policy adoption – 
national interaction, regional diffusion, and internal determinants. This schematic is useful within the 
context of multilevel policy analysis by classifying antecedent variables across different levels of the 
federalist structure. This suggests that the structure of the policy mix itself shapes the process of the 
response. In addition, the broad literature on science policy and innovation (e.g. Stephan, 2012; Teich, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Sources: http://www.ssti.org/Digest/1999/032699.htm; http://www.ssti.org/Digest/2005/082905.htm 
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2009; Hecker, 2005; Ruegg & Feller, 2003; Cozzens 2003) provides further guidance for identifying 
relevant economic and R&D-related factors. Taken together, we extend this discussion and examine three 
sets of multilevel factors for the empirical model – top-down, lateral, and bottom-up.35 Within each set we 
consider a range of political, economic, and R&D-related factors that likely drive adoption. These factors 
are each discussed in turn. 
Top-down  
Since its inception, the federal SBIR program has undergone a series of reauthorizations that have 
expanded its scope and scale. We expect that states react to these federal policy actions and are more 
likely to adopt in the years immediately following one of the reauthorizations. Additionally, because the 
SMP-I program’s broad aim is to leverage federal R&D expenditures, the size of federal investments for 
applied R&D likely plays a role in state government decisions to have the SMP-I program. The practice 
of states looking to federal policy actions is certainly not unique to this portfolio of programs; 
Baumgartner and his colleagues (2009), for example, find in their review of energy-stabilizing programs 
that federal policy activity directly coerces and stimulates complementary state policy activity.  
Looking more closely at the structure of the federal SBIR program, the amount of funding 
available depends on the participating federal mission agencies’ research budgets, with the Department of 
Defense (DOD) accounting disproportionally for the largest share of SBIR activity (Wessner, 2008). 
There is great heterogeneity in the industrial structure of states, which determines their ability to benefit 
from the federal program and thus their incentive to implement complementary policies. We expect that 
states with more defense-related activity, as demonstrated by their capacity to secure federal DOD 
funding, are more likely to have the SMP-I policy.  
Turning to economic factors, a recent report issued by the Kauffman Foundation, “The State of 
Entrepreneurship: State and Local Governments Hold the Key to Accelerating Economic Growth in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 We thank the anonymous reviewers for helping to develop this section. 
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2012,” 36 emphasizes the links between innovation policy and economic activity, specifically technology-
based, skilled, high-wage employment. Nebraska Governor Dave Heineman’s 2011-12 National 
Governor’s Association Initiative, “Growing State Economies,”37 asserts much of the same conclusion. 
Such centralized public reports and initiatives, coupled with the growing research linking the federal 
SBIR program with employment growth (Link & Scott, 2012), likely direct states’ attention to SBIR-
related programs as a means to bolster their economies.  
Lateral  
There is growing evidence to suggest that policymakers are constrained by limited resources 
(Karch, 2007) and bounded rationality (Simon, 1978). Research has found that in confronting such 
problems, state policymakers may emulate other state governments, notably those adjacent to them (Berry 
& Berry, 1990). Thus, we expect that states are more likely to adopt and maintain the program as the 
share of their neighbors with the program increases. 
Bottom-up  
Internal state conditions also likely influence state responses. Regarding political factors, there is 
a long standing political debate over the proper scope of public R&D support stemming back to Vannevar 
Bush’s (1945) influential article, “Science, the Endless Frontier.” We anticipate that democratic 
governors are more likely to support the SMP-I program. Besley and Case (1995) find that new program 
spending is higher under democratic governors, while republican governors are more likely to focus on 
tax cuts. More conservative politicians would likely withhold public support from R&D, arguing that 
government funds crowd-out private investment.  
The challenge in using this measure, however, lies in the fact that we are considering a policy 
over a 30-year period where the preferences and priorities of the democratic and republican political 
parties have fluctuated along the political spectrum. In an effort to address this shortcoming, we consider 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Source: http://www.kauffman.org/newsroom/the-state-of-entrepreneurship-state-and-local-governments-hold-the-
key-to-accelerating-economic-growth-in-2012.aspx 
37 Source: http://www.subnet.nga.org/ci/1112/ 
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an additional political variable that measures a state’s early interest in science policy. In the early 1960s, 
after the 1957 launch of Sputnik and the subsequent upsurge in federal investment in R&D, a cohort of 
states followed the federal government’s lead and established science policy advisory positions 
(Sapolsky, 1968).38 This early policy activity suggests that certain states may have more of a proclivity 
toward science policy than others.  
Turning to economic factors, implementing R&D and innovation-based programs not only entails 
a certain level of risk, but also requires slack resources to fund the SMP-I financial awards. Therefore, we 
anticipate that states with strong fiscal health are more likely to adopt and maintain this matching 
program. 
While states surely consider their industrial structure and may seek to build upon their industrial 
strengths, the recent growth of state science and innovation-based activity can also be viewed as an effort 
by states to address weaknesses in their relative R&D capacity and economic competitiveness. Taylor’s 
(2012) recent paper on the role of governors as economic problem solvers highlights that states turn to 
R&D investment to curtail their lagging economies. We therefore anticipate that states lagging in R&D 
performance are more likely to adopt this program as a bottom-up effort to boost their economies. Of 
course, disentangling the causal direction between R&D performance and having the SMP-I program is 
certainly problematic, as we expect states to consider their R&D capacity as they implement a policy 
directed to improve this very vector of performance measures. Nevertheless, we include these R&D 
variables to estimate the strength of the associations. 
2.4.3 Methods & Data  
 While much of the policy diffusion literature employs event history analyses (EHA) to examine 
the antecedent factors that may influence state policy adoptions, this paper takes a slightly different 
empirical approach. EHA is predominantly used to examine the risk of a discrete event with observations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 These states include: Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. 
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subject to only one transition; however, over the time frame for this analysis, we observe state adoptions, 
reauthorizations and terminations. Due to state budgetary limits, state policies are not ensured in 
perpetuity but rather are subject to a reauthorization process as frequently as on an annual basis. Initial 
policy adoption may demand greater political backing than its reauthorization does; nonetheless, the true 
tenure of a state program is rarely determined at the time of its adoption. EHA analysis only considers the 
factors leading up to the initial adoption and ignores the factors associated with the program’s 
continuation or termination. Thus, instead of conducting an EHA analysis, this study examines multilevel 
factors associated with adopting and maintaining an SMP-I program through OLS econometric methods.39  Pr  (𝑆𝑀𝑃  𝐼!") = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑇𝑜𝑝_𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛! + 𝛽!𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙!" +   𝛽!𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚_𝑢𝑝!"  +  𝜀!"       (2.1) 
Equation 2.1 is a state level fixed effects model estimating the relationship between three sets of 
factors and the dichotomous outcome variable SMP-Iit, where i denotes the state and t denotes the year. 
This analysis uses data from 1983 to 2010, a timeframe that was determined by the initial establishment 
of the federal SBIR program and the availability of data of the covariates; the four recent SMP-I 
adoptions since 2010, therefore, are not included. Table 2.4 details the list of the variables, their data 
sources and functional forms. We have classified each of the motivating factors as top-down, lateral, or 
bottom-up; however, we recognize that some measures may have implications across multiple levels. 
Each set of variables is discussed in turn. 
Three variables are included to assess top-down, nationally driven factors – Federal Applied 
R&Dt, Federal Reauthorization Windowt, and Industrial Specializationit.40 In lieu of using year fixed 
effects, which consume many degrees of freedom and pose a concern for state-level models, the former 
measure controls for annual macro-economic shocks that may be associated with state innovation policy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Although a series of estimation procedures are employed – including the use of state fixed effects – to discern the 
causal relationships between the state and national level factors that affect the policy adoption, the authors are 
hesitant to claim causality with this model. Given that this analysis considers the tenure of the SMP-I program – as 
opposed to the initial adoption – disentangling the direction of causality is problematic as the relationships, 
especially among the state-level covariates, are likely endogenous. 
40 In Eq. 2.1 we note that the variables vary only by year; however, this does not pertain to the Industrial 
Specializationit variable.  
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actions. This variable measures total federal obligations for applied R&D for industrial firms. Federal 
Reauthorization Windowt is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for the year of the federal SBIR program’s 
implementation and reauthorizations, as well as the two years following the federal policy actions. The 
program was initially implemented in 1982 and was reauthorized in 1992, 2000, and 2011. The most 
recent reauthorization in 2011 falls outside the timeframe for this analysis. Regarding the third variable, 
due to the greater level of DOD SBIR resources available, we include Industrial Specializationit41 as a 
measure of states’ industrial specialization in defense-related activity. Specifically, this measures federal 
DOD contract activity within the state.42 
We include one measure to directly assess lateral factors – Regional Diffusionit. Drawing from 
Berry and Berry’s (1990) work, we include a continuous variable measuring the relative proportion of 
contiguous states with the SMP-I program to assess state peer effects.  
A series of bottom-up, state level political, economic and R&D-related variables are included as 
well. Democratic Governorit is a dichotomous indicator of the governor’s political party – coded 1 in the 
years the state has a democratic governor. Recognizing the shortcomings of relying solely on the political 
partisanship of the governor,43 we interact this measure with the binary variable Early Science Advisori in 
case state political factors are driven by early-demonstrated political interest in science policy (Sapolsky, 
1968). The baseline value is time-invariant and therefore is not reported in the state fixed effect model.  
 Turning to economic factors, we include State Revenueit to measure the health of the state’s 
budget.44 As noted in Table 2.4, all expenditure values in the model are adjusted for inflation and are 
presented in logged form. This variable enables us to assess how the amount of slack funds available to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 We considered including data for DHHS since this federal mission agency also accounts for a disproportionately 
large amount of SBIR funds; however, data on contracts and grants is only available after 2000, thus significantly 
limiting the timeframe for the analysis.  
42 This is an example of a variable that has implications with top-down and bottom-up conditions. We thank our 
anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this cross over. 
43 We thank our anonymous referees for drawing our attention to this limitation. 
44 We adjust the level of State Revenue for inflation using the July 2013 GDP Implicit Price Deflators – base year 
2005. We include the log form of the expenditure in the empirical model. 
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the state government relative to that state’s mean relates to the state policy adoption and maintenance. 
Additionally, we include a series of economic measures related to the state’s R&D capacity – High Tech 
Employmentit and Higher Education Capacityit. The former measures the high tech employment capacity 
for a state. This is derived from employment data that is stratified by industry, and it relies on the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics’ definition of high-tech industries (Hecker, 2005). Given that states likely benchmark 
their performance to that of other states, we use the quartile rankings of the location quotient functional 
form to measure the relative high tech employment capacity of states.45 With states positioned in a zero-
sum situation competing for limited federal funds, there is evidence to show that they pay greater 
attention to their relative standing rather than to their absolute performance (Feldman & Lanahan, 2013). 
The nature of this variable’s functional form allows us to assess lateral effects as well. 
While High Tech Employmentit can be understood as a “downstream” R&D measure, we also 
include Higher Education Capacityit as a measure of states’ R&D “upstream” capacity. Although the 
SBIR program is designed to support early-stage innovative activity among small firms, it is likely that 
many firms originate to some extent as spinouts from university research activity. Drawing upon data on 
state higher education research activity, we include two variables that assess the state’s research strength 
in DHHS-related (specifically, the National Institute of Health (NIH)) and DOD-related fields.  
We additionally considered including a measure of the state’s SBIR capacity defined as the rate 
of Phase I recipients that end up securing Phase II federal funding. As with the High Tech Employment 
indicator, states may likely benchmark their SBIR performance to other states’ given that they are 
competing for funds from the same program. However, complete SBIR funding activity was only recently 
made publicly available in 2011 through the SBA’s central, user-friendly database. Prior to that time, 
award data was decentralized, unstandardized, and difficult to access making it difficult for state 
policymakers to assess their own state’s success or peer states’ success in securing federal SBIR funding. 
For this reason, we determined that such a measure was not needed in this model. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The U.S average serves as the referent base in the location quotient, and the fourth quartile ranking of the location 
quotients, the leading cohort of states, serves as the referent category. 
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Advocacy coalitions may significantly impact state policy activity; thus in earlier iterations of this 
research we included a series of dummies to control for years when the National Governors Association 
focused on innovation and the economy. However, the results were not robust, suggesting that this may 
be an insufficient measure. Additionally, we hoped to include variables measuring state-level private 
investments in private firms – notably seed, angel, and venture capital funding – and state government 
investments in private firms. Unfortunately, accurate state-level data on all these measures are not 
accessible for our timeframe of interest. We attempt to address these empirical challenges by including 
state fixed effects, 𝛼!, to control for state specific time-invariant factors. This approach is helpful for 
controlling for state and private investment trends, which are likely time-invariant, though we realize that 
we are unable to control for factors related to advocacy activity, which likely has greater variation.  
Equation 2.1 was estimated using a Linear Probability Model (LPM) with state fixed effects, 
pooled probit with year and state dummies, and pooled cross-sectional LPM.46 In addition, a series of 
specification strategies were employed to assess the potential influence of outliers and the functional 
forms of the state-level covariates. The results were generally robust across all specifications. This paper 
presents the results for the LPM state fixed effect model due to the ease of interpretation it allows 
regarding the marginal effects and the more conservative nature of its estimates since it controls for state 
time-invariant unobserved factors.47 
2.4.4 Results 
Table 2.5 reports the descriptive statistics of the set of multilevel variables in Equation 2.1; again, 
all expenditures are adjusted for inflation and are presented in logged form. Table 2.6 presents the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Both the pooled probit and LPM models were run with state clustered standard errors. We compared the direction 
and level of significance of the odds ratio, in addition to the average marginal effects from the probit models to the 
LPM fixed effects models. The LPM fixed effects models offered more conservative estimates. 
47 Out-of-range predications ranged from 27% to 36% depending on the model. This paper, however, is retrospective 
in nature and not concerned with predictions.  
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correlation matrix for the variables in the empirical model.48 Table 2.7 presents the coefficients from the 
LPM state fixed effects regression with each successive model including an additional set of multilevel 
covariates, respectively. To elaborate, Model 1 reports the baseline model with the top-down variables; 
Model 2 adds the lateral regional diffusion variable; and Model 3 presents the full set of variables and 
includes the series of bottom-up variables that include political, economic, and R&D-related measures.49 
Model 3 includes the quartile rankings of the location quotient functional form for High Tech 
Employment. The fourth quartile – the cohort with the leading rankings for high tech employment – 
serves as the referent category.  
 The variable Federal Applied R&D was included in all the models in lieu of year fixed effects 
and controls for federal R&D investments in industrial applied research. The association is positive and 
statistically significant for Models 1 and 2; however, it is no longer significant once the bottom-up, state 
variables were added. The coefficients for Federal Reauthorization Window, which denote the years of 
federal SBIR legislative activity as well as the two years following each reauthorization year, are 
negative, yet only statistically significant in the baseline model. Among the top-down variables, 
Industrial Specialization is positive and the only measure that is robustly statistically significant across all 
models. As for the lateral measure, Regional Diffusion, the coefficient is positive and robustly significant. 
The coefficient from the full model indicates that the marginal increase in the proportion of contiguous 
states with the SMP-I increases the probability of the state having the program by 0.122, ceteris paribus. 
Turning to the set of bottom-up, internal state controls, the coefficient for Democratic Governor 
is positive, yet not statistically significant. The size of the differential effect, however, increases among 
those states with an early science policy advisor and is positive and jointly significant when the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 We determined that multicollinearity is not an issue for this model (Wooldridge, 2006). The VIF test was run after 
every model and did not exceed 2.6. 
49 Out-of-range predications were 28.4% for Model 1; 27.3% for Model 2; and 36.2% for Model 3. 
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interaction term – Dem Gov * Early Sci Advisor – is added.50 In the full model, states with a Democratic 
Governor and with an early science policy advisor position have a 0.065 greater probability of having the 
SMP-I program than those without these characteristics.51 The baseline measure for Early Science 
Advisor was not reported since time invariant factors drop out in state-fixed effect models.52 As for the 
state economic and R&D-related factors, the coefficient on State Revenue is positive and statistically 
significant indicating that states with greater slack resources are more likely to have the program. Next, 
the quartile dummies for High Tech Employment are significant and positive for all three quartile 
rankings. This indicates that states that are not leading in terms of high tech employment are more likely 
to have an SMP-I program. The two variables measuring higher education capacity are not robust in the 
full model.     
The R2 for the three models varies from 0.057, 0.066 to 0.084, respectively. This points to the fact 
that we only account for a portion of the variation in this model. In other words, there are other factors 
that are also driving the variation in the State Match policy activity. We suspect that a large portion of the 
variation is attributed to idiosyncratic variation across the different state governments. This, of course, is 
something that we are unable to account for in this design. Nevertheless, in building the empirical model, 
we relied heavily on the literature to identify a comprehensive set of multilevel factors that lead states to 
adopt and maintain the State Match program.    
2.5 Discussion 
 The empirical component of this paper was an exploratory exercise to move the theoretical 
discussion of the policy mix forward and identify trends among a range of multilevel factors that drive 
policy augmentation responses. It estimates the relationship between a series of multilevel factors and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Joint significance was determined by running F tests for Democratic Governor and Dem Gov * Early Sci Advisor 
for each model. The joint significance tests for model 3 was as follows: F test = 5.35 (*** p < 0.01). 
51 𝛿𝑦 𝛿𝑥 = 0.014 + 1 ∗ 0.051 =   0.065, where Early Science Advisor = 1. 
52 Additional specification tests were run with a pooled OLS model to include the baseline measure, and as expected 
the direction and significance were positive and robust. 
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response of states’ adoption and maintenance of an SMP-I program – the most widely diffuse and 
traceable state SBIR Match program.  
 Among the top-down measures, the results from the Industrial Specialization variable suggest 
that states do consider their industrial structure in relation to the structure of the federal program when 
deciding whether or not to adopt or maintain the program.53 Having the SMP-I program can be viewed as 
a state’s effort to build upon its pre-existing industrial and innovative capacity that augments the existing 
program. While the other two top-down measures are not robust in the full model, the direction of the 
negative coefficients for the variable Fed Reauthorization Window are surprising. One would expect state 
policy actions to sequentially follow the federal actions given that the program is intentionally designed to 
complement the federal SBIR program. Yet the results are suggestive of the opposite – federal SBIR 
legislative activity is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of having an SMP-I Match program.54 It 
is worth noting that we only included the year of federal legislative activity and the two years following in 
our Fed Reauthorization Window variable. Perhaps any federal influence on state policymaking activity 
takes place over a longer timeframe.55 It is important to note that the upper time limit for this analysis is 
2010 (due to data limitations), so the most recent state adoptions are not included. The most recent federal 
reauthorization in 2011, which was finally passed after fourteen short-term continuing resolutions that 
took place over a three-year period, resulted in a six-year extension and expansion of the current program. 
Seemingly in response to this, four states then adopted the program thereafter and three others publicly 
expressed interest in adopting. The sign for this coefficient may change with updated data that includes 
these years. 
 As for a lateral effect, the results from Regional Diffusion indicate that neighboring peer effects 
do exert pressure on states to consider adopting or maintaining the policy. Contrasting these results with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for encouraging us to consider this measure as a top-down measure.  
54 Yet again, we recognize that these effects are not robust; and therefore, interpret with caution. 
55 This trend stands in contrast to that of the SBIR Outreach programs, many of which were initiated with partial 
federal funding.  
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those of the politically-driven top-down variable – Fed Reauthorization Window – we are led to conclude 
that external governmental pressures stem more from neighboring state actions than from federal 
policymaking. That is to say that lateral politics appear to outweigh top-down federal actions. This stands 
in contrast to what we might expect given the federal government’s prominent role in science policy and 
R&D spending (e.g. Teich, 2009). Placing this discussion within the framework of the 2 X 2 matrix 
discussed above, this suggests that the policy response is not only an example of enhancement – a state 
response to national policy activity – but also experimentation – a state response to another state policy 
activity. 
Turning to bottom-up factors, the differential effect on the interaction term notably increases for 
those states that have a Democratic Governor and that demonstrated early interests in science policy by 
establishing a science policy advisor position in the 1960s. It appears that certain states with this 
demonstrated interest have a greater proclivity toward science policy and innovation programs. Results 
from the State Revenue measure show that state governments tend to have the program in years when 
their revenue is up.56 This makes sense insofar as the SMP-I program, in contrast to the SBIR Outreach 
programs, requires a greater level of investment.  
Results from the High Tech Employment quartile dummies indicate that states with lagging high 
tech employment have a greater chance of having a match program. While we classify this as a bottom-up 
measure, the nature of the functional form has implications for lateral effects as well. This points to the 
SMP-I as a proactive, “catch up” effort by state policymakers. Indeed, looking more closely at the size of 
the coefficients for this series of variables, the likelihood of having the SMP-I is strongest for states in the 
lowest quartile. Placing this result next to the results from the Industrial Specialization variable, 
nevertheless, suggest that having the SMP-I program cannot be viewed entirely as a catch up effort; it 
must also be seen as a state’s effort to build upon its pre-existing industrial and innovative capacity. High 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 The expenditures have been adjusted for inflation allowing for comparisons over this time frame. By including 
state fixed effects, the positive coefficients indicate that states are more likely to have the SMP-I program in the 
years when their state revenue exceeds that state’s mean.  
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Tech Employment assesses more downstream R&D activity, while Industrial Specialization is a more 
upstream measure. Taken together, the results for these measures suggest that states are more likely to 
rely on the strength of their R&D capacity – as measured by their ability to secure DOD R&D funds – 
while lagging performance along a more downstream measure appears to incentivize state policy action.  
2.6 Conclusions 
This paper examines multilevel innovation policy responses within a dynamic context, 
highlighting the interdependencies between different jurisdictions. By considering the level of 
government where policy originates and then the subsequent response by other levels of government, we 
bring greater focus to the policy mix. We highlight four archetypes of multilevel policy responses that are 
salient for the U.S. context. Most salient for our purposes is the concept of policy enhancement – state 
government innovation policy responses that either complement or augment federal policy. We provide a 
detailed examination of state programs that are designed to enhance the federal SBIR program and find 
evidence of these two broad types of state SBIR programs that have been implemented in response to the 
federal SBIR program. The results from our empirical analysis indicate that state policy implementation is 
associated with a confluence of multilevel factors driven not only by top-down federal actions, but also 
from bottom-up, internal state political and economic factors as well as from lateral pressures from peer 
states. 
The contributions of this paper are twofold.  First, we provide a theoretical framework that 
considers multilevel innovation policy responses broadly. Our specific context is calibrated to federalist 
systems like the U.S., Germany and Australia, among others. As we find that context matters in making 
policy endogenous, we hope that others will build upon our work and add other dimension to 
considerations of multilevel innovation policy mixes. Our second contribution is to provide an empirical 
analysis of the multilevel conditions that motivate state policy responses. We employ a large-scale 
assessment of a multilevel innovation mix by focusing on state responses designed to enhance the U.S. 
federal SBIR program. The results from the empirical analysis complement the qualitative information 
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gathered on state SBIR responses and point to a confluence of multilevel factors – top-down, lateral, and 
bottom-up – that are associated with the state policy adoption and maintenance. In other words, we find 
an assemblage of multilevel motivating factors associated with the subsequent state response. Most 
pointedly the results indicate the endogeneity of policy activity at the regional or subnational level.   
Up until now, the majority of research on innovation policy activity has focused on national or 
subnational policies, respectively, without taking into consideration how they overlap and interact. 
Building upon discussions initiated by Uyarra (2010) and Flanagan et al. (2011), “public policies, just like 
innovations […] are adopted not on a tabula rasa but in a context of pre-existing policy mixes and 
institutional frameworks which have been shaped through successive policy changes” (Flanagan et al., 
2011: 708). The analysis adds to these discussions and draws attention to innovation policy agendas that 
comprise multiple levels of activity. By examining the motivating factors associated with state policy 
responses, the analysis demonstrates that policy responses are shaped by the nature of the multilevel mix 
itself. In short, public policy is dynamic and contextual. Attention on innovation policy actions conflates 
public investment as a single source when in fact public support comprises a multilevel policy mix. It is 
important to bring focus to this and consider how multiple levels of government interact.  
Additional work on this topic certainly remains and we hope our efforts encourage others to 
investigate this topic. However, certain obstacles stand in the way. For one, the lack of data on policy 
actions – at either centralized or decentralized levels – makes data collection for the complete set of 
participating jurisdictions cumbersome. Moreover, this study has focused on policy activity within the 
U.S. and has not considered multilevel policy mixes in other regional, national and international contexts. 
Future empirical research could examine how the policy mix varies across different political systems and 
policy agendas. Once the requisite data has been gathered and studies have been conducted on the factors 
associated with adopting and maintaining these policies, the next step is to consider the efficacy and 
implications of the broader mix.  
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Figure 2.1 Multilevel Innovation Policy Responses – 2 x 2 Matrix
 
Note: Authors’ own illustration.
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Table 2.1 State SBIR-related programmatic activity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57At the time of writing this paper, an SBIR-SMP had been written into the Accelerate Alabama economic 
development plan. As of June 2013, the program is under review.  
(http://www.madeinalabama.com/assets/2013/03/AccelerateAlabamaPlan.pdf) 
State 
SBIR Match Programs SBIR Outreach Program 
SMP-I SMP-II 
Limited 
Match Phase 0 Phase 00 
Support 
Services 
Alabama57       1 
Alaska    1 1  
Arizona      1 
Arkansas      1 
California      1 
Colorado       
Connecticut 1     1 
Delaware      1 
Florida   1 1   
Georgia      1 
Hawaii 1     1 
Idaho      1 
Illinois 1     1 
Indiana 1  1   1 
Iowa      1 
Kansas 1 1    1 
Kentucky 1 1    1 
Louisiana    1   
Maine    1   
Maryland   1    
Massachusetts   1    
Michigan 1 1     
Minnesota      1 
Mississippi     1  1 
Missouri    1   
Montana 1   1   
Nebraska 1   1   
Nevada       
New Hampshire      1 
New Jersey 1     1 
New Mexico        
New York 1     1 
North Carolina 1   1  1 
North Dakota    1  1 
Ohio      1 
Oklahoma 1 1    1 
Oregon    1  1 
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58 Although the state does not have a state SBIR-related program, the Emerging technology (ETF) is a quasi-public 
program designed to provide matching funds for TX firms.  
Pennsylvania    1 1 1 
Rhode Island       
South Carolina    1   
South Dakota    1  1 
Tennessee    1 1  
Texas58       
Utah      1 
Vermont    1   
Virginia 1   1 1 1 
Washington      1 
West Virginia    1  1 
Wisconsin      1 
Wyoming    1   
Total 14 4 4 19 4 31 
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Table 2.2 List of State SBIR Outreach programs 
 
 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Transferred from the Minnesota Project Innovation. 
60 NH Inspires Innovation is a collaboration between the NH Innovation Research Center and the NH Small 
Business Development Center.  
State SBIR Outreach Programs 
Alabama Alabama Small Business Development Center 
Alaska TREND in partnership with EPSCoR 
Arizona Arizona Innovation 
Arkansas AR Risk Capital Matching Fund; AR S&T Authority 
California California SBIR/STTR 
Connecticut CT Innovations 
Delaware DE Small Business Technology Development Center (SBTDC) 
Florida Enterprise Florida – State University Research Commercialization Assistance Grant Program 
Georgia SBIR Assistance Program 
Hawaii High Technology Development Corporation 
Idaho Idaho Department of Commerce (with partners) 
Illinois Innovation Challenge Technical Assistance Grants 
Indiana Indiana Economic Development Corporation (IEDC) & 21stFund 
Iowa Office of Intellectual Property and Technology Transfer 
Kansas KS Bioscience Authority 
Kentucky KY S&E Foundation 
Louisiana LA SBIR/STTR Phase Zero Part I Program 
Maine ME Technology Institute’s SBIR/STTR Phase 0 Grants 
Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development59  
Mississippi  MS-FAST Program 
Missouri MO Technology Incentive Program (MoTIP) 
Montana Montana SBIR Program 
Nebraska Nebraska Department of Economic Development 
New Hampshire New Hampshire Inspires Innovation60  
New Jersey NJ Small Business Development Center (SBDC) 
New York Division of Science, Technology and Innovation (NYSTAR) 
North Carolina SBIR-STTR Incentive Program; NC Small Business Technology Development Center 
(SBTDC) 
North Dakota Center for Innovation 
Ohio Team SBIR 
Oklahoma OK Center for the Advancement of Science and Technology (OCAST) 
Oregon SBIR/STTR Phase 0 Matching Grant Program; Portland State Business Accelerator 
Pennsylvania Innovation Partnerships (IPart) 
South Carolina SC Phase 0 Program 
South Dakota SD SBIR Center 
Tennessee TN Technology Development Corporation (TTDC) Phase 0/00 Program 
Utah SBIR/STTR Assistance Center (SSAC) 
Vermont SBIR Phase 0 Program 
Virginia Center for Innovative Technology 
Washington Innovate Washington & WA Biotechnology Biomedical Association (WBBA) 
West Virginia WV Small Business Development Center (WVSBDC) Research and Commercialization 
Assistance Program 
Wisconsin Technology Matching Grant Program & WI Entrepreneurs’ Network (WEN) 
Wyoming WY SBIR/STTR Initiative (WSSI) 
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Table 2.3 State SBIR Match programs (listed in order of initial adoption) 
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Table 2.4 Indicators for Empirical Model 
Variable Metric Unit of Analysis Source 
State Match State  Matching  Program  –   Phase  I!" Binary Various state government 
agencies, SSTI61 
Multilevel Motivating Factors  
Top-down  
Federal Applied 
R&D62 
  Total  Federal  Industrial  R&D!! Continuous, logged 
(adjusted for inflation) 
NSF Survey of Federal 
Research Funds for R&D 
Federal 
Reauthorization 
Window63 
SBIR  !!!! Federal  Reauthorization  Window! Binary Derived 
Industrial 
Specialization 
DOD  Contracts!"! Continuous, logged 
(adjusted for inflation) 
Federal Procurement 
Data System 
Lateral  
Regional 
Diffusion 
Proportion of contiguous states with SMP-Iit Continuous (ratio) Derived from SMP-I 
policy variable 
Bottom-up    
Democratic 
Governor64 
Democratic Governorit Binary Book of States: Council 
of State Governments 
Early Science 
Advisor 
Early Science Advisori Binary Sapolsky, 1971 
State Revenue State  Revenue!"! Continuous, logged 
(adjusted for inflation) 
US Census State 
Government Finances 
High Tech 
Employment65 
 
High Tech Employmentit 
 
Quartile binary rankings 
of continuous LQ 
Derived from Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Higher Education 
Capacity66  
NIH  &  DOD  Federal  agency  obligations  for  R&D!"! Continuous, logged 
(adjusted for inflation) 
NSF Survey of Federal 
S&E 67 
Notes: i denotes state and t denotes year. † denotes that the variable has been adjusted for inflation using 
the July 2013 GDP Implicit Price Deflators – base year 2005; in addition, the data on expenditures in real 
(2005) dollars are presented in logged form. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 For a more detailed discussion of how this information was gathered, see Appendix A. 
62 This indicator reports the sum of Applied Research obligations for Industrial Firms (excluding FFRDCs) for the 
11 Federal mission agencies that participate in the SBIR/STTR Federal program.  
63 The window includes the year of the initial SBIR legislation and subsequent reauthorizations – 1982, 1992, and 
2000 – and the two years following the federal legislation. The most recent SBIR reauthorization (2011) was not 
included since it fell outside the timeframe for this analysis 
64 Nebraska was coded as missing for this indicator due to the unicameral structure of the state legislature. 
65 High Tech Employment was drawn from the list of high tech industries based on the BLS definition (Hecker, 
2005). Location Quotient = 
!!"!  !"#!  !"#$%&"!'(!" !"!#$  !"#$%&"!'(!"!"  !!"!  !"#!  !"#$%&"!'(! !"  !"!#$  !"#$%&"!'(! 
The empirical models report the quartile rankings of the High Tech Employment location quotient with Q4, the 
quartile of states each year with the highest location quotient, serving as the referent category. 
66 This indicator reports the sum of NIH and DOD federal agency obligations for R&D for higher education 
institutions, respectively.  
67 NSF Survey of Federal S&E Support to Universities, Colleges, and Nonprofit Institutions 
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Table 2.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
SMP-I 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Federal Applied R&D 22.03 0.18 21.71 22.33 
Federal Reauthorization Window 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Industrial Specialization (DOD 
contracts) 
20.98 1.58 16.47 24.73 
Regional Diffusion 0.05 0.11 0 0.75 
Democratic Governor 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Dem Gov * Early Sci Advisor 0.15 0.36 0 1 
State Revenue 16.46 0.98 14.26 19.45 
High Tech Employment (LQ) 0.88 0.24 0.27 1.87 
High Tech Employment (LQ, Q3) 0.26 0.44 0 1 
High Tech Employment (LQ, Q2) 0.24 0.43 0 1 
High Tech Employment (LQ, Q1) 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Higher Education Capacity (NIH) 17.91 1.85 11.61 21.66 
Higher Education Capacity (DOD) 16.32 1.72 10.50 19.97 
Notes: Unless other noted, the number of observations is 1400 (data on 50 states from 1983 – 2010). 
Nebraska was coded as missing for the Democratic Governor indicator due to the unicameral structure of 
the state legislature. Only 49 states are included; the total number of observations is 1372. Data on Higher 
Education Capacity is available for the 50 states from 1983 – 2009. Thus, the number of observations for 
these variables is 1350. Additionally, four states received no DOD Higher Education support over the 
time period. Given that the data is reported in logged form, these were coded as missing. The total 
number of observations for Higher Education Capacity (DOD) is 1346. 
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Table 2.6 Correlation matrix  
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Table 2.7 LPM State fixed effects model 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES SMP-I SMP-I SMP-I 
        
Top-down    
Federal Applied R&D 0.065** 0.060** -0.036 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.049) 
Federal Reauthorization Window -0.020* -0.015 -0.009 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Industrial Specialization (DOD 
contracts) 0.067*** 0.058*** 0.052*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
Lateral    
Regional Diffusion 
 
0.200*** 0.122** 
  
(0.054) (0.057) 
Bottom-up   
Democratic Governor 
  
0.014 
   
(0.012) 
Dem Gov * Early Sci Advisor 
  
0.051** 
   
(0.024) 
State Revenue 
  
0.055** 
   
(0.026) 
High Tech Employment (LQ, Q3) 
  
0.051** 
   
(0.021) 
High Tech Employment (LQ, Q2) 
  
0.053** 
   
(0.025) 
High Tech Employment (LQ, Q1) 
  
0.088*** 
   
(0.033) 
Higher Education Capacity (NIH) 
  
0.013 
   
(0.015) 
Higher Education Capacity (DOD) 
  
0.005 
   
(0.008) 
Constant -2.759*** -2.469*** -1.518* 
 
(0.566) (0.569) (0.835) 
    Observations 1,400 1,400 1,319 
R-squared 0.057 0.066 0.084 
Number of statecode 50 50 49 
State FE YES YES YES 
Notes: Data includes years from 1983 – 2010; complete case analysis is used. Coefficients are from a 
Linear Probability Model (LPM) state fixed effect model. Standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Model 1 offers a baseline that includes top-down variables. Model 2 adds the lateral 
regional diffusion variable. Model 3 presents the full model and includes the series of political, economic 
and R&D-related bottom-up variables. Note NE is removed from the model due to the unicameral 
legislature. The baseline value for Early Sci Advisor is not included given that it is time invariant. 
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CHAPTER 3: MULTILEVEL PUBLIC FUNDING FOR SMALL BUSINESS INNOVATION 
A REVIEW OF STATE SBIR PROGRAMS1 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The public sector has made significant investments in small business innovation, viewing small 
businesses as central engines of job creation, competitiveness and economic growth. The federal Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program stands as the largest U.S. public investment in small firm 
innovative activity, having awarded over 140,000 projects totaling over $30 billion as of 2012.2 This 
competitive federal program has received notable accolades, particularly in the policy community, in its 
ability to identify and fund small U.S. high tech firms with innovative and commercial potential (Keller & 
Block, 2013; Link & Scott, 2012; Wessner, 2008; Toole & Czarnitski, 2007; Audretsch, Link & Scott, 
2002; Tibbetts, 2001; Lerner, 1996 and others). Building off this perceived success, state governments 
have stepped in to assist small high tech firms as they compete for follow on federal funding. As of 2013, 
45 states have established programs specifically designed to enhance the federal SBIR program; these 
programs range from offering support services to providing matching funds that supplement federal SBIR 
funding (Lanahan & Feldman, 2014). Collectively, these public investments from the federal and state 
governments illustrate how R&D is becoming increasing complex and expansive, involving multiple 
sources of support and myriad actors (Bradley et al., 2013; Stephan, 2012).  
Most scholars and policymakers agree that the public sector has a central role in supporting early-
stage innovative activity by small firms given the tenuous nature of the venture capital cycle at this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 At the time this dissertation was submitted to the UNC Graduate School, a version of this chapter was accepted for 
publication at the Journal of Technology Transfer. 
 
2 Source: http://www.sbir.gov/past-awards; total derived. 
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preliminary, yet critical, stage of firm activity (Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Lerner, 1996). However, so 
much of scholars’ and the public’s attention has focused on federal R&D activity, overlooking the 
growing commitment of state governments. The prevalence of state SBIR-related programs designed to 
complement the federal SBIR program illustrates a broader shift in public support for innovation towards 
multilevel public funding (Lanahan & Feldman, 2014). States with these programs are proactively 
investing in firms to leverage federal funding and bolster innovative activity within their borders.  
This paper offers an empirical review of State Match Phase I (SMP-I) – state government 
programs specifically designed to complement the federal SBIR program by providing matching funds to 
successful SBIR Phase I recipients as they compete for Phase II funding. The primary aims of this paper 
are two-fold: (i) to articulate the motivations for multilevel public support for small business innovative 
activity, placing emphasis on state level programs directed towards early-stage high tech activity; and (ii) 
to empirically evaluate the effect of the State Match Phase I program on two outcomes – Phase II success 
rates and Phase I applications.  
The U.S. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) demands critical review and 
accountability for federal investment, yet there is no comparable oversight for state government 
investment. As Osborne (1988) cogently noted, “clearly, state governments view their spending on 
technology development as an investment, yet they rarely measure the return they got on that investment” 
(p. 58). Much of the literature on state government policy evaluations are limited to descriptive overviews 
and single-state case studies (Plosila, 2004; Combes & Todd, 1996; Berglund & Coburn, 1995); the 
broader implications and generalizations of these state actions, therefore, are limited.  
This paper employs a different approach by evaluating a comparable state program that has 
diffused across multiple states. Moreover, considered within the context of the federal SBIR program, the 
SMP-I program offers a unique opportunity to examine the marginal adjustments in public R&D more 
broadly. There remains an ongoing debate regarding the nature of R&D policy designs (e.g. Storey, 
1994). Some have even argued for randomly allocating R&D subsidies to better understand the public’s 
role and contributions (Mccan & Ortega-Argiles, 2013). Given that the state program offers non-
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competitive awards to the Phase I recipients, this presents an opportunity to examine variation in the level 
of R&D investments. This has implications for state R&D policy, but also for the design and 
administration of the federal program as well.  
The next section considers the motivations for multilevel public support for early-stage firm 
development, placing emphasis on the role of state governments. Section three overviews the state policy 
of interest – the State Match Phase I program – and places it within the context of the federal SBIR 
program. Section four presents the research design, methods, data and sample for the empirical analysis. 
Sections five and six present the results of the empirical analysis and a concluding discussion, 
respectively. 
3.2 Theoretical Framework: Multilevel public support for small business innovation 
 Scholars and policymakers have identified innovation as a critical source of economic 
development, growth and prosperity (Georghiou & Roessner, 2000; Solow, 1956). In contrast to 
Schumpeter’s large firm superiority hypothesis, there is growing evidence to suggest that small, newer 
ventures account for a disproportionate amount of innovative activity among firms (Lerner, 2009). 
Research has found that small firms are more willing to take on risk than larger, more established firms 
that tend to be constrained by inertia (Keller & Block, 2013; Almeida & Kogut, 1997; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984; Downs, 1967). Nevertheless, while small businesses are critical drivers of innovation, 
they are not sufficient. The nature of this activity demands considerable resources that span multiple 
sectors.   
The public sector plays an essential role in supporting early stage R&D. These investments are 
predicated on the assumption that the social returns have the potential to outweigh private returns given 
the positive spillover effects produced by innovative activity.3 At the same time, private investment has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 As Greenstone et al. (2010) highlight, these spillovers are likely to be local and include “cheaper and faster supply 
of intermediate goods and services, proximity to workers or consumers, better quality of worker-firm matches in 
thicker labor markets, lower risk of unemployment […] and knowledge spillovers” (p. 537). 
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been viewed to be insufficient given the inherent risks with early-stage innovative research.4 In short, 
resources are scarce, and organizations are moving away from vertical integration toward complex 
collaborations with public and private institutions (Arora et al., 2004). At a time when market 
fundamentalism has come to guide policy debates, the public sector has actually become more immersed 
in the economy through its technology policies. As Mazzucato (2013) emphasized, “most of the radical, 
revolutionary innovations that have fuelled the dynamics of capitalism […] trace the courageous, early 
capital intensive ‘entrepreneurial’ investments back to the State” (p. 3).5 
Attention on public investment in R&D, however, has largely focused on federal or centralized 
activity (e.g. Blume-Kohout, 2009; David et al., 2000; Ruegg et al., 2003; Payne, 2001). In the context of 
the U.S., the federal government has led in these efforts to extend the scientific frontier and bolster 
national competitiveness and societal welfare (Bush, 1945). While the substantial financial demands that 
are characteristic of innovative activity places federal agencies in a position to lead in these investments, 
state governments have increased their role as well to build capacity and enhance local economic 
conditions. The relative distribution of the public sources of R&D in fact is shifting. In recent years, 
federal R&D budgets have remained flat while state government investments have notably increased.6 
State governments have devoted considerable resources towards strategic economic development 
investments through S&T programs (Zhao & Ziedonis, 2012; Plosila, 2004) and university-based R&D 
programs (Feldman & Lanahan, 2014; Feldman et al., 2013). While globalization is shifting the 
comparative advantage of traditional inputs of production that include labor and capital, the input of 
knowledge and resulting agglomeration economies produced from innovative activity are spatially 
proximate (Audretsch & Feldman, 2004; Jaffe et al., 2000). This places state governments in a fortuitous 
position to invest in entrepreneurial programs and leverage the local economic capacity. In the Federalist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 More commonly, private investors tend to provide financial support later in the development cycle when the 
economic returns are more secure (Lerner, 2009). 
5 Mazzucato’s reference to the “State” refers broadly to the government, not to U.S. state governments.  
6 Sources: http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf14300/ and http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf14307/#tab1. 
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Papers, James Madison emphasized, “The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the 
objects which […] concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, 
improvement, and prosperity of the State” (2008; p. 1621-2). While the national debate sometimes gives 
the impression that economic development is the responsibility of the federal government, state 
governments have a crucial role to play. State government investment in early-stage firm activity is 
grounded in this argument given that it has direct implications on the development and prosperity of the 
state’s economy.  
Too often, attention on public R&D conflates the multiple levels of government and myriad 
policies; this overlooks the more complicated reality. As Flanagan et al. emphasize, “emergence of the 
‘policy mix’ concept into common use in the field of innovation policy studies provides us with a window 
of opportunity […] to better deal with a messy and complex, multi-level, multi-actor reality” (2011: p. 
702). To understand the role of public R&D, it is critical that we expand the lens of analysis to identify 
and clarify the broader policy context. While the mix of small business innovation policies vary in their 
capacity and approach, federal and state governments share a common imperative to bolster economic 
activity.  
Any examination of multiple sources of R&D support begs consideration of whether they are 
substitutive or complementary. Scholarship on this question, however, has predominately focused on the 
relationship between public and private support of R&D and provides convincing evidence that federal 
investment in R&D results in an increase in private support, suggesting a complementary or crowding-in 
effect (Blume-Kohout et al., 2009; David et al., 2000; Diamond, 1999; Payne, 2001). State programs 
designed to enhance a federal program, however, implies a complementary relationship between the two 
levels of funding. The question that remains to be answered, however, is how effective those state 
programs are in complementing the federal program’s goal of fostering innovation and, in the longer 
term, bolstering economic growth among small businesses.   
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3.3 Case study: State Match Phase I program 
 Before discussing the features of the SBIR state match programs, it is useful to briefly review the 
structure of the federal SBIR program. Established in 1982, the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
oversees an interagency consortium of 11 federal agencies7 that provide competitive extramural R&D 
funds8 for small businesses to demonstrate proof-of-concept (Phase I) to then move toward product 
development (Phase II) and ultimately commercialization (Phase III). Although the well-known federal 
program is structured into three phases, federal funding is only available for the first two. The size of the 
award notably increases from Phase I to Phase II. Under the most recent reauthorization, Phase I awards 
are roughly $150,000 while Phase II awards are close to $1,000,0000. Only firms that have successfully 
secured a Phase I award are eligible to apply for the larger Phase II award. Each participating mission 
agency is responsible for the administration and review of proposals; however, they share a central 
mission and evaluate applications on scientific, technical and commercial merit. While there remains 
debate among scholars regarding the efficacy of the SBIR program (e.g. Wallsten, 2000), it has received 
notable accolades, particularly in the policy community, in its ability to select and award small businesses 
with innovative potential. A recent review of the program conducted by the National Academies (2008) 
lauded the decentralized structure (i.e. administration by the 11 different agencies) and rigorous proposal 
review.  Moreover, Keller and Block (2013) attribute the program’s success to a series of positive 
interactions with external factors that include “shifts in the innovation strategies of large corporations, the 
growth of the venture capital industry, state and local development efforts, and new strategies by 
universities and federal laboratories to transform the US innovation system” (pg. 649).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  The 11 federal agencies that participate in the SBIR/STTR program include: Department of Agriculture, 
Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and National Institutes of Standards 
and Technology), Department of Defense, Department of Education, Department of Energy, Department of Health 
and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection 
Agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and National Science Foundation. 
8 The legislation currently requires federal agencies with annual extramural R&D budgets in excess of $100 million 
to set aside 2.5 percent of their funds for the program. 
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As of 2013, all but five states have established one or more formal programs to support small 
businesses as they compete for the federal SBIR program. Lanahan and Feldman (2014) have classified 
state SBIR-related policies into two broad groups – SBIR Outreach programs and SBIR Match programs.9 
Forty-two states have established outreach programs that offer a range of services for prospective 
applicants as they prepare to compete for Phase I or Phase II funding.10 Applicants have noted that the 
decentralized nature of the federal SBIR program results in high administrative costs in preparing a 
competitive proposal. Applicants are faced with the added burden of aligning their research project with 
the appropriate agency and ensuring that the proposal meets the respective agency’s programmatic 
requirements. These state programs are designed to help offset those costs.  
Seventeen states have had at least one of the three SBIR Match programs – State Match Phase I 
(SMP-I); State Match Phase II (SMP-II); and the Limited Match (LM) programs. These more aggressive 
programs are designed to bridge the funding gap between the different phases of funding opportunities 
and require considerably more capital than the SBIR Outreach programs. This paper is particularly 
interested in the SMP-I program, which offers noncompetitive matching funds to the state’s successful 
Phase I recipients11 to aid the technical aspects of the projects and improve competitiveness for Phase II 
funding. In contrast, the SMP-II program provides noncompetitive matches for successful Phase II 
recipients as they proceed to Phase III and compete for external funding, while the LM program offers 
competitive funding for successful Phase I and Phase II SBIR recipients. The SMP-I program is the most 
diffuse of the SBIR Match programs with 14 states having established this type of program during the 
tenure of the federal SBIR program. The size of the SMP-I’s match varies across states from Hawaii’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Tables 2.1 – 2.3 for a comprehensive list of the programs by state. 
10 These services include in-kind funds for proposal preparation, workshops, one-on-one mentoring and consultation 
support. 
11 Noncompetitive funds are available for all successful Phase I recipients, though it is subject to availability of 
funds in each fiscal year.   
	   58 
$25,000 grants to Kentucky and New York’s dollar for dollar matches. Table 2.3 lists the states, program 
features and policy years for the SMP-I program. 
3.3.1 Policy implications of the State Match Phase I program 
These programs can be viewed as policy experiments that marginally increase the size of the 
federal SBIR program. Thus, evaluation of these state programs has notable implications both for state 
and federal policymakers. Table 3.1 illustrates the potential implications. The primary desired outcome of 
the SMP-I program, which provides basis for evaluation of the policy, is improved competitiveness to 
secure the follow on Phase II funding. Other outcomes may include a larger applicant pool of Phase I 
applicants, accelerated product development or successful commercialization. The former outcome – 
Phase II success – is considered here. 
Regarding implications for state policymakers, an efficacious SMP-I program would bring more 
federal Phase II awards to firms located in states with the policy. Unless the number of federal Phase II 
awards increased, the redistribution of Phase II awards would play out in a zero-sum manner where other 
states would experience a decrease, ceteris paribus. State governments without the matching program 
might respond by implementing their own match programs to improve their competitiveness. On the other 
hand, a null policy effect would suggest that the match is insufficient to improve the competitiveness of 
projects. Given that innovative activity demands such high levels of resources, perhaps the state match is 
not enough to enable the principal investigators to differentiate their proposals from their competitors who 
do not receive a state match. State policymakers could respond by either increasing the size of the match 
or investing the resources in a different capacity.  
The policy implications are slightly different for federal SBIR policy makers. The state match can 
be seen as a marginal increase in the size of the federal Phase I award. This presents an opportunity to 
assess the optimal size of a Phase I award. Rather than experimenting with the size of Phase I awards 
themselves, federal policymakers are in a position to learn from the state experiments. In the event the 
SMP-I programs are shown to be efficacious in improving the competitiveness of Phase II applicants, 
	   59 
federal policymakers could consider increasing the size of the SBIR award given the positive outcome in 
terms of improved competitiveness. On the other hand, a null effect would offer validation of the federal 
SBIR program’s current award size. Regardless of the outcome, however, analysis of the SMP-I program 
promises valuable information for policymakers at the federal and state government levels.  
3.4 Research Design 
There is considerable scholarship evaluating the federal SBIR program; however, there are no 
studies that empirically assess complementary state actions – namely the state match programs. The 
common methodological hurdles confronting state policy analyses – such as decentralized state programs, 
fragmented activity and selection bias (Melkers, 2004; Melkers & Willoughby, 1998) – limits much of the 
scholarship on state innovation policy to descriptive overviews and single-state case studies (Combes & 
Todd, 1996; Berglund & Coburn, 1995). While these approaches offer a foundation for understanding 
state R&D policy activity, they lack external validity (Holmes, 2010).  
Fortunately, the SMP-I program provides an opportunity to assess a state program that has 
diffused across many states. While the policy years and size of the match varies by state and year, all of 
the programs share the common design of providing matching funds solely to firms that have secured a 
Phase I award and are preparing to compete for the larger Phase II funds. This enables a national level 
comparison between states with the program and those without. The common structure of the match 
offers useful direction in defining the outcomes of interest. Moreover, between state comparisons are 
possible in this case given that the sample of small firms were selected a priori by an external federal 
review process based on the scientific, technical and commercial merits of the proposals not on the firm’s 
state affiliation.12   
 Two outcome variables are considered in this analysis – Phase II success rates and Phase I 
applicant rates. The former is the more direct outcome given that the state match funds are meant to aid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This was confirmed not only in the program solicitations, but also in conversation with a number of program 
officers responsible for administering the federal SBIR program. 
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Phase I recipients as they compete for the follow on Phase II funding. Regarding the latter outcome, the 
match essentially increases the size of the Phase I award and may thereby attract additional firms on the 
margin to submit applications for federal SBIR funding. Regarding the latter outcome, there is utility in 
considering the state match program within the larger SBIR policy mix. The state program can be viewed 
as offering dual advantages – not only to improve the competitiveness of the Phase II application, but also 
to increase participation given the increased size of public support during Phase I. Hsu and Ziedonis 
(2013) emphasize this broad point in their evaluation of entrepreneurial-firm patents where they find 
evidence that the benefits of patenting extend beyond traditional intellectual property protection to 
include private financing advantages as well.  
The results from Chapter Two find evidence that states adopt this match policy due to a 
confluence of multilevel factors from federal top-down to state bottom-up and lateral factors. Placing 
these results within the context of this paper, this indicates that the policy switch is not exogenous. 
Therefore, the internal validity of an analysis of the efficacy of this state match program is compromised 
(Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2002). To address this shortcoming, this paper presents a state and year 
fixed effect model and includes a set of multilevel covariates – that range from federal to state level 
factors – to control for unobserved time-invariant state level factors and potential confounding time-
varying factors, respectively. This approach aims to effectively control for factors that might drive the 
outcomes and bias the results on the state policy variable. Nevertheless due to data limitations,13 this 
paper does not claim causality, as state level data are more likely to suffer from unobservable factors that 
may confound the results. Thus, this analysis estimates the association of the state match on the two 
outcome variables. The silver lining in drawing upon data from all 50 states, however, is the stronger 
external validity. This notably lacks among prior studies on state government R&D activity. Each of the 
controls is discussed in turn beginning with SBIR policy factors, additional sources of external R&D, and 
innovative capacity. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Data on the population of project level state matches is not available; specifically for certain states. Thus to assess 
the effect of the SMP-I program on a national scale, the author aggregated the data to the state level.  
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With the SMP-I program positioned within a larger SBIR policy mix, it is important to control for 
other SBIR-related policy factors. Fluctuations in the federal SBIR program will likely confound the 
effect of the state match program on the two outcome measures. This pertains to variation in the nature 
and administration of the federal program across the participating mission agencies. Annual adjustments 
to the size of the federal SBIR program are common given that the program’s budget is contingent on the 
federal government’s annual extramural R&D budget.14 In addition, the national distribution of SBIR 
activity varies across states (Wessner, 2008).  
Other forms of external support for early-stage firm development may also affect the outcome 
variables. The notion that firms depend on external sources of financial support, especially during the 
early-stages of development, is well established (Keller & Block, 2013; Stephan, 2012). As highlighted 
above, the federal government leads in providing public support for the earlier stages of activity whereas 
private investors are more likely to invest at later stages. While this analysis is specifically interested in 
the role of state investment, it is critical that these other sources of external support for small business 
innovative activity are controlled for. Otherwise, we risk attributing more to the state program than is 
warranted.  
A state’s high tech innovative capacity is another factor – both as it pertains to performance with 
the SBIR program and more generally. There is a large and growing literature showing that firms – 
especially small, newer businesses – do not operate within silos but rather are part of complex, 
overlapping networks (Feldman & Lanahan, 2010; Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2007; Audretsch & Feldman, 
2004). The level of productivity achieved by one firm or industry depends not only on its own research 
efforts, but also on the pool of general knowledge accessible and often proximate to it (Griliches, 1998). 
Moreover, the rate and success of production externalities resulting from innovative activity depends on 
the relative absorptive capacity of the local economy to recognize, assimilate and apply the new scientific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 As is emphasized at the annual AAAS Science and Technology Forums, this is subject to frequent fluctuations 
(e.g. Koizumi, 2008). Federal mission agencies with annual extramural R&D budgets in excess of $100 million are 
required to set aside 2.5 percent of their funds for the program. 
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knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Areas like Silicon Valley and Route 128 are prominent regions 
well known for their entrepreneurial culture, high tech capacity and effective ability to absorb production 
externalities (Chatterji et al., 2013; Glaeser & Kerr, 2009; Saxenian, 1996; Jaffe et al., 1993). In looking 
at the distribution of federal SBIR awards, it comes as no surprise that California and Massachusetts 
together have secured over 30% of the SBIR awards over the tenure of the federal program. It is worth 
noting that neither of these states have an SMP-I program; this is not surprising as Lanahan & Feldman 
(2014) found that states tended to adopt the SMP-I program if they were lagging in terms of their high 
tech innovative capacity. The federal SBIR program does not consider the location of an applicant when 
evaluating a proposal; nevertheless, this line of research clearly indicates that location does matter when it 
comes to innovation potential and capacity (Porter & Stern, 2001). While innovative capacity is clustered 
in certain regions throughout the U.S., this analysis approximates the geographic component of high tech 
innovative activity by aggregating to the state level. Belenzon and Schankerman (2012) find supporting 
evidence of this geographic level of classification in their analysis of knowledge spillovers produced by 
patents; notably, citations to patents are strongly constrained by state borders. Moreover, the notion of 
state benchmarking is well established, which provides further evidence to estimate the variation at the 
state level (Berry & Berry, 1990; Taylor, 2012; Feldman & Lanahan, 2014). 
3.4.1 Methods 
Equation 3.1 is a state level fixed effects model estimating the impact of the SMP-I program on 
two outcomes Yit – Phase II success rates and Phase I applications. The empirical model is specific to state 
i and year t. In addition, given the decentralized nature of the SBIR program (Wessner, 2008), SBIR 
activity is stratified by mission agency to account for program heterogeneity in the federal program.15 
This is discussed in greater detail in the data section.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 “The effective alignment of the program with widely varying mission objectives, needs, and modes of operation is 
a central challenge for an award program that involves a large number of departments and agencies. The SBIR 
program has been adapted effectively by the management of the individual departments, services, and agencies, 
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𝑌!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑀𝑃  𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝐵𝐼𝑅!" + 𝛽!𝑅&𝐷!" + 𝛽!𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ  𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦!" + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒! +   𝜀!"     (3.1) 
Both outcome variables are treated as continuous. The Phase II success rate is the ratio of Phase I awards 
in a state that are successful in securing a Phase II award. The second outcome variable is the count of 
Phase I applications. The policy variable of interest, SMP I, is binary, coded one for the year a state has 
the policy and zero otherwise. As highlighted in Table 2.3, 14 states adopted the policy during the tenure 
of the federal SBIR program; however, a number of states also terminated the program due to budget 
constraints or other political concerns. This variation is accounted for in the model. 
 A series of controls are included to account for potential confounding factors. The set of SBIR 
variables include the size of the federal SBIR program, the relative state SBIR capacity (with respect to 
the Federal SBIR activity) and an interaction term of the latter with the state match policy variable. 
Regarding the second measure, state location quotients of Phase I activity by mission agency are included 
to estimate the variation and relative strength of SBIR performance across states. This serves as a useful 
benchmarking indicator. 16  Taken together, these SBIR terms are included to control for potential 
confounding variation within the larger SBIR policy mix. Two continuous measures are included for 
R&D to account for additional external R&D that may confound the level of innovation in a state. These 
include federal R&D investment and private venture capital investment in early-stage firm activity. To 
control innovation capacity, High Tech Capacity, another benchmarking indicator measuring the high-
tech employment for the state is included.  
 As a baseline, the pooled OLS model is also estimated.17  In addition to the set of controls, the 
lagged dependent variable is included to control for prior capacity. Nevertheless, the state level fixed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
albeit with significant differences in mode of operation reflecting their distinct missions and operational cultures” 
(Wessner, 2008; p. 5). 
16 This variable is included to effectively control for state capacity in the SBIR program. This is likely endogenous 
with the outcome variables, thus the author is aware that this coefficients for this term will offer insight on the 
association of this variable with the outcomes. This variable is included to control for endogenous variation that 
might bias the effect of the SMP-I variable on the two outcome measures. 
17  𝑌!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑀𝑃  𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝐵𝐼𝑅!" + 𝛽!𝑅&𝐷!" + 𝛽!𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ  𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦!" + 𝛽!𝑌!"!! + 𝜀!"   (Pooled OLS).  
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model offers a more conservative estimate than pooled OLS given that it accounts for unobserved time-
invariant factors (Kennedy, 2003).  
Additional empirical considerations 
 Fixed effect models help to control for omitted time-invariant factors. In the case of this analysis, 
this helps to control for state level characteristics like size, political preferences and economic capacity. 
However, for the model with the Phase II success rate outcome variable, the state’s previously 
demonstrated capacity to secure SBIR awards likely affects the outcome variable of interest in year t. 
Annual fluctuations in Phase II success rates across states indicate that this is time-variant and thus not 
accounted for with the state fixed effect, 𝛼!.18  
Considering the structure of the federal SBIR program, past success rates are correlated with 
current SBIR activity as firms are not restricted in the number of Phase I applications they submit. It is 
common for firms to secure multiple awards across years – even from different mission agencies. Certain 
recipients have even come to be known as “SBIR mills” for their ability to successfully secure SBIR 
awards at an accelerated rate.19 This points to the fact that a state’s SBIR capacity is likely to be 
correlated to the previous year, as there is overlap in the firms that are successful in securing the SBIR 
awards over time. Moreover, information on federal SBIR awards – both Phase I and Phase II – is made 
public to mark as a signal of demonstrated innovative potential (Lerner, 1999; Howell, 2015). This signal, 
in addition to the actual federal funds, likely has an effect on the innovative capacity for a region, for 
example, by attracting increased private investment (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013; Yu & Jackson, 2011; 
Greenstone et al., 2010; Glaeser & Kerr, 2009; Muller et al., 2005). In light of these factors, previous 
performance of SBIR Phase II success rates likely introduces bias into the model, which needs be 
accounted for.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The descriptive statistics for the aggregate measure of Phase II success rates reports greater within state variation 
(0.1392 standard deviations) than between state variation (0.0602 standard deviations).  This trend holds when 
stratified by mission agency as well.  
19 The DoD has actually received criticism for this concentration of funding (Wessner, 2008). 
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Unfortunately, inclusion of the lagged dependent variable and fixed-effect estimator does not 
obviate endogeneity as the lagged component Yt-1 is correlated with the error component, 𝜀!!!, in the fixed 
effects model (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Arellano and Bond (1991) offer a resolution for this issue by 
instrumenting the lagged dependent variable at least two periods in the fixed effects model. This approach 
conditions on both the fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable. Equation 2 draws from Arellano 
and Bond’s seminal work (1991) and presents the two-stage model for the outcome – Phase II success 
rates – instrumenting the lagged dependent variable two periods.  𝑌!" =   𝛼! +   𝛽!𝑆𝑀𝑃  𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝐵𝐼𝑅! + 𝛽!𝑅&𝐷!" + 𝛽!𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ  𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦!" + 𝛽!𝑌!"!! + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒! + 𝜀!"    
(3.2) 
The validity of this approach requires that Yt-2 be uncorrelated with the error component, 𝜀!!!. There are 
specification tests available to determine if the error terms across years are serially uncorrelated and if the 
lagged instrument meets the test of overidentifying restrictions (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009).  
Angrist and Pischke (2009) highlight that the conditions for consistent estimation of the lagged 
instrument are more demanding than the fixed effects model or lagged dependent variable alone (p. 245). 
The Arellano-Bond (AB) model, therefore, can be viewed as a robustness check that accounts for both. In 
the event the conditions for estimation are not met, they highlight that the fixed effects and lagged 
dependent variable models have a useful bracketing property for narrowing in on the estimate of interest 
(p. 245-6). Specifically, positive fixed effects estimates will be biased upwards while pooled OLS 
estimates with lagged dependent variables will be biased downward.  
While lagged activity of the dependent variable theoretically poses a threat for the model with 
Phase II success rates as the outcome variable, lagged performance of the dependent variable is arguably 
not a concern for the model with Phase I application rates as the outcome variable. In contrast to the fact 
that information on SBIR awards are publicized, project level data on SBIR application activity is 
confidential. Certainly, the scale of SBIR applications is somewhat correlated with innovative potential; 
however, application rates do not directly correspond with quality, competitiveness or performance in the 
SBIR program. Moreover, firms are not likely to disclose the fact that they have applied unless they 
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successfully secure the grant. Therefore, lagged application activity does not pose a threat to this specific 
model. The AB estimation is not estimated for this outcome.  
3.4.2 Data 
 This paper uses state level data from a range of sources. Table 3.2 details the list of variables, 
their functional forms and data sources. Again, two outcome measures – Phase II success rates and Phase 
I applications – are considered for examining the efficacy of the SMP-I program. The former draws from 
the publicly accessible SBIR award data and is a continuous measure reporting the ratio of Phase I 
projects that successfully secure Phase II funds to move toward product development. The latter outcome 
variable is a continuous measure of the number of Phase I applicants per state. This number is reported in 
aggregate by each of the participating federal mission agencies. For both dependent variables, the 
measures are stratified by federal mission agency.  
 Information on the policy variable of interest – SMP I – is derived from earlier research on state 
SBIR-related programs (Lanahan & Feldman, 2014). This policy variable is binary, coded one for the 
year states have the SMP-I program and zero otherwise. While the author initially hoped to use the level 
or ratio of the match as the policy indicator, gathering state level award data on the matches by year for 
all the states with the program proved to be an insurmountable task.20  
Turning to the set of controls, data on the size of the federal SBIR program was derived from 
SBA public records. This measure reports the national aggregate of SBIR Phase I funds stratified by 
mission agency. This measure is included in the pooled OLS model, but drops out in the panel 
estimations. The SBIR location quotient reports the ratio for each state’s Phase I funding by agency to the 
total Phase I funding relative to the U.S. ratio. This measures state capacity of the federal SBIR program. 
In addition, to estimate benchmarking activity the quartile rankings of the SBIR location quotients are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The author was successful in securing project level matches for a handful of the states with the policy; however, 
some states were unwilling or unable to share this detailed information due to data restrictions or incomplete 
administrative records. Thus in the effort to offer a broad overview of the SMP-I program, the policy variable is 
coded as a binary indicator. 
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included. The fourth quartile – the cohort of states with the highest ratio of Phase I activity in a given 
mission agency – serves as the referent category. Both the location quotient and series of quartile rankings 
vary by state, year and mission agency. The interaction term of the SBIR LQ and state policy variable is 
included to estimate their cross product. Two measures were used to control for public and private 
investment in industrial R&D, respectively. The former measure – Federal R&D – reports state level 
aggregates of federal obligations for applied R&D. The latter measure – Venture Capital – controls for 
state level venture financing in high tech activity. High Tech Capacity approximates the high-tech 
industrial capacity of a state. This measure is derived from public employment data that is stratified by 
industry relying on the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ definition of high-tech industries (Hecker, 2005). This 
ratio is reported in the location quotient functional form to again place precedence on state benchmarking 
activity. The U.S. ratio serves as the referent base.  
3.4.3 Sample  
 Taking into consideration the structure of the federal SBIR program, the data are stratified by 
federal mission agency (where applicable). Although there are 11 mission agencies that participate in the 
program, five account for 96 percent of the SBIR programmatic activity – DoD, HHS, NSF, DoE and 
NASA. The remaining six agencies are dropped from this analysis due to limited activity.  
The DoD and HHS fund the greatest share of awards due to the size of their extramural R&D 
budgets. Despite their large levels of investment, both agencies stand out among the participating mission 
agencies given their operational differences in administering the program. To briefly elaborate, the DoD 
is unique in that it funds contracts as opposed to grants and relies on an internal review board. The awards 
are meant to serve DoD’s own procurement needs rather than benefit innovation or economic growth 
more broadly for defense-related industries. The DoD essentially serves as the market in its assessment of 
a project’s viability (Wessner, 2008). HHS, on the other hand, is unique given the large size of its awards. 
For all other agencies, the SBA caps Phase II awards at $1 million, yet HHS Phase II awards can be as 
large as $3 million. This adjustment was made in light of the extremely high costs of health-related 
	   68 
research. It is estimated that pharmaceutical drugs cost upwards of $1 billion to move from the lab bench 
through clinical trials to the market (Gagnon et al., 2008). HHS has adjusted the size of the awards given 
these financial demands. The other three federal mission agencies – NSF, DoE and NASA – cater to 
particular industries; however, their administrative operations of the SBIR program, mission aims, and 
extramural budgets are comparable.  
In consideration of the outlier status of the DoD and DHHS agencies, this analysis narrows its 
scope to recipients of awards from NSF, DoE, and NASA. DHHS is dropped given the financial demands 
of health-related research. Before we would see an effect from these matches, we would likely see one for 
firms that received awards from the other agencies. The DoD is also dropped given the uniquely internal 
focus of the program, which implies a different evaluation process. 
The central aim of this policy evaluation is to estimate the efficacy of state investment – in the 
form of SBIR matching awards – on early-stage firm development. Data on SBIR award activity extends 
back to 1982; however, we restrict the timeframe for this analysis to the most recent 11-year interval 
between federal SBIR reauthorizations, 2000 – 2010. Data on Phase I application activity is available 
from 2001, so those models are limited to the ten-year period from 2001 – 2010. Complete data on Phase 
II success rates are available through 2008; thus the timeframe for this analysis is limited to the 9-year 
period, 2000 – 2008.21 By restricting the timeframe of analysis, we are able to examine the efficacy of 
state investments during a time when the federal SBIR program was relatively consistent in size and 
structure.22 Fourteen states have established an SMP-I as of 2013; however, four states – NE, CT, MT, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 TechNet and the SBA’s sbir.gov are the two central repositories for SBIR award data. TechNet was the primary 
SBIR data source prior to the roll out of the sbir.gov website in 2011. Several diagnostic tests were run comparing 
the two data sources. The sbir.gov data source is more complete than TechNet; however, TechNet matches Phase II 
to Phase I awards, which is one of the primary outcome measures of interest in this analysis. TechNet provides data 
up through 2013; however, complete data is available through 2008. While the sbir.gov data is more complete, 
determining the Phase II Success Rate would require matching over 19,000 Phase II awards to Phase I awards based 
on the string variable – Proposal Title. Given limited resources, the author relied on the TechNet database, which 
matches the awards; however, the data is only complete up through 2008. 
22 The program was initially authorized in 1982 mandating federal agencies with extramural budgets in excess of 
$100 million to set aside 0.2%. Over the first six years of the program, this increased to 1.25%. In 1992, the program 
was reauthorized and the set-aside rate increased to 2.5%. In 2000, the program was reauthorized a second time 
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and VA – adopted after the most recent SBIR reauthorization in 2011 while New York only maintained 
the program from 1984 through 1991. Thus, policy activity for only nine states is included in this 
analysis.23 Table 3.3 provides the descriptive statistics for the sample of state level activity under 
consideration; where applicable, the estimates are stratified by mission agency. 
3.5 Empirical Results 
The results for the two outcomes – Phase II success rates and Phase I applications – are discussed 
in turn. 
3.5.1 Outcome: Phase II Success Rates  
Tables 3.4 – 3.6 present the empirical results for the first outcome measure – Phase II success 
rates – for the three mission agencies under consideration – NSF, DoE and NASA, respectively. For each 
of these tables, columns 1 – 2 report the OLS pooled cross-sectional model with the full set of regressors 
plus the one-year lagged dependent variable. The standard errors are clustered at the state level. This 
model was included to offer a lower bound estimate for the causal effect of interest (Angrist & Pischke, 
2009). Columns 3 – 4 report the estimates for Eq. 3.1, the state fixed effect model with the full set of 
regressors for NSF, DoE and NASA, respectively. Columns 5 – 6 report the estimates for Eq. 3.2, the AB 
model with the full set of regressors for NSF, DoE, and NASA, respectively. Two sets of estimates are 
reported for each model. Those listed in odd columns report the state SBIR location quotient as a quartile 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
resulting in an increase in the size of the Phase I and Phase II awards. The most recent reauthorization in 2011 
extended the program to 2017. 
23 Policy activity for the most recent four adoptions falls outside the timeframe of interest; complete data on the key 
dependent variables are only available through 2011. Moreover, the most recent reauthorization was 2011, prior to 
these state adoptions. 
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dummy (with the fourth quartile as the referent category), while those listed in even columns report the 
state SBIR location quotient measure in addition to the interaction term with the State Match Policy.24  
Additional specification tests were run to assess the validity of the AB models (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2009). The results from these post estimations are included in the Appendix B. The first 
specification tests for zero autocorrelation in the first-differenced error. For the NASA model, the z-
scores indicated that there was no serial correlation thus allowing for consistent estimation; the test was 
weakly supported for the NSF model. The test, however, did not hold for the DoE model. The second 
tests the validity of overidentifying restrictions. The population moment conditions are correct for the AB 
measure for all three stratification.25 Although the model failed to pass the test of zero autocorrelation in 
the first-differenced error for the DoE and were only weakly significant for NSF, the full set of results are 
presented. Caution is taken with the interpretation of these AB coefficients for the NSF and DoE samples 
(columns 5 & 6 in Tables 3.4 & 3.5).  
The results for the state policy variable and the SBIR-related regressors are discussed in turn. 
Emphasis is placed on these variables since they measure aspects of the larger SBIR policy mix. There is 
evidence of a policy effect for the NSF stratification (models 1, 3 – 4 in Table 3.4). These significant 
results provide evidence that the state match program increases the Phase II success rates for firms 
competing in the NSF SBIR program. The coefficients on the policy variable for the two other federal 
mission agencies, however, are not robust.26 Turning to the set of SBIR benchmarking measures the 
coefficients for Q1 for the SBIR LQ are negative and statistically significant for all agency stratifications. 
This result was robust across various sensitivity analyses that addressed the outlying distribution.27 Again, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 This paper presents the level ratio of the SBIR location quotient in addition to the quartile rankings of the SBIR 
location quotient. The former is included as a baseline and is interacted with the primary policy variable of interest. 
The latter is included to illustrate how the state’s relatively ranking varies with respect to the leading group of states.  
25 This test holds if the null hypothesis that the population moment conditions are correct is not rejected.  
26 The policy variable is significant for the NASA stratification in the pooled OLS estimation with the set of quartile 
rankings of the SBIR LQ (Table 3.6 Column 1).  
27 Results are available upon request from the author. 
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the fourth quartile – those states with the highest location quotients – serves as the referent category. In 
contrast to states that lead in terms of SBIR activity, states ranked in the lowest quartile are less likely to 
increase their Phase II success rates. This is to be expected. The sign of the SBIR LQ also reflects this 
relationship, which is positive and robust. The interaction term is not robust; it is only positive and 
significant for the NASA state fixed effects specification.  
Regarding the AB models, it is worth noting that the two-year lagged dependent variable is only 
statistically significant for the DoE stratifications. The AB model was included given that lagged Phase II 
success rates were viewed to be plausible confounding factors for the fixed effects model. Nevertheless, 
the results are not interpreted given that this model did not meet the post estimation specification tests.  
3.5.2 Outcome: Phase I Application  
Tables 3.7 – 3.9 present the empirical results for the second outcome measure – Phase I 
applications – for the three mission agencies under consideration – NSF, DoE and NASA, respectively. 
The presentation of these results mirror the prior set of results for the first outcome measure for the 
pooled OLS and state fixed effect estimations. Emphasis is placed on the state fixed effect models as they 
offer more conservative estimates. 
The results for SMP I are positive and significant for the NSF stratification for the pooled OLS 
estimation model (Table 3.7, columns 1 & 2); however, these results are not robust for the state fixed 
effect specification. Results for SMP I for the other mission agency stratifications are statistically 
insignificant. For the other set of SBIR related factors, there is evidence that the relative SBIR capacity of 
the state is positively associated with Phase I application activity – as indicated by the negative 
coefficients for the first and second quartile rankings (e.g. SBIR NSF LQ Q1 and Q2) and the positive 
SBIR location quotient. This trend generally holds for the NSF and DoE samples, though it is not robust 
across the NASA stratifications. As with the set of models for the first outcome, these results were robust 
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across various sensitivity analyses that addressed the outlying distribution of the location quotient.28 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the lagged dependent variable is positive and robustly significant across 
all models.29 Regarding the other regressors, there is evidence of a positive relationship between federal 
expenditures in R&D in the state and the application activity. This coupled with the positive coefficients 
for High Tech Capacity for the NSF and NASA stratification indicate that the strength of the state’s 
innovative capacity – in terms of employment and federal R&D – is associated with demonstrated interest 
in the SBIR program.  
3.6 Discussion 
 This paper empirically examines the effect of the SMP-I program by considering two outcome 
measures – Phase II success rates and Phase I applications activity. Moving beyond single-state case 
studies and descriptive analyses, this analysis employs a series of state level models to broadly assess 
state efforts to advance small business innovation. The data were stratified by federal mission agency to 
account for industrial heterogeneity.30  
 The results for the primary policy variable – SMP I – provide evidence that the state investment 
has a positive effect for firms participating in the NSF SBIR competition. Specifically, the results suggest 
that the state match program increases the competitiveness of Phase I projects as they advance and 
compete for NSF Phase II funding. The coefficients for the policy variable from the state level fixed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Results are available upon request from the author. 
29 Interestingly, this indicates that the AB model might be appropriate for this specification. The results for the AB 
for the models with Phase I applications were not included given the lack of theoretical motivation – as discussed in 
section 4.1.1. Nevertheless, based off these results, there appears to be evidence that lagged application activity is 
positively associated with subsequent application activity. Although this is not the focus of this particular study, this 
warrants additional research. Attention, moreover, should be directed to SBIR mills. While research on SBIR mills 
are lacking, there is a general consensus that these recipients are associated with excessive Phase I award rates that 
never commercialize. Among the sample of firms that are classified as SBIR mills, this suggests that Phase I success 
breeds Phase I success rather than applying to Phase II. The author would like to thank one of the anonymous 
reviewers from earlier revisions of this paper for pointing this out. 
30 Research has found that the nature of innovative activity varies across industry, thus it is useful to account for 
these differences. These differences are particularly evident when comparing software and biotech industries, for 
example (Graham et al., 2010). 
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effect specification in Table 3.4 indicate that, on average, the differential effect for states with the SMP-I 
program increases the Phase II success rates by 19.4 to 23.8 percent. While it is difficult to discern the 
precise estimate for the policy, this points to a significant and positive effect.  
To put these numbers into context, the national average success rate for Phase II applications is 
roughly 40 percent (Wessner, 2008). Assuming that the coefficients for the state level fixed effect 
specification offer a range of the state policy effect, then on average the state match program increases the 
Phase II applicant’s likelihood of securing the larger follow on SBIR award up from 40 percent to 47.8 or 
49.5 percent.31 This has notable policy and economic implications for the state given that the size of the 
Phase II funding is $1 M – up approximately $850,000 from the size of the Phase I award. Lanahan and 
Feldman’s (2014) earlier work overviewing the portfolio of state match programs documented that the 
range in the level of the state matches for SMP-I programs across state jurisdictions span $25,000 to 
$150,000 matches. Additional assessment is needed to examine how variation in the levels of the match 
affect the probability of securing the follow on funding, however, these results offering compelling 
evidence to show how the average marginal investment can differentiate the competitiveness of an R&D 
project as it advances down the R&D pipeline. The implications are notable given that the state match 
investments are marginal in contrast to the size of the Phase II follow on award.  
Results for the policy variable on Phase II success rates for DoE and NASA and for the other 
outcome variable – Phase I applications – are not significant. Elaborating on the former, while there is 
some evidence that the program increases the Phase II success rate for NASA projects, the results are not 
robust. Lack of significance does not conclusively imply a null effect; however, this variation across the 
agency stratifications suggests that the effect of the match may vary by industrial sectors. The SBIR 
program funds early-stage firm development across a broad range of high tech industries. The features of 
innovative activity and financial demands for these different industrial sectors are certainly heterogeneous 
(Graham et al., 2010; Cohen et al., 2002). Pharmaceutical research requires considerable up front costs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 This was derived as follows based on the marginal effects reported from the coefficients on the state policy 
variable – SMP-I: 0.40 * 1.194 = 0.4776; 0.40 * 1.238 = 0.4952.  
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and is highly proprietary while software development relies more on open collaboration (Scotchmer, 
2004). The state match program provides noncompetitive funds for all Phase I recipients without taking 
into consideration this variation. Thus, it may be the case that the state match awards are sufficient to give 
a competitive boost to firms in NSF related industries (e.g. engineering, software development, or 
physical sciences) but insufficient for firms in NASA and DoE related industries (e.g. astronautics or 
energy development). In contrast to the latter two programs, NSF supports a broader scope of basic 
research fields. To reiterate, the noncompetitive State Match can be viewed as a marginal adjustment to 
the Phase I award. This heterogeneous treatment effect suggests that the marginal state adjustment offers 
more competitive value in this broader scope of research.  
In contrast to the other federal mission agencies, NSF caters to a broader spectrum of projects that 
span the science and engineering fields. DoE and NASA, however, are more narrowly focused in 
industrial scope. Importantly, industrial activity is not evenly dispersed across the U.S., but rather is 
concentrated in various locations offering local and regional competitive advantages (Furman, 2000; 
Feldman & Audretsch, 1999). We would be remiss to assume that every state has comparable industrial 
strength across all sectors. Thus competition across the SBIR mission agencies likely varies by state given 
the various concentrations of industrial strength within states. The null results for the policy variable for 
the DoE and NASA stratifications may be attributable to the fact that the states with the match do not 
have sufficient industrial capacity that aligns with these two mission agencies.  
Table 3.10 presents the correlation matrix for the state policy variable of interest and a series of 
benchmarking indicators that measures the state’s relative industrial strength in securing federal funds 
from these mission agencies, respectively.32 In looking at the results in the first column, they indicate a 
negative and statistically significant correlation between the policy and DoE and NASA, respectively. 
The correlation for NSF is slightly negative but not statistically significant. This suggests that states with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 DoE (LQ), NASA (LQ) and NSF (LQ) report the location quotient functional form of grant and contract activity 
for states by federal mission agency, respectively. The US average serves as the reference category. See the notes in 
Table 11 for more discussion. 
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the match policy lag in terms of their ability to secure federal funds from the DoE and NASA, 
respectively. This is likely indicative of the state’s relative industrial strength within the energy and 
aeronautic fields, respectively. While the coefficients on the policy variable of interest are null for the 
DoE and NASA stratifications, this evidence suggests that the lack of effect may be attributable to the fact 
that these states do not have sufficient industrial capacity to compete for SBIR funds from these two 
agencies. State governments with the noncompetitive match for all Phase I recipients may want to 
consider the implications of industrial heterogeneity within their state borders for more optimal outcomes.   
Regarding the second outcome measure, there is some evidence that the program incentivizes 
firms to apply for the NSF SBIR Phase I program. This outcome was included given the assumption that 
the state match can be viewed as a marginal increase for the size of the Phase I award. This likely would 
incentivize applicants on the margin to compete for the Phase I award. This relationship, however, is 
predicated on applicants’ awareness of the state match program. The null effect offers two possible 
implications: either the marginal increase is insufficient in incentivizing potential applicants to apply for 
the program; or applicants on the margin are unaware of the state program. Aspects of both are likely 
driving the effect. The latter is plausible, especially given the limited resources for states. Only recently 
has academic attention on the SBIR program turned to state activity (Lanahan & Feldman, 2014). This 
recent shift may be reflective of the broader community and therefore suggests that understanding and 
awareness of the state SBIR program – especially during the timeframe of the analysis – was limited.    
The regressors were included to control for potential confounding factors that may bias the state 
policy variable. The SBIR policy variables, in particular, offer insight regarding the larger SBIR policy 
mix. These include the SBIR location quotients (both quartile rankings and level form) and the interaction 
term. Among these regressors, the results for the SBIR location quotients offer robust results. 
Specifically, the relative ranking of the state’s performance in the federal mission across mission agencies 
is associated with the outcome variables of interest. These are to be expected. Given that the state policy 
is couched within the larger federal program, it is important to control for this variation as the innovative 
capacity of the state might bias the results on the state program. The interaction term is of particular 
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interest given that it estimates the relationship of the cross product. The results for this variable were not 
robust. The only significant effect held for the NASA stratification with the state fixed effects model. 
One limitation of this analysis is that it only utilizes state level data. Project or firm level data 
would improve the estimations and offer greater insight on variation within the policy. However, it was 
not possible to obtain complete state match data for all of the states with a SMP-I program. Thus, analysis 
of micro-level data would be an option if we narrowed the selection of states under analysis, but this 
would be at the expense of a broad analysis of the state policy activity.  
Another limitation of this analysis is its consideration of only two outcomes – Phase II success 
rates and Phase I application activity. Early-stage development is a highly volatile period for firms, 
especially given limited access to funds. Use of the SBIR state matches are discretionary, so they may be 
used to secure other sources of funding, retain technical staff, cover legal fees, explore additional research 
projects, or move straight to commercialization. As Hsu and Ziedonis (2013) highlight, the advantages of 
innovative activities are broad and extend beyond the direct outcomes. This empirical analysis is unable 
to measure all these outcomes. Subsequent research might address this limitation by coupling quantitative 
analysis with firm level surveys of SBIR recipients that consider a broader spectrum of outcomes.  
3.7 Conclusions 
Considerable attention and research has been placed on federal investment in early-stage firm 
development (e.g. Keller & Block, 2013; Wessner, 2008; Lerner, 1996). While there is a growing body of 
scholarship that examines the efficacy of the federal SBIR program, there is scant research on state 
involvement in R&D and early-stage firm development. Nevertheless, the role of states demands our 
attention. The state SBIR programs are just one component of a growing portfolio of state science policies 
(Feldman et al., 2013; Zhao & Ziedonis, 2013; Plosila, 2004; Cozzens, 1997; Feller, 1997). State-based 
university R&D programs that include the Eminent Scholars, Centers of Excellence and University 
Research Grants have grown in number since the 1980s with 21, 37, and 29 states having these programs, 
respectively (Feldman et al., 2013). Thirty-two states have R&D tax credits (Wilson, 2009), and over 30 
	   77 
have quasi-public entities to promote R&D. As for state SBIR-related policies, all but five states have 
established at least one formal program to support firms competing for federal SBIR funds (Lanahan & 
Feldman, 2014); and among those states, 14 are offering sizeable matching funds to successful SBIR 
recipients to aid them in the technical aspects of the project. These trends points to a real commitment by 
state governments to support early-stage firm development that cannot be ignored. 
 Too often, discussion and analysis of “public support” for science and technology conflates 
federal and state sources of support, or ignores the role of states completely. This paper distinguishes 
between these two sources of support for early-stage R&D and places emphasis on multilevel public 
funding for R&D. There is much to be gained by such an approach by acknowledging and assessing the 
larger public role that includes and distinguishes the multiple levels. The role of state science policy is on 
the rise; and it is likely to continue on this trajectory given the potential for economic returns and tenuous 
state of the federal R&D budget.  
To build upon this paper, future state level studies could employ alternative research designs. 
This essay relied upon a state fixed effect model to assess the efficacy of the State Match program – 
comparing those with the program to those without. While this study drew upon activity from all fifty 
states, future state level analyses could also consider synthetic control methods, which rely on pre-
treatment data to identify and construct a weighted control group (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller, 
2010).  
Turning to policy implications, state match programs designed to complement federal 
investments, moreover, serve as useful policy experiments for assessing the marginal impact of the public 
funds. Not only is there utility in understanding the role of state investment in early-stage firm activity, 
this state policy activity places federal policymakers responsible for the SBIR program in a fortuitous 
position to examine the impact of a marginal adjustment of the program by simply assessing the impact of 
state actions. The results offer preliminary evidence to suggest that an increase in the size of the Phase I 
funding would improve the competitiveness of proposals submitted to the NSF program. Additional 
research that considers industrial heterogeneity, however, is warranted. 
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In an effort to improve our understanding of state R&D, this paper examined the efficacy of the 
SMP-I program. There is evidence that the state match program increases the Phase II success rates for 
firms interested in NSF SBIR funds. Results for the DoE and NASA stratifications are null, however, they 
are likely attributed to the lagging industrial capacity within the state that aligns with these two mission 
agencies. States without the match might choose to react and increase their own competitiveness by 
adopting a match program with the expectation of increasing their competitiveness. Nevertheless, it is 
important to consider the implications of industrial heterogeneity. As for federal policymakers, there is 
evidence to suggest that increasing the size of the Phase I award for the NSF program improves 
competitiveness. The lack of significance across the other two agencies points to the fact that financial 
demands vary by industry. Additional research is needed to clarify the nature of these variations. 
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Table 3.1 Potential policy implications of State Match 
 State government Federal government 
Policy Effect 
 
Competition; additional policy adoption Reconsider size of SBIR awards 
Null Policy Effect Increase size of match; invest resources 
elsewhere 
SBIR program validation 
Notes: Own illustration. 
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Table 3.2 Variables, functional form and data sources 
Variable Metric Unit of 
Analysis  
Source 
Outcome Variables  
Phase II Success Rate 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝐼  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠  𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝐼𝐼  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔!"#𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝐼  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠!"#  
 
Continuous 
(ratio) 
SBA TechNet 
database33 
Phase I Applications 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝐼  𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠!"# Count  SSTI34 
Regressors  
SBIR    
     State Policy 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝐼  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚!"   Binary Lanahan & Feldman 
(2014) 
 
     Federal – SBIR LQ 
 
𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝐼  𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔!"# 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝐼  𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔!"𝑈𝑆  𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝐼  𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔!" 𝑈𝑆  𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝐼  𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔! 
 
Continuous  
(location 
quotient) 
SBA TechNet 
database (derived) 
     Interaction  SBIR LQijt * SMP-Iit Continuous  Derived 
     Federal – Phase I 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙  𝑆𝐵𝐼𝑅  𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝐼  𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡!"   Continuous, 
logged 
(adjusted for 
inflation) 
SBA TechNet 
database (derived) 
Federal R&D   𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙  𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑅&𝐷!" Continuous, 
logged 
(adjusted for 
inflation) 
NSF Survey of 
Federal Research 
Funds for Research 
and Development 
 
Venture Capital 𝑉𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝒊𝒕 Continuous, 
logged 
(adjusted for 
inflation) 
PriceWaterhouse 
Coopers 
 
High Tech Capacity35 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ  𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ  𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!" 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!"𝑈𝑆  ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ  𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ  𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡! 𝑈𝑆  𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡! 
Continuous  
(location 
quotient) 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
Notes: i denotes state, j denotes federal mission agency and t denotes year.  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Both the SBA TechNet and SBIR.gov databases report information on Federal SBIR activity, however, each 
database provides slightly different information on the awards. The SBA TechNet database is especially useful in 
that it links Phase I to Phase II awards (where applicable), while the SBIR.gov database provides more detailed 
information on each award and has more recent data available up through 2012. A series of diagnostic tests were run 
to determine differences in the list of awards between the two databases. For data between 1982-2010, the SBA 
TechNet database reports award data on over 99% of the SBIR awards listed in SBIR.gov up through 2008. The 
differences in the list of awards for the years 1982-2008 are negligible. 
34 Aggregate information is gathered from each participating mission agency and presented by the State Science 
Technology Institute (SSTI) Source: http://www.ssti.org/Digest/digest.php?page=2012/060612#research 
35 High tech employment was drawn from industries with high tech activity. These were based on the BLS definition 
(Hecker, 2005).  
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Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Outcome Variables 𝐏𝐡𝐚𝐬𝐞  𝐈𝐈  𝐬𝐮𝐜𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬  𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐬‡ 0.435 0.136 0 1 
DoE 0.276 0.328 0 1 
NASA 0.345 0.349 0 1 
NSF 
 
0.300 0.303 0 1 𝐏𝐡𝐚𝐬𝐞  𝐈  𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬‡ 462.262 765.825 14 5476 
DoE 27.460 47.026 0 373 
NASA 38.874 68.027 0 572 
NSF 33.412 51.416 0 488 
 
Regressors 
SBIR     
     State Policy – SMP-I 
 
0.102 0.303 0 1 
     Federal – SBIR LQ36     
         DoE 0.979 1.436 0 16.651 
         NASA 0.951 1.147 0 13.225 
         NSF 
 
1.712 2.173 0 16.051 
     Federal – SBIR Phase I 𝐀𝐥𝐥𝐨𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧‡ 436.689 73.287 294.164 547.938 
   𝑺𝑩𝑰𝑹‡ (logged) 19.879 0.184 19.500 20.122 
  DoE 27.052 6.779 19.901 43.000 
  DoE (logged) 17.086 0.226 16.806 17.577 
  NASA 24.335 5.802 18.607 36.432 
  NASA (logged) 16.982 0.217 16.739 17.411 
  NSF 30.115 13.708 15.055 66.472 
  NSF (logged) 
 
17.139 0.386 16.527 18.012 
Federal Applied R&D 2.122 3.650 0.035 27.227 
Fed Applied R&D (logged) 
 
20.539 1.409 17.373 24.027 
Venture Capital 645.931 2527.397 0 43034 
VC (logged) 
 
16.879 5.423 0.000 24.485 
High Tech Capacity 0.882 0.197 0.476 1.394 
Notes: Data for the controls are reported for 50 states over the entire 11-year time period from 2000 – 
2010 (550 observations). Data is available for 50 states from 2000 – 2008 for Phase II Success rates (450 
observations) and from 2001 – 2010 for Phase I Application activity (500 observations). ‡ reports the 
aggregate SBIR activity for the variable, which includes SBIR activity from all 11 participating federal 
mission agencies. Descriptive statistics stratified by SBIR federal mission agency – DoE, NASA and NSF 
– are presented as well. Funding amounts for the SBIR and R&D (Federal R&D and Venture Capital) are 
reported in the level (in millions) and logged forms. As noted in Table 3.2 the logged functional forms are 
included in the empirical models.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 It is notable that there are outliers with these distributions. This was present for states with very limited SBIR 
activity. As sensitivity analyses, the outliers that exceeded the value of 5 were recoded to this max value. The results 
were run with both sets of regressors and the coefficients were robust. The results for the sample presented above 
are reported in this paper. Results from the sensitivity analyses are available upon request. 
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Table 3.4 Regression Results - NSF Phase II success rates 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 (OLS) (OLS) (FE) (FE) (AB) (AB) 
             
SMP I 0.133*** 0.139 0.194** 0.238** 0.068 0.092 
 (0.046) (0.086) (0.085) (0.107) (0.109) (0.165) 
SBIR NSF LQ Q1 -0.129**  -0.082*  -0.198*  
 (0.052)  (0.044)  (0.118)  
SBIR NSF LQ Q2 0.029  0.067  0.121*  
 (0.055)  (0.053)  (0.069)  
SBIR NSF LQ Q3 0.022  0.041  0.118*  
 (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.065)  
SBIR NSF LQ  0.027**  0.023**  0.043 
  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.032) 
Interaction  
(SMP-I * SBIR NSF 
LQ) 
 0.016  -0.020  -0.016 
 (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.058) 
SBIR NSF (logged) 0.063 0.065     
 (0.046) (0.046)     
Federal R&D (logged) -0.012 0.006 -0.067 -0.050 -0.102 -0.110 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.063) (0.064) (0.113) (0.104) 
Venture Capital 
(logged) 
0.008** 0.009** 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
High Tech Capacity 
(LQ) 
0.091 0.143 -0.533 -0.557 3.880* 2.866 
 (0.108) (0.100) (0.510) (0.514) (2.015) (1.845) 
       
Lagged Phase II 
Success Ratet-1 
0.057 0.050   0.008 -0.045 
(0.059) (0.062)   (0.264) (0.233) 
Lagged Phase II 
Success Ratet-2 
    -0.053 -0.135 
    (0.276) (0.025) 
Constant -0.761 -1.261 2.045 1.705 -1.259 -0.088 
 (0.844) (0.809) (1.373) (1.382) (2.648) (2.204) 
       
Observations 400 400 450 450 300 300 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.112 0.088 0.077 0.056   
State FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The primary outcome variable of interest is NSF Phase I success rates. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Data are available for 9 years from 2000 – 2008 for all 50 states. Models 1 – 2 report the 
pooled OLS estimates (standard errors are clustered at the state level); models 3 – 4 report the OLS state 
fixed effect estimates; and models 5 – 6 report the estimates for the Arellano Bond model. Models 1, 3 
and 5 report the estimates with quartile rankings of the NSF Phase I location quotient. The fourth quartile 
serves as the referent category. Models 2, 4 and 6 report the estimates for the NSF Phase I location 
quotient in addition to the interaction term: SMP-I * SBIR NSF LQ. *Statistically significant at the 10% 
level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level.  ***Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 3.5 Regression Results - DoE Phase II success rates 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 (OLS) (OLS) (FE) (FE) (AB) (AB) 
             
SMP I -0.042 -0.033 -0.002 -0.047 -0.021 0.079 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.082) (0.097) (0.145) (0.151) 
SBIR DoE LQ Q1 -0.368***  -0.299***  -0.330***  
 (0.043)  (0.046)  (0.084)  
SBIR DoE LQ Q2 0.053  0.131**  0.030  
 (0.064)  (0.060)  (0.103)  
SBIR DoE LQ Q3 -0.034  -0.008  -0.037  
 (0.041)  (0.048)  (0.084)  
SBIR DoE LQ  0.091***  0.066***  0.070** 
  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.032) 
Interaction  
(SMP-I * SBIR DoE 
LQ) 
 -0.010  0.015  -0.025 
 (0.038)  (0.054)  (0.067) 
SBIR DoE (logged) 0.129 0.120     
 (0.141) (0.154)     
Federal R&D (logged) -0.001 0.040** -0.009 -0.046 -0.009 -0.029 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.060) (0.063) (0.066) (0.058) 
Venture Capital 
(logged) 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
High Tech Capacity 
(LQ) 0.174* 0.343*** -0.095 -0.138 0.816 1.130 
 (0.097) (0.116) (0.483) (0.510) (1.595) (1.995) 
       
Lagged Phase II 
Success Ratet-1 
-0.048 -0.039   -0.612** -0.652** 
(0.040) (0.043)   (0.211) (0.288) 
Lagged Phase II 
Success Ratet-2 
    -0.642** -0.677** 
    (0.238) (0.282) 
Constant -1.912 -2.997 0.468 1.081 0.199 0.196 
 (2.320) (2.621) (1.306) (1.376) (1.907) (2.230) 
       
Observations 400 400 450 450 300 300 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.350 0.249 0.221 0.129   
State FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The primary outcome variable of interest is DoE Phase I success rates. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Data are available for 9 years from 2000 – 2008 for all 50 states. Models 1 – 2 report the 
pooled OLS estimates (standard errors are clustered at the state level); models 3 – 4 report the OLS state 
fixed effect estimates; and models 5 – 6 report the estimates for the Arellano Bond model. Models 1, 3 
and 5 report the estimates with quartile rankings of the DoE Phase I location quotient. The fourth quartile 
serves as the referent category. Models 2, 4 and 6 report the estimates for the DoE Phase I location 
quotient in addition to the interaction term: SMP-I * SBIR DoE LQ. *Statistically significant at the 10% 
level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level.  ***Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 3.6 Regression Results - NASA Phase II success rates 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 (OLS) (OLS) (FE) (FE) (AB) (AB) 
             
SMP I 0.063** -0.005 0.102 0.006 0.114 0.139 
 (0.031) (0.073) (0.083) (0.110) (0.219) (0.274) 
SBIR NASA LQ Q1 -0.512***  -0.357***  -0.538***  
 (0.039)  (0.048)  (0.102)  
SBIR NASA LQ Q2 -0.069  -0.027  0.031  
 (0.044)  (0.051)  (0.082)  
SBIR NASA LQ Q3 -0.026  0.010  -0.013  
 (0.037)  (0.043)  (0.060)  
SBIR NASA LQ  0.139***  0.077***  0.143*** 
  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.036) 
Interaction  
(SMP-I * SBIR NASA 
LQ) 
 0.198  0.209**  0.220 
 (0.137)  (0.098)  (0.193) 
SBIR DoE (logged) 0.155 0.114     
 (0.096) (0.100)     
Federal R&D (logged) -0.045*** -0.003 0.114* 0.116* 0.104 0.130 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.061) (0.064) (0.074) (0.090) 
Venture Capital 
(logged) -0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.005 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) 
High Tech Capacity 
(LQ) 0.326*** 0.607*** -0.045 0.128 1.206 -0.189 
 (0.121) (0.119) (0.494) (0.514) (1.765) (1.769) 
       
Lagged Phase II 
Success Ratet-1 
-0.009 0.040   0.029 0.450 
(0.051) (0.060)   (0.297) (0.501) 
Lagged Phase II 
Success Ratet-2 
    -0.068 0.295 
    (0.274) 0(.478) 
Constant -1.404 -2.177 -1.980 -2.368* -2.639 -2.648 
 (1.662) (1.722) (1.333) (1.384) (1.925) (2.275) 
       
Observations 400 400 450 450 300 300 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.410 0.309 0.213 0.144   
State FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The primary outcome variable of interest is NASA Phase I success rates. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Data are available for 9 years from 2000 – 2008 for all 50 states. Models 1 – 2 report the 
pooled OLS estimates (standard errors are clustered at the state level); models 3 – 4 report the OLS state 
fixed effect estimates; and models 5 – 6 report the estimates for the Arellano Bond model. Models 1, 3 
and 5 report the estimates with quartile rankings of the NASA Phase I location quotient. The fourth 
quartile serves as the referent category. Models 2, 4 and 6 report the estimates for the NASA Phase I 
location quotient in addition to the interaction term: SMP-I * SBIR NASA LQ. *Statistically significant 
at the 10% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level.  ***Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 3.7 Regression Results - NSF Application Activity 
 1 2 3 4 
 (OLS) (OLS) (FE) (FE) 
         
SMP I 2.489* 4.522* 5.967 4.359 
 (1.469) (2.375) (5.260) (6.597) 
SBIR NSF LQ Q1 -5.064***  -3.673  
 (1.661)  (2.757)  
SBIR NSF LQ Q2 -6.210**  -8.395***  
 (3.022)  (3.193)  
SBIR NSF LQ Q3 -2.256  0.820  
 (2.444)  (2.915)  
SBIR NSF LQ  1.602***  1.629** 
  (0.380)  (0.768) 
Interaction  
(SMP-I * SBIR NSF LQ) 
 -1.176  0.463 
 (1.263)  (2.338) 
SBIR NSF (logged) -4.754** -4.621**   
 (2.153) (2.106)   
Federal R&D (logged) 4.807*** 4.790*** 12.627*** 12.404*** 
 (1.381) (1.262) (3.963) (3.986) 
Venture Capital (logged) -0.200** -0.201** 0.005 -0.054 
 (0.090) (0.098) (0.267) (0.270) 
High Tech Capacity (LQ) 10.250* 10.735* -45.341 -50.305 
 (6.103) (5.971) (35.869) (35.982) 
     
Lagged Phase I Applicationst-1 0.876*** 0.871***   
(0.057) (0.058)   
    
Constant -13.231 -21.207 -190.163** -185.992** 
 (36.518) (34.252) (85.304) (85.914) 
     
Observations 450 450 500 500 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.801 0.800 0.338 0.327 
State FE   Yes Yes 
Year Dummies   Yes Yes 
Notes: The primary outcome variable of interest is NSF Phase I application activity. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Models 1 – 2 report the pooled OLS estimates (standard errors are clustered at the state 
level); and models 3 – 4 report the OLS state fixed effect estimates. Models 1 and 3 report the estimates 
with quartile rankings of the NSF Phase I location quotient. The fourth quartile serves as the referent 
category. Models 2 and 4 report the estimates for the NSF Phase I location quotient in addition to the 
interaction term: SMP-I * SBIR NSF LQ. *Statistically significant at the 10% level. **Statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  ***Statistically significant at the 1% level.   
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Table 3.8 Regression Results - DoE Application Activity 
 1 2 3 4 
 (OLS) (OLS) (FE) (FE) 
         
SMP I 0.241 -0.129 -0.834 -1.730 
 (0.465) (0.642) (3.339) (3.709) 
SBIR DoE LQ Q1 -1.750*  -1.523  
 (0.889)  (1.969)  
SBIR DoE LQ Q2 -2.578*  -4.980**  
 (1.442)  (2.488)  
SBIR DoE LQ Q3 0.166  -2.528  
 (1.508)  (2.005)  
SBIR DoE LQ  0.558*  0.446 
  (0.292)  (0.699) 
Interaction  
(SMP-I * SBIR DoE LQ) 
 0.611  0.728 
 (0.643)  (2.090) 
SBIR DoE (logged) 0.951 0.558   
 (1.291) (1.314)   
Federal R&D (logged) 0.633** 0.681*** 7.799*** 7.854*** 
 (0.300) (0.244) (2.514) (2.515) 
Venture Capital (logged) -0.052 -0.044 0.004 0.004 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.169) (0.169) 
High Tech Capacity (LQ) 3.599 3.355 -15.822 -20.957 
 (2.409) (2.269) (22.839) (22.686) 
     
Lagged Phase I Applicationst-1 1.032*** 1.036***   
 (0.029) (0.028)   
     
Constant -29.406 -25.204 -125.592** -124.066** 
 (23.534) (23.028) (54.038) (54.207) 
     
Observations 450 450 500 500 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.958 0.958 0.214 0.208 
State FE   Yes Yes 
Year Dummies   Yes Yes 
Notes: The primary outcome variable of interest is DoE Phase I application activity. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Models 1 – 2 report the pooled OLS estimates (standard errors are clustered at the state 
level); and models 3 – 4 report the OLS state fixed effect estimates. Models 1 and 3 report the estimates 
with quartile rankings of the DoE Phase I location quotient. The fourth quartile serves as the referent 
category. Models 2 and 4 report the estimates for the DoE Phase I location quotient in addition to the 
interaction term: SMP-I * SBIR DoE LQ. *Statistically significant at the 10% level. **Statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  ***Statistically significant at the 1% level.   
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Table 3.9 Regression Results - NASA Application Activity 
 1 2 3 4 
 (OLS) (OLS) (FE) (FE) 
         
SMP I -0.597 -0.356 4.737 4.458 
 (0.960) (1.072) (4.279) (5.731) 
SBIR NASA LQ Q1 -1.697  -3.117  
 (1.219)  (2.673)  
SBIR NASA LQ Q2 -4.094*  -3.731  
 (2.384)  (2.740)  
SBIR NASA LQ Q3 -2.999  -3.318  
 (2.377)  (2.296)  
SBIR NASA LQ  0.657  1.003 
  (0.420)  (0.954) 
Interaction  
(SMP-I * SBIR NASA LQ) 
 -0.620  0.161 
 (1.341)  (4.622) 
SBIR NASA (logged) -4.119* -4.057*   
 (2.072) (2.041)   
Federal R&D (logged) 1.686** 1.465*** -4.382 -4.067 
 (0.661) (0.530) (3.237) (3.242) 
Venture Capital (logged) -0.094** -0.102** 0.043 0.052 
 (0.044) (0.047) (0.218) (0.218) 
High Tech Capacity (LQ) 10.277** 8.548** -13.971 -13.606 
 (4.107) (3.595) (29.218) (29.232) 
     
Lagged Phase I Applicationst-1 0.930*** 0.932***   
 (0.016) (0.016)   
     
Constant 33.031 35.389 136.283* 125.922* 
 (34.378) (33.748) (69.721) (69.691) 
     
Observations 450 450 500 500 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.933 0.933 0.215 0.211 
State FE   Yes Yes 
Year Dummies   Yes Yes 
Notes: The primary outcome variable of interest is NASA Phase I application activity. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. Models 1 – 2 report the pooled OLS estimates (standard errors are clustered at the state 
level); and models 3 – 4 report the OLS state fixed effect estimates. Models 1 and 3 report the estimates 
with quartile rankings of the NASA Phase I location quotient. The fourth quartile serves as the referent 
category. Models 2 and 4 report the estimates for the NASA Phase I location quotient in addition to the 
interaction term: SMP-I * SBIR NASA LQ. *Statistically significant at the 10% level. **Statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  ***Statistically significant at the 1% level.   
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Table 3.10 Correlation Matrix  
 SMP I DoE (LQ) NASA (LQ) NSF (LQ) 
SMP I 1    
     
     
DoE (LQ) -0.1339** 1   
 (0.0073)    
     
NASA (LQ) -0.1679*** -0.1101* 1  
 (0.0007) (0.0277)   
     
NSF (LQ) -0.0474 -0.1631** -0.031 1 
 (0.3439) (0.0011) (0.5362)  
Notes: Data are reported for 50 states over the 11-year timeframe, 2000 – 2010 (550 observations). SMP-I 
is a binary variable indicating 1 if the state has the State Matching Phase I program. DoE (LQ), NASA 
(LQ) and NSF (LQ) report the location quotient functional form of grant and contract activity by federal 
mission agency respectively.37  P-values are in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
**Statistically significant at the 1% level. ***Statistically significant at the 0.1% level. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Federal funding data (including grants and contracts) for DoD, HHS, DoE, NASA, and NSF were pulled from 
USAspending.gov. Data was retrieved for all available years (2003 – 2012). The benchmarking measure was 
computed as follows: 
LQi = 
!"#"$%&  !"##"$%  !"#$%&!"#/!"#$%  !"#"$%&  !"##"$%  !"#$%&!"!"#"$%&  !"##"$%  !"#$%&!"/!"#$%  !"#"$%&  !"##"$%  !"#$%&!  
where, i denotes the mission agency (DoE, NASA and NSF), j denotes the states and t denotes the year. The values 
for the Total summation comprised the cumulative spending for the five federal mission agencies with the largest 
external R&D budgets (DoD, DHHS, DoE, NASA and NSF). 
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CHAPTER 4: APPROXIMATING EXOGENOUS VARIATION IN R&D 
SBIR PROJECTS & STATE MATCHING FUNDS 
 
(With Maryann P. Feldman)1 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
There is an active discussion about the best way to use public funds to promote innovation (e.g. 
Griliches & Mairesse, 1995; Hall, 2002; Salter & Martin, 2001; Blume-Kohout et al. 2009; Cerulli, 2010). 
The theoretical rationale for government investment in research and development (R&D) is well 
established; however, empirical work has been more controversial (Einio, 2014). Some have advocated 
for experimental designs that would randomly assign research resources to treatment or control groups; 
yet this is not politically feasible. As a result, new methods and data are needed to move the debate about 
the impact of government R&D spending forward. Moreover, much of the scholarship on R&D funding 
has focused at the level of the firm; this particularly holds for the literature examining the extent to which 
government funding crowds out private investment. Once again, this research has mixed results (e.g. 
David, Hall et al. 2000, Garcia-Quevedo, 2004; Diamond, 1999). A more salient approach for 
understanding the effect of R&D funding on innovation would be to narrow the scope of analysis and 
measure the impact of government investment in advancing the progress of innovative ideas or projects.  
Research on government investment in R&D typically examines only national policies and 
programs (e.g. Payne, 2001; Ruegg et al. 2003; Feller, 2007). Even as the literature comes to recognize 
that processes of economic growth are more regionally grounded (Audretsch & Feldman 2004), few 
studies consider sub-national policy initiatives and evaluate their impact on innovation, entrepreneurship 
and economic development. And despite the active involvement of a range of actors in federalist systems 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 At the time this dissertation was submitted to the UNC Graduate School, a version of this chapter was under peer 
review at The Review of Economics and Statistics.  
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and an international emphasis on policies and programs at the cluster or city-industry level (Andersson et 
al. 2004), there is limited understanding of the impact of subnational R&D investments and the ways in 
which multilevel programs interact. As a result, policy makers around the world struggle to develop 
policies to stimulate and increase the efficiency of the R&D process with an incomplete understanding of 
the potential for multilevel coordination between different levels of government and a lack of empirical 
evidence on investment outcomes.  
The U.S. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is a case in point.2 It is one of the 
most studied and widely emulated R&D support programs in the world (Keller & Block, 2013; Link & 
Scott, 2012; Wessner, 2008; Toole & Czarnitski, 2007; Audretsch, Link & Scott, 2002; Tibbetts, 2001; 
Wallsten, 2000; Lerner, 1996 and others). However, our knowledge of the program is incomplete due to a 
lack of consideration of complementary programs initiated by American states. As of 2013, 45 of the 50 
states had established programs – and in many cases a portfolio of programs – specifically designed to 
complement the federal SBIR program (Lanahan & Feldman, 2014). These programs run the gamut from 
state outreach programs (42 states), which simply provide information or assistance to lower the cost of 
applying to the federal SBIR program, to state match programs (17 states), which provide a prize to SBIR 
award recipients in the form of matching funds. The most prominent state SBIR match program, referred 
to in this paper as the State Match, offers a noncompetitive match to the pool of successful SBIR Phase I 
recipients competing for the larger Phase II awards.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Initially established by the Small Business Development Act of 1982, the federal SBIR program offers competitive 
funding in two phases – Phase I and Phase II – where only those small businesses that secure a Phase I award are 
eligible to compete for the larger Phase II award. Centrally coordinated by the Small Business Administration, 11 
federal mission agencies with extramural R&D funds over $100 million set aside roughly 2.8 percent of their 
budgets for small business innovative research in 2014. The 11 federal agencies that participate in the SBIR program 
include: Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
and National Institutes of Standards and Technology), Department of Defense, Department of Education, 
Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department 
of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and National 
Science Foundation. While the SBIR program is part of the larger SBIR/STTR, this paper focuses on the SBIR 
program specifically. The SBIR program has a greater focus on small business activity, rather than university 
partnerships – as emphasized in the STTR program. 
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While the federal SBIR program aims to enhance private sector R&D and stimulate technological 
innovation (Link & Scott, 2010), the state match program attempts to leverage and augment the federal 
SBIR program to increase the number of awards within a state’s jurisdiction thereby redirecting federal 
R&D funds for small businesses to the state. These programs are similar in structure – providing grants to 
Phase I recipients as they prepare to compete for the larger Phase II award. However, the size of the 
matches varies not only across states but also between years. For example, New York’s NYSTAR and 
Kentucky’s SBIR/STTR Matching Funds programs offer a dollar for dollar match; the Kansas Bioscience 
Authority provides a 50 percent match; the Connecticut Innovation program also provides a 50 percent 
match – but requires a third-party match; and the One North Carolina Small Business program offers 
awards ranging from $30,000 to $100,000 matches, which approximates a 20 to 70 percent match 
(Lanahan & Feldman, 2014).  
Preliminary research on the State Match program has focused on understanding the antecedent 
factors associated with state government adoption (Lanahan & Feldman, 2014). While the structures of 
the match programs align – notably, to bolster the innovative capacity of the firm by improving the 
competitiveness of the project – adoption of the state program is not random. The authors find that states 
are more likely to adopt the program when their economic performance lags behind other states. This 
pattern holds for a range of state university science and technology policy programs as well (Feldman & 
Lanahan, 2014). Moreover, they find evidence that state policy actions to adopt the program is positively 
associated with the state’s own internal political and economic climate in addition to external pressures 
from neighboring jurisdictions. One might expect the policy adoptions to be driven primarily by federal 
policy actions given that the match is designed to complement the federal program; however, the evidence 
shows that state policy actions stem more from a confluence of factors at the state and federal levels 
(Lanahan & Feldman, 2014).  
This paper turns to the task of examining the effect of the State Match program. First, it is 
necessary to review the structure of the federal SBIR program and the intended role played by the state 
matching funds. The match most immediately rewards successful Phase I projects to encourage progress 
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towards securing the larger SBIR Phase II award. Phase I of the federal program awards competitive 
funds to firms to demonstrate proof-of-concept of the scientific, technical, and commercial potential for a 
project in relation to the federal funding agency’s objectives. Phase II awards are provided to develop the 
project into a commercially viable product, process or service. Phase I awards typically do not exceed 
$150,000 and are meant to support up to six months of research while Phase II awards are roughly 
$1,000,000 and are meant to provide two years of support.3 The average time between awards, however, 
is slightly more than one year for the 42 percent of Phase I projects that successfully receive Phase II 
awards.4 Although the federal program was designed to support competitive early-stage projects due to 
the lack of perceived private support during this phase, the structure of the program places even the most 
promising projects in a “valley of death” between the proof-of-concept stage and the development stage 
(Auerswald & Branscomb, 2003). The State Match is designed to support projects during this critical 
interim period. By placing this program within the context of the federal SBIR program, the State Match 
offers an opportunity to examine variation in R&D funding. Importantly, the design of the 
noncompetitive state matches allows for the approximation of exogenous variation in the level of R&D 
funding. 
This paper examines the impact of state matching funds on the probability of projects securing a 
Phase II award. While Phase I recipients are not required to compete for the Phase II award, we assume 
that Phase I recipients compete for the Phase II award given that these projects are still at a nascent stage 
of the innovative process making it difficult to attract non-federal follow on funding.5 In addition, the size 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Given the nature of innovative activity within health-related fields, the Department of Health and Human Services 
offers much larger awards. Phase I and Phase II awards are as large as $500,000 and $3,000,000, respectively.  
4 This was derived from SBIR award data at sbir.gov. The average time lapse between a Phase I and Phase II award 
is roughly 1.2 years. The Phase I award provides funding for 6 months, while Phase II is intended to support firms 
for 2 years. This leaves successful Phase II applicants on average in a financial “valley of death” for slightly over six 
months. 
5 Results from the One NC Small Business Survey of State Match recipients found that roughly 75% of Phase I 
recipients intended to apply for the follow on funding. We recognize that some firms may select not to proceed with 
the competition due to number of reasons. Some may be positioned to secure non-federal follow on funding 
(Howell, 2015), while other projects may fail leading to the closure of a firm. The large majority, however, appear to 
proceed forward to apply for the larger follow on award. Thus, we focus the analysis for this paper on this response. 
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of the award is notably larger and the success rates are more favorable than the Phase I competition.6 This 
clear and quantifiable outcome variable offers a more immediate measure of progress towards 
commercialization, lessening concerns of potential confounding factors that are common when measuring 
R&D investment outcomes over longer time horizons. This analysis thus stands in contrast to other 
analyses that seek to examine more intangible and approximated outcomes related to innovation and 
economic development (Salter & Martin, 2001; Jaffe, 2008; Vuolle et al. 2009; Holmes, 2010). While 
states often mention longer-term firm level benefits such as increased employment as additional goals of 
the matching programs, these objectives are predicated on making more immediate R&D progress as 
signaled by the receipt of a Phase II award.  
This paper narrows the scope of analysis to the project level, tracing the path of federal and state 
SBIR funds for Phase I recipients – from Phase I award to state match (if eligible) to Phase II award (if 
successful). Efforts were made to include federal SBIR application activity as well, however, only state 
level statistics are available.7 The federal SBIR program is highly competitive8 and administered without 
regard to the geographic distribution of recipients. Critical to this paper’s research design is the fact that 
only those small businesses that secure a Phase I award are eligible to compete for the larger Phase II 
award: all eligible projects have competed in the federal SBIR competition and achieved a minimum level 
of competency. This addresses concerns about selection of the population of Phase I projects under 
consideration. 
This paper contributes to our developing understanding of government investment in R&D in a 
number of ways. First, by taking a closer look at R&D activity at the project level, rather than the firm 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The national Phase I and Phase II success rates are approximately 15 and 40 percent, respectively (Wessner, 2008: 
Chapter 4).   
 
7 The authors spoke with the Program Officers at the SBA, NSF, DHHS and DOD regarding SBIR application 
activity. It was made very clear that project level application data is not available for analysis. Nevertheless, the 
authors are hopeful that the mission agencies will be more willing to share this data once they share the results from 
this research. Application data would certainly strengthen the analysis and allow for a more comprehensive 
assessment of the behavioral responses to the Match program. 
 
8 The national Phase I success rate is approximately 15 percent (Wessner, 2008: Chapter 4).  
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level, it enables a more direct and precise evaluation of government investment’s effectiveness in 
supporting innovative activity. Second, by examining the role of the State Match in complementing the 
federal SBIR program, it represents one pioneering effort to comprehend the “innovational policy mix” as 
comprised of multiple layers of overlapping policies (Flanagan et al, 2011). Finally, this paper presents a 
creative research design for assessing both the differential and marginal impact of state R&D funding. 
Because the federal SBIR program does not take into consideration the location of firms when making 
Phase I or Phase II award decisions, it is possible to identify and compare similarly qualified projects in 
states with and without a matching program to approximate exogenous variation in R&D funding.9 
4.2 Research Design 
This study focuses on the effect of the State Match for North Carolina and Kentucky. North 
Carolina passed legislation in 2005 and Kentucky passed the legislation in 2006. Importantly, these two 
states were selected for this analysis given that the size of the match varies for Phase I recipients. The 
Kentucky SBIR/STTR Matching Funds Program provides a dollar for dollar state match for Phase I 
projects.10 North Carolina’s One NC Small Business Program began with $100,000 matches in 2006; 
however, due to state budgetary restrictions, the size of the match decreased to $30,000 in 2010. We focus 
on these two programs because variation in the size of the matches allows assessment of the effect of 
marginal increases in the state investment. It is worth noting that state administrative records of matches 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 SBA mandates that proposals are reviewed based solely on scientific, technical and commercial merit. We 
confirmed this with a follow up phone conversation with Dr. Hennessey (12/20/13) – Program Officer at NSF. 
While programs like FAST and ROP are designed to strengthen proposals from areas in the country that lag in 
performance, the SBIR review process does not take location into consideration. 
10 Kentucky’s SBIR/STTR Matching Funds program also provides matching funds for Phase II recipients. This 
aspect of the state program was not considered in this analysis. In 2013, we corresponded with the Program Director 
of the KY program to gather a greater understanding of the program’s structure. The program is intended to support 
Phase I recipients as they proceed to compete for the Phase II award, contingent on the availability of funds. Firms 
are required to submit an application for these state funds indicating their intention to apply for the Phase II award.  
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are not available for all states with the program, so a comprehensive assessment of all State Match 
activity across the U.S. is infeasible.11 
This paper examines the population of SBIR projects in a contiguous region12 with Phase I 
projects for firms located in Kentucky and North Carolina comprising the treated region. This approach 
mirrors a growing line of scholarship that exploits policy discontinuities at state borders (Card & Krueger, 
1990; Lee & Lemieux, 2009; Dube, Lester & Reich, 2010). We selected Phase I projects in Arkansas, 
Missouri, South Carolina and Virginia as controls. While Tennessee and Indiana share the longest 
geographical borders with Kentucky, they are not defensible control regions because Tennessee far 
surpasses the rest of the region in terms of total SBIR activity and Indiana has its own State Match 
program.13 We exclude the Northeast region of Virginia – which is part of the Washington DC greater 
metropolitan area and recipient of a disproportionate number of SBIR awards. These contiguous states 
share similar state-level economic development characteristics (Sallee et al., 2011), making them making 
them strong candidates for a control group. The sample is restricted to successful Phase I projects from 
2002 to 2010. Receipt of a Phase II award is the outcome of interest. 
4.2.1 Stratifications 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 We were successful in securing project level matches for a handful of the states with the policy; however, some 
states were unwilling or unable to share this detailed information due to data restrictions or incomplete 
administrative records. New York’s NYSTAR program serves as an illustrative example of the latter. Given that the 
program existed from 1984 – 1991, the state does not have record of the individual matches. Moreover, complete 
federal SBIR award activity for all 50 states is available through SBA’s central data repository; however, given that 
there is not a unique identifier to match Phase II to Phase I awards; the demands to match Phase II awards to their 
preceding Phase I awards is considerable. Over 39,000 Phase II awards would need to be matched to a potential pool 
of over 102,000 Phase I awards based on a series of string variables that include title, Principal Investigator, firm 
name and abstract. For more information on matching procedures, please refer to Appendix A. 
12 We restricted the sample of SBIR Phase I projects given that the distribution of SBIR awards across states is 
skewed. Firms in both California and Massachusetts, for example, have attracted a disproportionate share of SBIR 
funds collectively totaling over 33 percent. The ten states with the lowest cumulative levels of SBIR awards (Alaska, 
South Dakota, North Dakota, West Virginia, Wyoming, Mississippi, Idaho, Nebraska, Iowa, and Louisiana) have 
collectively secured less than 1.4 percent of the federal funds. This analysis derived from the full list of SBIR 
awards: www.sbir.gov. 
13 Indiana’s State Match program is the 21Fund. 
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In setting up the design for this analysis, the decentralized structure of the program and patterns 
in the distribution of awards have to be taken into account. We account for this variation in the program 
by stratifying the data two ways: (i) by federal mission agency; and (ii) by firms’ research capacity. Each 
is discussed in turn.  
The Small Business Administration (SBA) coordinates the SBIR program, but eleven federal 
mission agencies are involved in administering the review of proposals and allocation of funds. While the 
basic aim of the program is consistent across the agencies – funding promising projects with scientific, 
technical, and commercial merit – there are operational differences between the agencies (Wessner, 2008: 
109). For example, the DOD tends to fund contracts and reviews proposals internally whereas NSF and 
DHHS award grants and administer external blind peer review processes. In addition to this variation in 
administration, there is a vast range of research fields being funded by the SBIR program – including 
health, science, engineering, transportation, energy, education, security, and aeronautics. Firms interested 
in the program must select the appropriate agency to which to apply depending on the topic of the 
proposal. This selection process serves as a useful proxy for R&D specialization of the project, offering 
an operational measure for stratifying the sample. Table 4.1 illustrates this variation across mission 
agencies and provides baseline descriptive statistics for the population of Phase I activity in the pre- and 
post-periods for the full sample of six states considered in the analysis (column 2), the Kentucky-based 
region (column 3), and the North Carolina-based region (column 3). The U.S. ratios listed in the first 
column are included as a reference. Compared to national trends, it is worth noting that there is a higher 
concentration of activity in the science-based mission agencies – DHHS and NSF – for the six-state 
region of interest.  
Regarding the distribution of awards, all firms competing for federal SBIR funds must be more 
than 50% U.S. owned and have less than 500 employees.14 Yet within the population of firms that meet 
these eligibility requirements, there remains variation in terms of research capacity. In examining the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Additional criteria apply for DHHS applicants. (https://www.sbir.gov/about/about-sbir).  
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distribution of awards over time, it quickly becomes apparent that certain firms have secured a 
disproportionate number of awards. In fact, the program has been criticized for the continued support of 
what have become known as SBIR “mills.”15 These are firms that seem to receive an inordinate number 
of awards owing to a special relationship with a government agency or a particular skill in grant writing 
(Lerner, 1999). In the sample for this analysis, three firms account for 18 percent of the SBIR activity16 
while 67 percent of the firms secured three or less Phase I awards.17 We stratify by prior Phase I activity – 
specifically the number of prior Phase I awards – to account for this variation in the level of firms’ 
research capacity. We considered stratifying by other firm characteristics including firm age and number 
of employees, but we argue that this lagged SBIR performance measure is the strongest way of 
accounting for firms’ innovative research capacity.18 For the differential model, we stratify the data into 
four groups by excluding firms that have received more than five, three, and one prior Phase I awards, 
while also including the full sample as a baseline measure. 
4.2.2 Identification 
The validity of this design is predicated on identifying a region with treated and control Phase I 
projects that are comparable except for exposure to the treatment (i.e. receiving state matching funds). We 
assess the strength of this design with a means comparison test for a series of firm-level characteristics: 
woman owned, HUBZone (Historically Underutilized Business Zones), minority owned, year established, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 There is no formal definition of SBIR “mills,” however, they tend to secure SBIR awards at a matter of magnitude 
over the rest of the recipients. 
16 These include Luna Innovations (located in Roanoke, VA), Nanosonic Inc. (located in Pembroke, VA), and 
Barron Associates (located in Charlottesville, VA).  
17 SBIR activity for 800 firms are included in the sample. 366 firms only secured 1 Phase I award, 138 firms secured 
2 and 64 firms secured 3 Phase I awards. As an illustrative example, Nanosonic, Inc. and Zumatek, Inc. both 
received a state match from NC, however, the impact of the match arguably varies for these two firms given that 
Nanosonic, Inc. secured 128 Phase I awards over our designated timeframe and Zumatek, Inc. only secured one. 
18 The measures for Firm Age and Employment are reported from the NETS data. These measures are not as 
complete as the SBIR award data. Therefore, due to incomplete data these are not as strong. Section 4.4 discusses 
the missing nature of the NETS data. 
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employment, and SBIR capacity (at the cbsa and firm level). Table 2 reports the means for the treated and 
control population of firms with SBIR Phase I projects for the full sample of six states. The data are 
stratified by mission agency and prior Phase I success. We report for the full program and the science-
based mission agencies – HHS and NSF – given the concentration of activity in these agencies for this 
region (as illustrated in Table 4.1).19,20 
Results from a series of t-tests on the full sample indicate that the population of small businesses 
in the treated group and in the control group are comparable for some measures – woman owned, 
HUBZone, and minority owned; however, they differ for others – firm age, employment and SBIR 
capacity. Specifically, the treated firms are younger, smaller, and located in geographic proximity to firms 
with higher rates of Phase I success. However, when we stratify the results by mission agency and prior 
Phase I success, the variation lessens.  
 Regarding firm age, the treated group’s relatively young age would likely bias the policy effect 
toward zero given that these firms are less mature and therefore less experienced at securing external 
funding (Kortum & Lerner, 2000). Regarding SBIR capacity, firms in the treated group tend to be in 
geographies with greater demonstrated capacity for securing SBIR awards, so they may benefit from 
spillover effects and agglomeration economies (Audretsch & Feldman, 2004; Audretsch & Lehmann, 
2005). This may introduce bias into the design, so it is necessary to control for the regional SBIR capacity 
in the empirical analysis. 
4.3. Methods 
This paper first considers the SBIR activity for all Phase I recipients from the treated and control 
states by employing a difference-in-difference (DD) research design.21 A DD approach serves as one of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The full output that includes the other federal mission agencies is available upon request. 
20 The science-based mission agencies are reported given that we find a policy effect for these stratifications. This is 
made clear later in the paper in section 4.4. 
21 The difference-in-difference model is as follows: 𝛿 =   𝑦!,! −   𝑦!,! − 𝑦!,! −   𝑦!,! , 
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the more robust interrupted times series designs because it employs a pre- and post-policy comparison 
group design (Murray & Stern, 2007; Henry, 2010; Furman & Stern, 2011). Equation 4.1 is a project-
level model estimating the effect of the state match on Phase II success rates. Pr  (𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝐼𝐼!) = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑠𝑡! + 𝛿!𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑦𝑟! + 𝛿!𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑦𝑟! ∗𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑠𝑡!   + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀! , 
[4.1] 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝐼𝐼! is the binary outcome variable of interest – Phase II award – and i denotes the SBIR Phase I 
project. The intercept, 𝛽!, is the average value of the Phase II success rates for states without the policy; 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑦𝑟! is coded one for years the treated state has the program and zero otherwise; the parameter 𝛿! 
captures the change in all Phase II success rates over the specified timeframe; and t denotes the year. The 
coefficient for 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑠𝑡, 𝛽!, measures the state effect not due to the policy. 𝛽! equals unity for those 
states that ever had the policy, and zero otherwise. The parameter of interest is the interaction term 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑦𝑟! ∗𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑠𝑡! ; 𝛿!  measures the change in Phase II success rates due to the State Match 
program.  
The set of firm-level measures reported in Table 4.2 are included as controls to account for firm 
variation that may affect the outcome variable of interest. While award decisions are explicitly stated to 
be based solely on the scientific merit and promise of the projects, it is notable that Congress specified, 
“increased participation among women and minorities” as one of the program’s official societal 
objectives (Wessner, 2008). Therefore, we include measures of woman and minority owned and 
HUBZone status. In addition, considerable research has found that innovation and R&D production are 
contingent on firm characteristics that include firm age and size (e.g. Cohen & Klepper, 1996; Sorensen 
& Stuart, 2000), so we include measures of age and employment. Lastly, we include a control that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
where 𝑦 denotes the average of the outcome variable; the first subscript denotes the year; and the second subscript 
denotes the state. C is the control group (those states without the policy), and T is the treatment group (those states 
with the policy). 
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measures the concentration of Phase I awards in the immediate geography to account for potential 
regional spillover benefits.22   
Marginal Effect 
Equation 4.2 presents a project-level model estimating the impact of the size of the match on 
securing the Phase II award. This model narrows the sample of Phase I recipients to only those that 
received a state match award.  Pr 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝐼𝐼! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +   𝑢! , [4.2] 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝐼𝐼! is the binary outcome variable of interest, and i denotes the SBIR Phase I project. The policy 
variable of interest, 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ!, is a continuous measure indicating the size of the financial award. The 
same set of controls for the differential analysis is included for the marginal analysis.  
4.3.1 Data 
The data are structured at the SBIR Phase I project level. This paper considers activity for the 
population of SBIR Phase I recipients located in a contiguous region: AR, KY, MO, NC, SC, and VA 
(excluding NoVA).23 To control for potential fluctuations in the federal SBIR program, the timeframe is 
limited to the most recent federal SBIR reauthorization window: 2002 to 2010.24 Detailed, project level 
federal SBIR activity was drawn from the SBA’s publicly accessible central repository of SBIR awards. 
Where applicable, data on the state match award and subsequent federal Phase II award are matched to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 There is growing evidence to suggest that the knowledge spillovers and agglomeration economies associated with 
this activity are spatially proximate (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Griliches, 1998). Spatial benefits that range from 
increased levels of supply, proximity, pooling of demands for specialized labor, reduced transportation costs, and 
knowledge spillovers explain why certain localities demonstrate heightened levels of innovative output and 
economic success. These trends suggest firm activity cannot be assessed in isolation of its spatial context (Audretsch 
& Feldman, 2004). 
23 We relied on Northern Virginia Regional Commission’s definition of NOVA (northern VA). This included the 
following VA counties: Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, Prince William; and it included the following cities: 
Alexandria, Arlington, Falls Church, Fairfax, Fairfax Station, Great Falls, Manassas, Manassas Park, McLean, Oak 
Hill, Potomac Falls and Reston. (Available at: http://www.novaregion.org/index.aspx?nid=233) 
24 In 2000, the program was reauthorized a second time (the first reauthorization took place in 1992) resulting in an 
increase in the size of the Phase I and Phase II awards. The most recent reauthorization in 2011 extended the 
program to 2017. 
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the Phase I project. The SBIR program does not link Phase I and Phase II activity with a unique identifier, 
so we matched both sources of follow on funding based on a number of project characteristics including 
project title, Principal Investigator, firm name, date of award, SBIR mission agency, and abstract. Forty-
two percent of the projects advanced from Phase I to Phase II in this sample. Appendix C provides more 
detail on the matching procedure. 
The Kentucky Science and Technology Corporation provided comprehensive project-level award 
data for Kentucky’s state match program.25 Although the state legislation was passed in 2006, the funding 
was not made available until 2007. Awards ranged from $70,000 to $150,000, averaging $99,000. North 
Carolina’s Department of Commerce provided comprehensive project-level data for the One North 
Carolina Small Business Program.26 The first match awards were made in 2006, the same year the 
program was established. Awards ranged from $30,000 to $100,000, averaging $74,000.  
Table 4.3 details the list of variables, their functional forms and data sources. For both the 
differential and marginal models, we use the binary indicator, Phase II, as the dependent variable, which 
indicates that a project advanced. We consider how the state policy increases the likelihood of securing an 
award rather than the size of the Phase II award. This is a more defensible approach as the SBA sets the 
size of the Phase II award a priori through federal authorizations.  
We stratify the data two ways to account for variation in the population: (i) by federal mission 
agency, and (ii) by firm research capacity. We derived the latter by considering number of prior Phase I 
awards dating back to 2000.27 Table 4.4 provides the descriptive statistics for the sample of project-level 
activity under consideration.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 We thank Kenneth Ronald, Program Manager of the Kentucky SBIR-STTR Matching Funds Program for sharing 
the award data. 
26 We thank Dr. John Hardin, Executive Director of the Board of Science & Technology for sharing the award data. 
Initially established in 2006, the One NC Small Business Program remained active until 2012. Between FY 2012 
and 2014 no solicitations were available; however, the program received funding during FY2015. (More information 
is available at: http://www.nccommerce.com/st/grant-programs/one-nc-small-business-program). 
 
27 This refers specifically to the cumulative number of Phase I projects awarded to the firm up through the prior 
calendar year. We recognize that this technique leaves room for potential underestimation of the prior capacity for 
firms most active at the beginning of the timeframe.  
	   102 
4.4 Results  
This paper empirically examines project-level data within a six-state region to assess the 
differential and marginal effects of the State Match program. Below, the results from each analysis are 
discussed in turn. For all models, we cluster the standard errors at the firm level to address issues of 
autocorrelation given that the federal SBIR program does not preclude firms from securing multiple SBIR 
awards.28  
4.4.1 DD Results 
Table 4.5 presents the empirical results for the DD model for the sample of Phase I projects for 
the entire region of interest. This includes the population of Phase I award activity for firms with SBIR 
projects in the treated states – Kentucky and North Carolina – and the control states – AR, MO, SC and 
VA. SBIR Phase I projects in 2006 were dropped for this analysis to ensure a clear cut off between the 
pre-policy and post-policy periods. While both Kentucky and North Carolina adopted the State Match 
program in 2006, Kentucky did not make the first award until 2007. Thus, the four-year period from 2002 
– 2005 denotes the pre-policy period and the four-year period from 2007 – 2010 denotes the post-policy 
period. We report only those results where we find a statistically significant effect for the state match.29 
Model 1 in Table 4.5 reports the LPM (linear probability model) estimates for Eq. 4.1 for the full 
sample of NSF Phase I projects; the result for the policy variable is positive and weakly significant. In 
Models 2 – 4, the sample is stratified by mission agency and by prior Phase I activity. Model 2 reports the 
results for HHS participants with five or less prior Phase I awards; the result is positive and statistically 
significant. Model 3 reports for HHS participants with even less prior success in the program – three or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Given that the treatment effect is derived from a state level policy, as we note later in the paper, we also run the 
DD model using the wild cluster bootstrap procedure (Cameron, Gelbach & Miller, 2008). There are limitations with 
this approach given the nature of the design; nonetheless, this is reported in the robustness section of the paper.  
 
29 Results for the full set of stratifications – by mission agency and prior SBIR Phase I activity – are available upon 
request. 
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less prior awards; the result is positive and weakly significant. Model 4 reports for the full sample of NSF 
participants with one or less prior Phase I award; the result is positive and statistically significant. 
4.4.2 Marginal Results 
In assessing the marginal effect of the program, we include only those projects that received a 
state match and estimate the effect of increasing the match in $10,000 increments. This approach limits 
the timeframe of SBIR Phase I activity to the period from 2006 – 2010. Table 4.6 presents the LPM 
estimates for Eq. 4.2. Model 1 reports the LPM coefficients for the full sample of projects with a State 
Match to serve as a baseline. The same stratification techniques used for the DD model were used for this 
analysis. The State Match is positive and statistically significant when the sample is stratified by prior 
Phase I activity – specifically nine or less, five or less, and three or less prior Phase I awards. These refer 
to Models 2 – 4, respectively. The coefficient, State Match, was significant for the seven stratifications 
that ranged from nine to three or less prior awards; however, we report these three results to demonstrate 
the trend of the effect. We do not find a statistically significant effect when stratifying by mission agency; 
however, this is likely due to the small sample size.  
Figure 4.1 illustrates these results by plotting adjusted predictions of the marginal increase of the 
match. The blue (relatively flat) line represents the entire sample of projects that received a state match 
while the red (steeper and positively sloped) line represents those projects whose firms have secured less 
than two SBIR Phase I projects. We include the blue line representing the full sample as a baseline 
reference, though it should be noted that the marginal effects for that sample are not statistically 
significant.  
4.4.3 Robustness Checks 
 As robustness checks, we also ran logit models for the DD and marginal analyses. Paying 
particular attention to the coefficient for the policy variable, Appendix B reports the coefficients for the 
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State Match for both sets of estimations.30 The results indicate that the coefficients are robust across all 
models. Moreover, we compared the average marginal effect for the State Match estimated from the logit 
models to the State Match coefficient for the LPM models.31 The average difference in the marginal 
effects for the differential analysis between the two estimations procedures for Models 1 – 3 was less than 
four percentage points. While the results for Model 4 were robust for the logit and LPM estimations, the 
difference in the size of the coefficients was notably larger. This, however, is due to convergence issues 
related to the small sample size for the logit estimation. For the marginal analysis, the coefficients for the 
State Match are robust, and the difference in marginal effects is negligible. While LPM models have 
received criticism due to the potential for out of range predictions, it is not a concern for this analysis.32 
For ease of interpretation of the marginal effects, the LPM results are presented as the primary models.  
 As added robustness checks, we also estimated the effect using a triple difference (DDD) method 
(Davidoff et al., 2008) and propensity score matching (PSM) procedure (Morgan & Winship, 2007). For 
the DDD, we ran two sets of models: (i) interacting the policy effect with an additional binary variable 
indicating previous SBIR activity and then stratifying by mission agency, and (ii) interacting the policy 
effect with an additional binary variable indicating the mission agency and then stratifying by previous 
Phase I activity. The results are robust and reflect the findings from the DD model.33 For the PSM 
procedure, we fully saturated the model on all firm and project level observables and ran the model using 
a variety of matching procedures.34 The size and direction of the State Match coefficients are consistent, 
but the results are not robust. This null effect can likely be attributed to the limited size of the control 
population.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 For Tables D.1 and D.2, row A reports the coefficients from the logit estimation; row B re-reports the coefficients 
from Table 4.5 from the LPM estimation.  
 
31 Refer to row C in Tables D.1 and D.2 in Appendix D. 
 
32 Refer to row D in Tables D.1 and D.2 in Appendix D. 
 
33 The results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
34 These included common nearest neighbor, LLR, and Kernel matching techniques. 
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 Given that the treatment effect is derived from a state level policy, we also ran the DD model (Eq. 
4.1) using the wild cluster bootstrap procedure (Cameron, Gelbach & Miller, 2008).35 This approach 
estimates more conservative standard errors when the number of clusters in a sample is relatively small. 
The direction of the coefficient is consistent with the main findings across the stratifications; however, the 
statistical significance is not fully robust. We interpret these results with caution given that we are 
estimating the model with six state-level clusters. Results from Cameron, Gelbach & Miller’s (2008) 
Monte Carlo estimations indicate that this method performs well with as few as six clusters; yet, the 
strength of this approach is compromised given that we only have six state clusters with a limited number 
of observations. We do not run the wild cluster bootstrap procedure with the Marginal Analysis (Eq. 4.2) 
given that only two states are included in the model.  
4.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
As noted above, data for this analysis was gathered from the central repository of SBIR awards, 
the two state agencies with the State Match, and the National Establishment Time Series database 
(NETS). Appendix C details the procedure by which data from these sources was matched. The former 
two sources are public and comprehensive; however, NETS is less complete. While rich in firm-level 
detail, approximately 15 percent of the sample was missing. Complete case analysis was used to estimate 
Eq. 4.1 and 4.2 reported in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, respectively. As sensitivity measures, we re-ran the 
differential and marginal models employing three additional estimation procedures to address issues of 
missing data: Dummy Variable Adjustment, Mean Imputation, and a simplified, underspecified model.  
The first technique follows Alison’s (2002) discussion of dummy variables; the missing values 
for Year Established were replaced with the year the Phase I award was granted and missing values for 
Employment were replaced with the value 1. A binary indicator was included to denote the imputed 
observations. For the Mean Imputation procedure, missing values for Year Established were estimated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Refer to row E in Table D.1 in Appendix D. 
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based on the average time lapse between firm birth and securing a first Phase I award – the average time 
lapse for this sample was six years. Missing values for Employment were replaced with the average 
employment values based on the age of the firm.36 The third procedure estimates a simplified model that 
includes all the observations by excluding the two controls from NETS – Year Established and 
Employment.  
The results for the coefficients – State Match – for the differential and marginal analyses are 
presented in Appendix E. The direction and significance of the results are robust across all models. It is 
worth noting, however, that the size of the coefficients for the State Match is slightly larger for the 
differential analysis (Eq. 4.1). This suggests that the complete case analysis technique may overestimate 
the size of the effect. As for the marginal analysis, the coefficients are roughly the same across the 
different imputation procedures.  
4.4.5 Cohort Study 
Thus far, we have discussed the effect of the policy for the full sample of projects in the six-state 
region. However, it is also instructive to consider the Kentucky region and North Carolina region 
separately in case the variation in the size of the match between the two programs has an important effect. 
Therefore, we ran Eq. 4.1 separately for the Kentucky-based and North Carolina-based cohorts. The full 
results are presented in Appendix F.  
The population of Phase I projects located in KY, AR, and MO comprise the former region. We 
included Phase I projects in 2006, coding them in the pre-policy period. While the coefficients were 
consistently positive, they were not statistically different from zero for the complete case analysis.37 The 
small sample size is likely a concern for this cohort, especially for the various stratifications. It is worth 
noting, however, that there is a positive and significant effect for NSF projects with limited prior SBIR 
experience when running the simplified, underspecified model (see Table F.6 in Appendix F).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 We relied on imputed values of age for the missing values. 
 
37 The results are not reported due to the insignificance for the State Match. Results are available upon request. 
	   107 
The population of Phase I projects located in NC, SC, and VA comprise the North Carolina-based 
study. We included Phase I projects in 2006, coding them in the post-policy period. The effect of the 
match is statistically significant and positive among the sub-sample of projects with less research capacity 
– specifically among those firms with five or less prior awards.38 Moreover, this effect holds for HHS 
projects with less prior experience.   
4.5. Discussion 
This paper traces SBIR activity for the population of Phase I projects within a contiguous region 
to assess both the differential and marginal effects of the State Match program. The data are stratified by 
federal mission agency to account for industrial heterogeneity across project topics and by prior SBIR 
Phase I activity to approximate the research capacity of firms conducting the projects.  
 The results show that the State Match program is somewhat effective in advancing innovative 
ideas toward development and commercialization for a subsection of projects. The effect of the State 
Match on securing a larger Phase II award varies according to mission agency and prior SBIR success. 
Results from the differential analysis indicate that the State Match has an overall effect for projects 
competing in the NSF program. These results align with earlier work that employed a more 
comprehensive, albeit state level, assessment of the State Match program (Lanahan, 2014).39 When the 
sample is stratified by research capacity, results indicate that the program is effective specifically for HHS 
and NSF Phase I recipients. In other words, the matching funds differentially benefit projects competing 
in the NSF and HHS programs whose firms have limited prior success with the SBIR program. We might 
explain this finding by considering differences in research practices and financial demands across 
industries (Gangnon et al., 2008; Graham et al. 2010). The results suggest that the size of the State Match 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See Table F.3 in Appendix F. 
 
39 This paper assesses the efficacy of the SBIR State Match program. It employs a state-level fixed effects model 
and considers two outcome variables – Phase II success rates and Phase I application activity. Results from the 
empirical analysis indicate that state matching funds increase Phase II success rates for firms participating in NSF’s 
SBIR program. 
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is sufficient to assist promising projects in the basic sciences to differentiate themselves but insufficient to 
do so for projects in other, more downstream, applied research fields.   
When considering the marginal effect of the program, we find evidence that the size of the match 
affects the probability of securing a Phase II award. Again, the results show that the State Match has an 
effect only among projects with less research capacity. Looking at this more closely, we find that this 
variation is indicative of other differences in the firm characteristics as well. The results from a 
comparison of means tests – comparing the full sample of firms with less than 10 prior Phase I awards to 
firms with 10 or more prior Phase I awards – indicate that the former group has on average 15 employees 
compared to an average of 40. Moreover, these firms are on average six years younger. Both of these 
differences in means are statistically different. Considering this firm-level variation, the impact of the 
additional match has a greater effect among the subset of firms that are more representative of smaller 
enterprises that likely include start-ups. More directly, it appears as though more funding is both better 
and worth more when invested in projects by firms with less success with the SBIR program.  
This variation is not surprising if we understand prior SBIR activity as a proxy for firms’ overall 
R&D funding reserves: firms with greater levels of prior SBIR success likely have a larger research 
budget while firms with less success in the federal program likely have fewer resources.40 If we then 
consider the State Match award as a proportion of firms’ overall research budgets, it would tend to 
constitute a greater proportion of the research budgets for firms with less prior SBIR experience and a 
smaller proportion for those with greater prior SBIR experience. In the former case, the award would tend 
to offer more slack resources to a firm, enabling greater flexibility for developing the project. In the latter 
case, the award would tend to increase a firm’s overall research budget by a relatively smaller 
proportional amount and would thus be less likely to yield a differential effect. This likely explains why 
we find a more consistent effect among those firms with less prior SBIR success rather than across the 
entire sample. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Detailed data on external funding sources for the firms considered in this sample were not available. We 
considered VentureXpert, CapitalIQ, and NETS as possible sources; however, the data for the population and time 
frame is incomplete. 
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In sum, these findings indicate that the impact of an additional dollar is not consistent across the 
entire population of projects, and rather varies by research focus and research capacity. While we are 
hesitant to interpret the lack of a policy effect for the entire sample, it is striking to note how the 
program’s effect seems to be limited in specific ways. The nature of innovative research requires 
substantial investment. The lack of a consistent effect across all of the various stratifications may indicate 
that the size of the State Match is not enough for many of the projects to differentiate themselves as they 
progress toward the development stage.  
The State Match programs are designed to support the R&D process, but identifying the precise 
mechanisms by which they may contribute to this process is difficult to determine. This analysis 
measured the effect of state investments on the likelihood of projects securing a follow on federal Phase II 
SBIR award. Assuming that Phase I recipients move on to compete for the Phase II award, the state funds 
may advance a project by enabling improvements in its technical or scientific aspects, or they may simply 
enable improvements in the Principal Investigator’s grant writing skills. Both of these would improve the 
competitiveness of a Phase II proposal, but the former more directly meets the objectives of the program – 
advancing early-stage innovation.  
As one effort to understand this mechanism, we examined the time lag from Phase I to Phase II 
for the projects that received the State Match in contrast to projects awarded at the same time but were 
part of firms located in the control region. If the State Match is used to aid in the technical aspects of the 
projects (in contrast to merely improving the PI’s grant writing), we suspect that the additional funds may 
be used to increase the incubation period of the Phase I project before moving on to compete for the 
larger Phase II funding. The results from a comparison of means test indicate that projects with a State 
Match that move on to secure the Phase II take longer than those without the State Match – specifically, 
1.53 years compared to 1.36 years, respectively.41 This offers preliminary evidence to suggest that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 A comparison of means test was run to assess if the time lag from Phase I to Phase II differed for projects with the 
State Match to those without. All projects in the control region of interest awarded after 2006 were compared to the 
sample of projects that received the State Match . The average time lag from Phase I to Phase II for projects with 
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funds are used to extend the initial phase of the project to increase the competitiveness of the follow on 
proposal. Additional analysis, however, is need as the State Match may advance the innovation process in 
a variety of ways.  
4.5.1 Other Considerations 
 While the federal program aims to bolster R&D across the U.S., the State Match program, 
adopted in Kentucky, North Carolina and 12 other states, invests in local firms that have already 
demonstrated innovative potential by winning a federal Phase I award. This match program can thus be 
understood both as an attempt to help local firms secure larger Phase II awards, but also as a direct 
investment in a state’s innovative capacity. The Phase II award serves as the most immediate intended 
outcome; nevertheless, state governments establish the State Match program with additional outcomes in 
mind, including increased employment and sales growth. Research is finding dual advantages associated 
with R&D investments (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013), so it is worth considering how the effects of the State 
Match may extend beyond securing the follow on Phase II award.  
During earlier iterations of this research project, we considered employment change as an 
additional outcome measure. Drawing upon NETS employment data, we estimated employment change 
based on annual firm employment for the years of receiving the Phase I and II awards. For those 
unsuccessful in securing the Phase II award, we approximated one calendar year as the average time lapse 
between Phase I and Phase II awards42 to estimate the year of employment and subsequent annual 
employment level for the post-period. NETS reported annual employment data for roughly 81 percent of 
the projects.43 For the remaining projects, we imputed the average employment levels based on firm age. 
We then derived a binary variable – Employment Change – that denoted if employment increased from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(100 projects) and without (421 projects) the State Match was 1.53 years and 1.36 years, respectively. This 
difference is statistically significant (p-value 0.045).   
 
42 This is based on the full sample of projects considered in this analysis. 
 
43 To be clear, employment level reflects the firm’s employment levels. 
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the Phase I year to the Phase II year. We ran the models with Employment Change as the outcome 
applying the same methods we used for the Phase II outcome.44 The results were not robust for this 
outcome measure across any of the stratifications. We are hesitant to conclude that the State Match has no 
effect on employment change. Instead, we attribute this to the quality of the available employment data. 
The NETS database relies on self-reported data, and it appears that a portion of the participating firms 
approximate employment levels rather than report exact levels.45 This data is useful as a proxy for firm 
size; however, it presents empirical problems when computing employment change over time, especially 
over one calendar year. Additionally, in crosschecking with the North Carolina Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (QCEW), we find variation in reported employment numbers, which further 
suggests the NETS data may be inaccurate. 
4.6 Conclusions & Policy Recommendations 
The federal SBIR program fosters innovation by investing in small businesses that demonstrate 
innovative and commercial potential. This program has received considerable attention in both the policy 
and scholarly communities. Much less attention, however, has been paid to the growing role played by 
state governments in complementing the federal program. By examining the State Match program, this 
paper advances the scholarship on R&D policy by moving beyond the common focus on federal policy 
toward an appreciation of the multilevel policy mix (Lanahan and Feldman, 2014).  
The contributions of this paper are compelling on two accounts. First, by considering state R&D 
actions within the framework of the SBIR program, we are able to set up a research design to assess the 
marginal effect of external public funding on innovative activity; in short, we rely on the noncompetitive 
nature of the state match to approximate exogenous variation in the level of R&D funding for innovative 
projects. As Diamond (1999) emphasized in his study of R&D funding levels, if innovation is a crucial 
source for economic growth, we should want to identify and advocate those institutions and reward 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Results for the models with Employment Change as the outcome variable are available upon request. 
 
45 We deduced this given the limited within firm variation on employment over time. 
	   112 
structures that are most efficient at creating new technology and scientific knowledge. By assessing the 
efficacy of an existing reward structure at the level of the R&D project, rather than the firm, this paper’s 
research design provides a model for future empirical work. 
Second, this analysis finds that that the value of state dollars varies across projects. Specifically, 
the state dollar is effective in assisting firms with less prior SBIR success carrying out R&D projects 
within the broad fields of science and health. This is likely due to differences in the financial demands of 
research across different industries and to differences in the proportion of firms’ overall research budgets 
taken up by the State Match award. These results offer compelling policy implications: rather than 
providing an equal amount of state matching funds to the entire pool of SBIR Phase I recipients, states 
ought to consider allocating funds more selectively. In addition, this entails notable policy implications 
for policymakers overseeing the federal SBIR program. The State Match can be viewed as a policy 
experiment approximating a marginal increase in the SBIR Phase I award. Given that the effect varies 
according to research field, federal policymakers might consider revamping the SBIR program to take 
into account the differing financial demands of different industries.  
This paper examines the innovation policy mix by considering the role of the SBIR State Match 
program within the framework of the federal SBIR program. To extend this research, including data on 
SBIR application activity would extend and complement this analysis. This would offer more complete 
information regarding the behavioral responses to the federal and state SBIR programs. In addition, we 
assume that all Phase I recipients move on to compete for Phase II funds; however, alternative outcomes 
should be explored. This includes securing additional non-federal funding and trading activity including 
firm acquisitions.  
Moving forward, scholars might consider the role of non-profit initiatives in supporting the 
innovation process.46 Non-profit and other non-public resources supporting R&D exist in practice, but are 
not accounted for in the literature (Denis, 2004). Another step forward would be to try to further hone the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Examples include New Mexico’s non-profit Technology Ventures Corporation, specifically the SBIR/STTR 
Outreach Center. This organization assists SBIR projects in the Southwest U.S.  
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unit of analysis. This paper moved from the firm to the project level, but scholars might also study the 
R&D process at the level of the individual Principal Investigator (Lane & Bertuzzi, 2011).   
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Table 4.1 SBIR Phase I Activity 
 (1) US (2) Full Sample (3) KY Region (4) NC Region 
 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
DOD  0.48  0.50  0.42  0.44  0.25  0.24  0.47 0.50 
DHHS  0.25 0.20  0.32  0.28  0.39  0.40 0.30  0.24 
NSF  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.10  0.17  0.16  0.05  0.08 
DOE  0.06  0.08  0.04  0.06  0.03 0.07  0.04  0.06 
NASA 0.07  0.08  0.06  0.07  0.05  0.05  0.07  0.08 
Other 
 
0.07 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.04 
Total 18856 15784 1030 1147 259 264 820 1079 
Notes: Phase I SBIR award activity from 2002 to 2010 is presented. Phase I awards are stratified by 
mission agency – Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), 
National Science Foundation (NSF), Department of Energy (DOE), National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), and Other. Other includes the following agencies: Department of Agriculture, 
Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and National Institutes of 
Standards and Technology), Department of Education, Department of Homeland Security, Department of 
Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency.  
 
The ratio of Phase I awards to the total number of Phase I awards in the respective time period are 
presented. The first set of columns reports the full population of SBIR Phase I activity for the entire U.S. 
The second set of columns reports the Phase I activity for the full sample considered in this analysis (AR, 
KY, MO, NC, SC, and VA (excluding Northern VA)). The third set of columns – KY Region – reports 
the Phase I activity for firms located in KY (treated state), MO and AR. The fourth set of columns – NC 
Region – reports the Phase I activity for firms located in NC (treated state), SC and VA (excluding 
Northern VA). Data on SBIR Phase I award activity were gathered from SBA’s SBIR award database 
(sbir.gov).  
 
The pre and post policy time periods vary across the different samples. For the US and Full Sample (the 
first two columns), the pre period spans 2002 to 2005 and the post period spans 2007 to 2010. The year 
2006 was dropped to designate a clear cut off between the pre and post policy period given the treated 
states considered in this analysis. For the KY Sample (the third set of columns) the pre-policy period 
spans 2002 to 2006; post policy period spans 2007 to 2010. For the NC Sample (the fourth set of 
columns) the pre-policy period spans 2002 to 2005; post policy period spans 2006 to 2010.  
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Table 4.2 Identification on firm-level characteristics
	   116 
Table 4.3 Indicators for Empirical Models 
Variables Metric Unit of Analysis Source 
SBIR Policy Outcome  
 Phase IIi Binary SBA 
    
DD Analysis – Policy Variable  
Post Policy Match_yrt  Binary Derived 
Treatment Group Match_sth Binary Derived 
State Match Match_yrt * Match_sth Binary Derived  
 
Marginal Analysis – Policy Variable 
 
 State  Match!! Level (in $10,000s, 
adjusted for 
inflation) 
KY Science and Technology 
Corporation;  
NC Department of Commerce 
Controls  
 Woman Ownedj Binary SBIR.gov 
 HUBZonej Binary SBIR.gov 
 Minority Ownedj Binary SBIR.gov 
 Phase Ikt Count (cbsa) Derived from SBIR.gov 
 Year Establishedj Calendar Year NETS 
 Employmentjt Level NETS 
Notes: i denotes the federal SBIR project, j denotes the recipient firm, k denotes the core based statistical 
area (CBSA), h denotes the state, and t denotes the year. † denotes that the variable has been adjusted for 
inflation using July 2013 GDP Implicit Price Deflators – base year 2005; in addition, the data on the State 
Match awards are reported in $10,000s. For Year Established and Employment data was gathered from 
the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) database. NETS data on Year Established is available for 
2445 projects (85% of sample). For the missing values, I manually searched for the year established 
online and identified an additional 321 data points yielding data for 96% of the sample. NETS data on 
Employment is available for 2369 projects (82% of sample). Data on annual employment for firms is not 
readily available. Therefore, complete case analysis is used. 
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Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Label Mean S.D. Min Max 
Phase II 0.455 0.498 0 1 
State Match (in $10,000s) 7.208 2.369 2.636 13.459 
     
Controls     
Woman Owned 0.071 0.256 0 1 
HUBZone 0.023 0.149 0 1 
Minority Owned 0.039 0.194 0 1 
SBIR Capacity (cbsa) 20.276 11.692 0 44 
Year Established 1996.48 9.295 1817 2011 
Employment 22.185 30.789 1 400 
Notes: Unless otherwise noted, the number of observations is 2422 (full sample of SBIR Phase I projects 
from 2002 to 2010). Given incomplete data reported from NETS, the number of observations for Year 
Established and Employment are 2346 and 2036, respectively. This includes roughly 97% and 84% of the 
sample, respectively. The marginal analysis considers SBIR-related activity only for the sample of Phase I 
projects that received the state match award, State Match. Two-hundred and twenty four Phase I projects 
were awarded in the time frame of interest. 
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Table 4.5 Difference in Difference (Eq. 4.1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Phase II Phase II Phase II Phase II 
          
Post-period -0.291*** -0.275*** -0.280*** -0.488*** 
 
(0.074) (0.083) (0.097) (0.161) 
Treated state -0.137 -0.100 -0.112 -0.258 
 
(0.125) (0.081) (0.093) (0.172) 
State Match 0.294* 0.248** 0.247* 0.536** 
 
(0.152) (0.112) (0.128) (0.223) 
Woman Owned 0.017 0.017 -0.017 -0.177 
 
(0.116) (0.084) (0.103) (0.203) 
HUBZone 0.079 0.209 0.185 -0.067 
 
(0.242) (0.145) (0.153) (0.226) 
Minority Owned 0.620*** 0.099 0.127 0.691*** 
 
(0.083) (0.114) (0.112) (0.175) 
SBIR Capacity (cbsa) 0.006* 0.001 0.001 0.008** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Year Established 0.008 -0.002 -0.002 0.019 
 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.016) 
Employment -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Constant -15.756 4.787 4.317 -36.831 
 
(13.662) (6.878) (7.069) (31.137) 
     Observations 162 311 263 88 
R-squared 0.098 0.048 0.047 0.159 
Sample NSF Full DHHS 5 Prior DHHS 3 Prior NSF 1 Prior 
Notes:  Data includes the population of Phase I activity for the entire region (KY, AR, MO, NC, SC and 
VA (sans Northern VA)) from 2002 to 2010. Phase I activity for 2006 was dropped from the analysis 
allowing for a clear cut off between the pre and post policy period. Coefficients are reported from an 
LPM (linear probability model). Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the firm level (*** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Model 1 includes the full sample of NSF Phase I recipients. Models 2 and 3 
report the coefficients for DHHS projects for firms with five or less prior Phase I awards and 3 or less 
prior Phase I awards, respectively. Model 4 reports the coefficients for NSF projects for firms with 1 or 
less prior Phase I awards. Complete case analysis is used. 
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Table 4.6 Marginal Effects (Eq. 4.2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Phase II Phase II Phase II Phase II 
          
State Match, adjusted (in $10k) 0.016 0.029* 0.038** 0.032* 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) 
Woman Owned -0.010 -0.166 -0.166 -0.175 
 
(0.142) (0.109) (0.110) (0.119) 
HUBZone 0.077 0.083 0.110 0.366 
 
(0.178) (0.176) (0.173) (0.223) 
Minority Owned -0.295** -0.331*** -0.331*** -0.265** 
 
(0.128) (0.115) (0.113) (0.131) 
SBIR Capacity (cbsa) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Year Established 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Employment 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Constant -2.504 5.331 7.194 6.541 
 
(14.457) (17.378) (17.901) (18.840) 
     Observations 182 163 152 136 
R-squared 0.018 0.041 0.055 0.058 
Sample Full 9 Prior 5 Prior 3 Prior 
Notes: Data includes the population of Phase I activity for the projects that received a State Match award. 
Coefficients are reported from an LPM (linear probability model) and estimate Eq. 2. Standard errors are 
in parentheses and are clustered at the firm level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Model 1 includes the 
full sample of Phase I projects that received a State Match (no stratifications). Models 2 – 4 stratify the 
sample by the level of the firm’s prior Phase I awards – 9 or less, 5 or less, and 3 or less, respectively. 
Complete case analysis is used. 
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Figure 4.1 Average Marginal Effect of State Match 
 
Notes: This figure presents the confidence intervals for two logit models (Eq. D.2, see Appendix D). The 
blue (flatter) line presents the adjusted predictions for the full sample of Phase I projects that received a 
State Match. The effect of the State match is not statistically significant for this sample. The average 
marginal effect (AME) for the model is 0.019 (p-value of 0.170). The red (more upward sloping) line 
presents the adjusted predictions for the sample of Phase I projects that both received a State Match and 
whose firm had secured less than two prior Phase I awards. The effect of the State Match is statistically 
significant. The AME for the model is 0.038 (p-value of 0.045). This figure was created using the 
marginsplot command in Stata. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION & POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
If scientific knowledge and innovation are crucial sources for economic growth and 
competitiveness, then we should want to identify and advocate those institutions and reward structures 
that are most efficient at bolstering this activity. The R&D enterprise, however, continues to expand, 
involving numerous actors and organizations (Stephan, 2012), complicating its analysis for scholars. As 
Jaffe and Jones and their collaborators (2014) highlight, the frontier for science and innovation systems is 
dynamic and multifaceted. Moreover, it is projected to continue to evolve in the coming decades. More 
research is needed not only to understand institutional norms, collaborations, and the nature of knowledge 
production, but also to inform policy that promotes optimal research.  
In an effort to contribute to this broad discussion and to push research in a direction that is 
responsive to the changing scientific frontier, this dissertation examined the growing role of state 
government innovation policy through the lens of the SBIR program. Examining state government 
innovation policy within this context offers an opportunity not only to understand the larger policy mix of 
public efforts directed to support early-stage innovative activity, but also to examine the impact of 
variations in the size of public R&D support on innovative activity. The implications from this research, 
therefore, extend to a broad spectrum of policymakers – that include both state and federal levels – and 
also researchers, scientists and the greater public concerned with innovation policy and promoting 
economic development. The research for this project is presented in a three-essay format; each of the 
essay’s central aims and contributions are briefly reviewed in turn.  
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5.1 Chapter Two: Aims and Contributions  
Serving as a foundational framework for this larger project, chapter two draws attention to the 
larger multilevel system that is supportive of innovation and R&D. Too often we limit analysis of R&D to 
federal investments when in fact myriad organizations and institutions are stepping up to support early-
stage innovative activity. Within a federalist system, state governments in particular are playing a greater 
role in this capacity. This essay offers a foundational overview of state R&D policy activity directed 
toward small businesses. The primary aims of this research are threefold: (i) to present a theoretical 
framework for understanding policy activity within a dynamic multilevel system; (ii) to identify the 
policy context of the portfolio of state programs designed to augment the federal SBIR program; and (iii) 
to examine the antecedent factors that lead states to adopt one of the more aggressive programs – the State 
Match.  
Chapter Two pays particular attention to policy enhancement – where policy is initiated at the 
federal level and yields a positive response from state governments. As expressed in Chapter Two, the 
inherent nature of innovation demands substantial investment, placing the federal government in a critical 
position to afford and therefore initiate policy responses. The shared imperative of bolstering innovative 
and economic activity ties these multiple systems together; moreover, state governments are in an 
advantageous position to complement federal efforts.  
Evidence points to a growing interest among states; however, our understanding of state 
innovation policy is limited given the notable methodological hurdles with this decentralized policy 
activity. The broad portfolio of SBIR policy activity – that includes State Outreach and State Match 
programs – illustrates the increasing role of state innovation policy. As of 2013, forty-five states had one 
or more formal programs to augment the federal SBIR program. Not only does this serve as a central 
repository of U.S.-based SBIR policy activity, the empirical component of the essay offers compelling 
evidence that more attention should be focused on the multilevel innovation policy mix. Specifically, the 
results indicate that state policy implementation is associated with a confluence of multilevel factors 
driven not only by top-down federal actions, but also from bottom-up, internal state political and 
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economic factors as well as from lateral pressures from peer states. As highlighted in Chapter Two, by 
examining the motivating factors associated with state policy responses, the analysis demonstrates that 
state policies are shaped by the nature of the multilevel mix itself. In short, public policy is dynamic and 
contextual. For a more accurate understanding of innovation policy, it is important to consider how 
multiple levels of government interact.  
5.2 Chapter Three: Aims and Contributions 
 Building upon the foundational classification scheme in Chapter Two that clarifies the multilevel 
U.S. SBIR policy context, this essay examines the implications of the State Match. The primary aims for 
this essay are twofold: (i) to consider the policy implications for multilevel innovation policy analysis 
within a federalist system; and (ii) to offer a comprehensive examination of the State Match program by 
considering the dual advantages of the program – Phase II success rates and Phase I applications.  
Program evaluation is important in its own right; and placed within a larger policy mix that 
extends to the federal and state government levels, the policy implications are even greater. From a state 
government perspective, this is an effort to invest in the local innovative economy to stimulate 
development and growth. From the federal perspective, the State Match can be viewed as a policy 
experiment that tests marginal adjustments to the size of the SBIR program. Importantly regardless of the 
efficacy of the program, the policy implications of the State Match extend to both levels of government. If 
the program is found to be effective in increasing the competitiveness of Phase II applicants, the federal 
government may consider adjusting the size of the Phase I award. Rather than experimenting with the size 
of the Phase I award, the federal SBIR program can simply learn from state actions. Moreover, states 
without the program may consider adopting comparable programs to increase the likelihood of securing 
follow federal funding. Though of course, without adjustments in the size of the federal SBIR program, 
this would play out in a zero-sum format. In the event the benefits of the program are limited, the federal 
government may view the evidence as validation for the current size of the Phase I award. State 
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governments with the program may opt to either increase the size of the award or invest resources 
elsewhere.  
In terms of program evaluation, this essay offers a comprehensive assessment of a diffuse state 
government innovation program. Much of the scholarship has focused on case study analyses and 
descriptive overviews, which limits their generalizability and validity (Shapira & Youtie, 2006; Combes 
& Todd, 1996; Berglund & Coburn, 1995). However, the standard structure of the State Match program – 
notably the noncompetitive match to the pool of successful Phase I recipients – offers an opportunity to 
examine a state policy on a larger national scale. The results indicate that the benefits of the State Match 
vary; the program differentiates recipients of the State Match competing for the NSF SBIR Phase II 
funding. The results, however, were not robust for Phase I application activity. While the State Match can 
be viewed as a marginal increase in the size of the Phase I award – given its noncompetitive nature – I 
expected prospective applicants on the margin to compete for the Phase I funding. Most of the State 
Match programs are relatively new, however, with initial adoptions dating after the 2001 federal SBIR 
reauthorization. What the null results suggest is that prospective applicants may be unaware of the state 
support. Increased awareness of the match may alter behavior. 
While there is evidence here in this analysis and in other studies to suggest that the financial 
demands vary across industrial sectors, the SBIR program and State Match programs are broadly set up as 
blanket policies and do not reflect these differences. These results suggest that architects of the program 
may want to adjust the size of the match to reflect the heterogeneity in financial demands across the 
various sectors. The federal SBIR program has made initial efforts in this vein by increasing the 
maximum size of the DHHS SBIR awards to $300,000 for Phase I and up to $3 million for Phase II;1 
however, more could be done to tailor the program to early-stage innovative needs.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Source: http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-files/PAR-14-088.html 
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5.3 Chapter Four: Aims and Contributions 
 Building upon the broad state-level evaluation of the State Match presented in Chapter Three, this 
essay takes a narrower approach by employing a project-level evaluation of the program for a contiguous 
region. In doing so, this essay includes the population of Phase I awards for two states with the State 
Match – Kentucky and North Carolina – and four contiguous states without the State Match – Arkansas, 
Missouri, South Carolina and Virginia. Importantly, the two treated states were selected given that they 
adopted the program in 2006 and 2005, respectively, and offer varying sizes of the match. This allows for 
a differential and marginal examination of the policy. Placed within the context of the federal SBIR 
program, between state comparisons are feasible given that the population of Phase I projects achieved a 
minimum level of competency through the federal SBIR review. Moreover, this approach offers a strong 
design not only to treat the noncompetitive State Match as an exogenous increase to the R&D investment, 
but also to examine innovation policy directed toward projects rather than firms.  
 The results from this analysis build upon the findings from Chapter Three. Notably, the effect of 
the State Match varies both by industrial focus and firm research capacity. More specifically, in contrast 
to projects without the State Match, the results indicate that additional funding improved the 
competitiveness of Phase I recipients competing for the Phase II awards among projects with a directed 
focus in the basic sciences – NSF and DHHS funded – and with less prior success with the SBIR 
program. Results from the marginal analysis also found positive effects of the program; for this set of 
models, the results indicate that more money is worth more when invested in projects with less experience 
with the program. Program success was defined as securing the Phase II award; however, employment 
change was also considered. The results for these models were not robust; this is likely due to 
measurement error with this metric. 
Taken together, marginal increases in early-stage innovative activity yield positive benefits – in 
terms of securing additional follow funding – for projects affiliated with the NSF and DHHS program 
with less prior success with the SBIR program. Viewing prior SBIR activity as a proxy for firm R&D 
research capacity, this suggests that firms with less success are able to more effectively leverage the 
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additional funding. As suggested by the results from the prior study, rather than offering a blanket policy 
of a standard State Match, policymakers may want to tailor the award. This has implications for state and 
federal policymakers. State policymakers may view these results as evidence that marginal investments 
can leverage significant follow on funding when invested in specific types of innovative endeavors. 
Federal policymakers, on the other hand, may consider adjusting the structure of the Phase I award for 
certain programs. Importantly, the value of the R&D investment varies. The results from Chapter Three 
found that the effect varies across industrial focus, whereas this study offered additional evidence to show 
that the effect varies by the firm’s research capacity as well.  
5.4 Future Research 
 This dissertation project brings greater focus to the multilevel innovation policy mix. The SBIR 
policy context, in particular, presents an opportunity to examine the interactions across multiple levels of 
innovation policy in a federalist system that share a common imperative of promoting innovation and 
bolstering economic activity. In doing so, this research directs greater attention to state government 
innovation policy, which is too often overshadowed by federal activity.  
The scientific frontier is changing and becoming increasingly complex and collaborative. As a 
researcher, it is important to be responsive to the changing context. Non-traditional sectors – including 
state governments and also non-profit organizations – deserve greater scholastic attention. This is needed 
in addition to clarifying and articulating the amalgamation of federal innovation policies. An inherent 
belief that scientific knowledge and innovation promote societal benefits and prosperity underlies much 
of the motivation to invest and examine R&D. Accurately and precisely measuring these connections, 
however, presents notable empirical challenges including breaking down the R&D process of inputs, 
outputs, outcomes, and impacts over the short-, medium-, and longer terms. Collectively, this complex 
process comprises the infamous black box that is hard to illuminate.  
This dissertation project directs greater attention to state innovation policy and sets up a research 
design to assess the efficacy of marginal investments in early-stage R&D. More work, however, remains. 
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While this research considers the complementary relationship between federal and state innovation 
policy, a larger literature hinges on the issue of additionality, notably between federal and industry 
funding (e.g. Blume-Kohout et al., 2009; David et al., 2000; Diamond, 1999; Payne, 2001). This line of 
literature overlooks the fact that R&D support stems from a broader range of sources that include state & 
local and nonprofit R&D investments. To extend this line of research, greater attention is needed to 
examine the relationships between this broader portfolio of sources. Data from the National Science 
Foundation indicate that state and local governments and nonprofit organizations each provided between 
5.5 and 6.5% of all R&D funding from 2010 – 2012; slightly more than industry levels.2 This is not 
surprising given the evidence from this dissertation and additional research that is finding that state 
governments are directing greater attention toward university R&D to bolster economic activity (Feldman 
et al., 2013). Meanwhile, nonprofit funding of academic research has been increasing as charities fill in 
gaps from decreases in federal and industry budgets, often in the bio-medical fields to increase research 
on treatments for diseases (Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2013). This research has notable implications for 
innovation policy by offering a clearer understanding regarding the relationship between the myriad 
sources of external R&D support.  
In addition, this research project advances our understanding of R&D by focusing on investments 
in projects rather than firms. This offers a closer examination of the mechanisms that advance innovation. 
Another line of future research could explore innovation policy directed toward individuals. Building off 
the SBIR program, there is great potential in looking at the activity of SBIR Principal Investigators. This 
would contribute to the large literature that traces the activity of STAR scientists – more senior, 
established scholars – in terms of their patterns of invention and innovation (e.g. Zucker & Darby, 1997).  
 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Source: National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, Higher Education 
Research and Development Survey; NSF 14-303 Table 1. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: Data collection methods for identifying state SBIR-related programs 
 
Data on state SBIR-related programs were gathered in two stages (January 2012 and November 
2012, respectively). The initial search focused on gathering information on SMP-I programs. The 
following search terms “state”, “SBIR”, “STTR” and “match” were used in Google searches. In looking 
through 30 pages of results for these terms, 16 states were initially identified as having characteristics of 
an SMP-I program. Each state was then contacted for additional information on the program. Of the 
original 16, 12 states matched the definition of an SMP-I program: state-run grant program; matching 
funds for successful Phase I recipients; funds are not limited to Phase II application costs, but rather are 
intended to cover the technical aspects of project. During this initial stage, it became apparent that there 
was a wider range of state SBIR-related program. 
The second data-gathering phase took place in November 2012. This more extensive data 
collection effort was conducted to gain a comprehensive understanding of all state SBIR-related 
programs. Press releases, news articles, legislative statutes and web sources were gathered from the SSTI 
online archives. The search terms for this collection effort included: “state”, “match”, “SBIR”, “STTR”, 
and “bridge”. The information from this collection effort provided a broader overview of the range of 
state policies.  
As a result, a series of SSTI online and Google web searches were conducted on the following 
topics: “SBIR/STTR”, “SBA FAST”, “ROP”, “Federal technical support programs”, “SBIR 
reauthorizations”, “Phase 0/00”, and “SBIR bridge programs”.  In addition, the authors conducted fifty 
state-specific searches for the following terms: “SBIR”, “STTR”, “bridge”, “match”, “Phase 0”, “Phase 
00” to learn about state SBIR-related activity. 
All references of state financial support were followed up with an email to the state office to 
inquire about the nature of funding. This information was then compiled into a word document, which is 
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available upon request. This document has been shared with Dr. John Hardin, Executive Director for the 
North Carolina Board of Science & Technology, and Rick Shindell, author of the widely disseminated 
SBIR Insider Newsletter. Dr. Hardin responded with comments. 
As an additional validity check, the authors crosschecked the information on the state agencies 
with NASA’s list of state technical programs.1 For the majority of cases, the author’s search matched 
NASA’s list, however, in some cases it was more up to date. This was a useful exercise to confirm that 
the data collection search was directed to the appropriate state agency. 
In addition to contacting the state agencies, numerous representatives affiliated with the federal 
SBIR program were contacted. These included program officers from the SBA, NSF and DOD. 
Additional information on the SBIR, FAST, and ROP programs was gathered at this time. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 http://sbir.gsfc.nasa.gov/SBIR/states.htm 
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Appendix B: Arellano Bond Ex-post Specification Tests 
 
Table B.1 reports the results from the test of whether ∆𝜀!"  are correlated with ∆𝜀!,!!! for k ≥ 2. This is 
caluated based on the correlation of fitted residuals ∆𝜀!". To pass the test, we reject at order 1, but not at 
higher levels (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009: p. 300). The results hold for the NASA estimation and are 
weakly supported for the NSF estimation. The results do not hold for the DoE estimation. 
 
Table B.1 Serial Correlation 
 NSF  DoE  NASA 
Order Z Prob > z  Z Prob > z  Z Prob > z 
1 -1.765 0.078  -1.428 0.153  -2.178 0.029 
2 -0.339 0.734  0.895 0.371  -0.917 0.359 
3 0.311 0.756  -1.83 0.067  0.724 0.469 
 
Table B.2 reports the tests for overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis states that the population 
moment conditions are correct (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009: p. 301). In each case, we fail to reject that the 
population moment conditions are correct, and therefore pass the test. 
 
Table B.2 Overidentifying restrictions 
 NSF  DoE  NASA 
Chi2 2.272  5.907  6.651 
Prob > chi2 0.686  0.206  0.156 
 
Taken together, the NASA estimation passes the post-estimation tests; the NSF estimation weakly passes 
the post-estimation tests; and the DoE estimation does not pass the test. All results are reported; however, 
caution is taken when interpreting the results for the NSF and DoE AB estimations.  
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Appendix C: Matching Procedure 
 
For this analysis, I matched State Match (if eligible) and Phase II (if successful) project activity to the 
population of SBIR Phase I projects for the population of interest. Project level data on federal SBIR 
activity was pulled from the SBA’s publicly accessible central repository. Project level data on the State 
Match awards was gathered from the Kentucky Science and Technology Corporation and North 
Carolina’s Department of Commerce. In addition, I identified the Dun & Bradstreet DUNS number for 
the Phase I firm recipients and used this information to match the firms in the sample to the National 
Establishment Time Series (NETS) database. This provided us with additional firm-level characteristics 
of the SBIR Phase I recipients.  Table C.1 details the match rate by state. I detail the matching procedure 
below. 
 
Table C.1 Match Rates by State 
 NC Sample KY Sample 
 NC VA SC KY MO AR 
SBIR       
I. Phase I (original) 746 1318 207 165 281 165 
II. Phase II (original) 372 688 87 85 124 88 
III. Phase II (matched) 357 670 85 79 121 88 
IV. Phase II (match rate) 96% 97% 98% 93% 96% 100% 
V. Success Rate (PI to PII) 39.7% 41.2% 35.8% 31.1% 31.7% 35.6% 
 
State Match 
      
VI. State Match (original) 202   952   
VII. State Match (match) 194 23  82   
VIII. State Match (cleaned) 175 1  48   
 
DUNS and NETS Match 
      
IX. Unique firms 297 274 73 103 138 58 
X. DUNS match (firm) 265 244 59 91 116 46 
XI. DUNS match (projects) 701 1271 190 147 255 153 
XII. NETS match (projects) 653 1197 179 133 251 145 
XIII. NETS match rate  88% 91% 86% 81% 89% 88% 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This includes STTR awards as well.  
3 It appears as though the NC program award to two firms in VA (one notably at Luna Innovations). I was able to 
match on PI, SBC, and Agency, which were convincing indications of an accurate match.  
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Phase II to Phase I Match: Data on matching Phase II to Phase I projects are provided in rows I – IV. I 
pulled the population of Phase I awards from 2000 – 2010 and the population of Phase II awards from 
2000 – 2013. I extended the timeframe for Phase II awards given that the average lag for successful Phase 
II recipients is roughly one calendar year. Although our analysis only considers activity from 2002, I 
pulled data from 2000 and 2001 to derive prior Phase I capacity for the earlier awardees. 2345 Phase I 
projects were located in Northern Virginia and therefore were dropped.4 For both samples of Phase I 
awards, I matched on the following measures: Title, SBC (small business company), Principal 
Investigator, city, SBIR mission agency, and project abstract.  
 
For the NC sample, I was unable to match 35 Phase II projects due to the following: 13 Phase II projects 
had a Phase I prior to 2000, 19 Phase II projects were duplicates, 3 Phase II projects had incomplete 
award information.  
 
For the KY sample, I was unable to match 9 Phase II projects due to the following: 2 Phase II projects 
had a Phase I prior to 2000, 1 Phase II project was a duplicate, 6 Phase II projects had incomplete award 
information.  
 
State Match to Phase I Match: I followed the same procedure with the Phase II to Phase I match and 
matched on the following measures: Title, SBC (small business company), Principal Investigator, city, 
SBIR mission agency, and project abstract.   
 
The One NC Small Business Program awarded 243 matches over the time frame of interest. I dropped 41 
matches that were STTR Phase I match awards. I was able to match State Match awards to Phase I 
projects with a 97% match rate.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 These are not included in the original count in row I. 
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The Kentucky SBIR/STTR Matching Funds program awarded 155 awards in the timeframe of interest: 95 
were matched to Phase I awards and 60 were matched to Phase II awards. This includes STTR matches as 
well (these were dropped prior to running the empirical analysis). I was able to match State Match awards 
to Phase I projects with a 86.3% match rate.  
 
DUNS Identification and NETS merge: In the winter 2013/2014, I matched firms by firm name and 
address in the Mergent Intellect database to identify a unique DUNS number. For verification, I re-
matched the firms a second time in March 2014. For the NC sample, I identified 644 unique firms among 
the population of Phase I awards based on SBC title, city, and address. I matched a unique DUNS id 
number to 568 firms – 88.1% match rate. For the KY sample, I identified 299 unique firms among the 
population of Phase I awards based on SBC title, city and address. I matched a unique DUNS id number 
to 253 firms – 84.6% match rate.  
 
I submitted a data request to Don Walls & Associates who pulled the NETS data based on the sample of 
DUNS ids – 89% match rate on Phase I projects. Among those firms with a DUNS id, I assigned the 
DUNS id to the firms’ respective Phase I project(s). In March 2013, I merged NETS data to the full 
sample of Phase I projects based on the years of the Phase I, State Match, and Phase II awards, 
respectively.5  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 I would like to thank Dr. Maryann Feldman for her guidance with this matching procedure and her assistance in 
procuring the NETS data. 
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Appendix D: Robustness Checks 
D.1 DD Analysis 
Equation D.1 is a project-level model estimating the effect of the state match – 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑦𝑟! ∗𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑠𝑡! – 
on the probability of securing a Phase II award.  
 !"#$%(!  |!)!!! =   𝛽!𝑓(𝑋𝛽),  (D.1) 
 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝐼𝐼! is the binary outcome variable of interest – Phase II award. X includes the vector of controls 
listed in table 4.3 and the policy variables listed for the differential analysis.   
 
Table D.1 Robustness Checks – DD Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Phase II Phase II Phase II Phase II 
(A) Logit     
State Match (AME) 0.239 0.219 0.223 0.333 
 (0.058) (0.016) (0.028) (0.062) 
(B) Linear Probability Model     
State Match (ME) 0.294 0.248 0.247 0.536 
 (0.057) (0.029) (0.055) (0.019) 
(C) State Match Difference     
ME – AME  0.055 0.029 0.024 0.203 
     
(D) Out of Range Predictions      
Percent OOR 0.52% 0 0 0 
Min 0.028 0.257 0.283 0.021 
Max 1.019 0.795 0.799 1 
     
(E) CGM Wild Bootstrap     
State Match (ME) 0.620 0.099 0.127 0.691 
CGM p-value 0.049 0.124 0.104 0.052 
     
Sample NSF Full HHS 5 Prior HHS 3 Prior NSF 1 Prior 
Notes: The coefficients in Row A report the average marginal effects from a logit model estimating 
Equation 3. The p-values are noted in parentheses and the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
In an effort to compare the two models – LPM vs. Logit – the coefficients on the policy effect reported in 
Table 5 are re-reported here – Row B. Row C, the state match difference, estimates the difference in 
marginal effect (Eq. 4.1) and average marginal effect (Eq. D.1). Row D provides descriptive statistics for 
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the out of range predictions estimated from Equation 1. Row E reports the coefficient and p-values for the 
policy variable of interest – State Match (Eq. 4.1) – using the wild bootstrap command (Cameron, 
Gelbach & Miller, 2008). The number of reps was set to 1500; however, the p-values were estimated with 
500 and 1000 reps as well. The null was set to the value of 0 for the nine variables included in the model. 
The cluster and bootclusters were set at the state-level. 
 
Model 1 includes the full sample of NSF Phase I recipients. Models 2 and 3 report the coefficients for 
HHS projects for firms with five or less prior Phase I awards and 3 or less prior Phase I awards, 
respectively. Model 4 reports the coefficients for NSF projects for firms with 1 or less prior Phase I 
awards. Complete case analysis is used. 
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D.2 Marginal Analysis 
Equation D.2 is a project-level model estimating the effect of the state match – 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑦𝑟! ∗𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑠𝑡! – 
on the probability of securing a Phase II award.  
 !"#$%(!  |!)!!! =   𝛽!𝑓(𝑋𝛽),  (D.2) 
 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝐼𝐼! is the binary outcome variable of interest – Phase II award. X includes the vector of controls 
listed in table and the policy variable listed for the marginal analysis. Notably, the policy effect of interest 
is the continuous measure – State Match.6   
 
Table D.2 Robustness Checks – Marginal Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
(A) Logit Phase II Phase II Phase II 
State Match (AME) 0.029 0.038 0.032 
 
0.080 0.031 0.088 
(B) Linear Probability Model    
State Match (ME) 0.029 0.039 0.032 
 0.089 0.035 0.094 
    
(C) State Match Difference    
ME – AME  0 0.001 0 
    
(D) Out of Range Predictions     
Percent OOR 0 0.54 0 
Min 0.034 -0.007 0.056 
Max 0.657 0.703 0.856 
    
Sample Full 9 Prior Full 5 Prior Full 3 Prior 
Notes: The coefficients in Row A report the average marginal effects from a logit model estimating 
Equation D.2. The p-values are noted in parentheses and the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
In an effort to compare the two models – LPM vs. Logit – the coefficients on the policy effect reported in 
Table 4.6 are re-reported here – Row B. Row C, the state match difference, estimates the difference in 
marginal effect (Eq. 4.2) and average marginal effect (Eq. D.2). Row D provides descriptive statistics for 
the out of range predictions estimated from Equation 4.2.  
Model 1 – 3 include the full sample of Phase I recipients for firms with 9, 5 and 3 or less prior awards, 
respectively. Complete case analysis is used.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 State Match denotes that the variable has been adjusted for inflation using July 2013 GDP Implicit Price Deflators 
– base year 2005; in addition, the data on the awards are reported in $10,000s. 
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Appendix E: Sensitivity Analysis – Data Imputation Considerations 
 
Table E.1 reports the descriptive statistics for Year Established and Employment for the three estimation 
procedures.  
Table E.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Label Observation Mean S.D. Min Max 
Year Established (CCA) 2110 1996.466 9.469 1817 2011 
Year Established (DVA) 2177 1996.733 9.454 1817 2011 
Year Established (MI) 2177 1996.548 9.346 1817 2011 
      
Employment (CCA) 1832 22.264 31.281 1 400 
Employment (DVA) 2177 18.894 29.727 1 400 
Employment (MI) 2177 20.1981 29.371 1 400 
Notes: CCA refers to Complete Case Analysis; DVA refers to Dummy Variable Adjustment; MI refers to 
Mean Imputation. For the DVA estimates, missing values for Year Established were replaced with the 
year the Phase I award was granted. Missing values for Employment were replaced with the value 1. This 
technique follows Alison’s discussion of dummy variable analyses (2002). For the MI estimates, missing 
values for Year Established were estimated from the average time lapse between firm birth and securing a 
Phase I. The average time lapse for this sample is 6 years. Missing values for Employment were replaced 
with the average employment values based on the age of the firm.  
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Table E.2 Sensitivity Analysis – Imputation Techniques (Differential Analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Phase II Phase II Phase II Phase II 
(A) Complete Case Analysis     
State Match 0.294* 0.248** 0.247* 0.536** 
 (0.152) (0.112) (0.128) (0.223) 
     
Observations 162 311 263 88 
     
(B) Dummy Variable Adjustment     
State Match 0.224* 0.196** 0.189* 0.379** 
 (0.131) (0.095) (0.106) (0.181) 
     
(C) Mean Imputation     
State Match 0.225* 0.204** 0.201* 0.356* 
 (0.132) (0.093) (0.104) (0.183) 
(D) Limited Controls  
    State Match 0.223* 0.205** 0.204** 0.342* 
 
(0.131) (0.093) (0.103) (0.178) 
     
Observations 192 420 369 112 
Sample NSF Full DHHS 5 Prior DHHS 3 Prior NSF 1 Prior 
Notes: Data includes the population of Phase I activity for the entire region (KY, AR, MO, NC, SC and 
VA (excluding Northern VA)) from 2002 to 2010. Phase I activity for 2006 was dropped from the 
analysis allowing for a clear cut off between the pre and post policy period. Coefficients are reported from 
an LPM (linear probability model). Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the firm level 
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
 
The coefficient for the State Match in Eq. 4.1 is presented – 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑦𝑟! ∗𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑠𝑡!. Columns 1 – 4 
denote the stratifications. Model 1 includes the full sample of NSF Phase I recipients. Models 2 and 3 
report the coefficients for HHS projects for firms with five or less prior Phase I awards and 3 or less prior 
Phase I awards, respectively. Model 4 reports the coefficients for NSF projects for firms with 1 or less 
prior Phase I awards. Rows A – D denote the different imputation techniques. Row A reports the 
complete case analysis (re-reported from Table 4.5). Row B reports the policy coefficient using a Dummy 
Variable Analysis. Row C reports the policy coefficient using a Mean Imputation technique. Row D 
reports the policy coefficient for Eq. 4.1 excluding the controls derived from the NETS database: Year 
Established and Employment. 
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Table E.3 Sensitivity Analysis – Imputation Techniques (Marginal Analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Phase II Phase II Phase II Phase II 
(A) Complete Case Analysis     
State Match 0.016 0.029* 0.038** 0.032* 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) 
     
Observations 182 163 152 136 
     
(B) Dummy Variable Adjustment     
State Match 0.020 0.033** 0.038** 0.032* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
     
(C) Mean Imputation     
State Match 0.021 0.033** 0.038** 0.032* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
(D) Limited Controls  
    State Match 0.021 0.033** 0.038** 0.033* 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
     
Observations 224 200 185 165 
Sample Full 9 Prior 5 Prior 3 Prior 
Notes: Data includes the population of Phase I activity for the projects that received a State Match award. 
Coefficients are reported from an LPM (linear probability model) and estimate Eq. 4.2. Standard errors 
are in parentheses and are clustered at the firm level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
 
The coefficient for the State Match in Eq. 4.1 is presented – 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑦𝑟! ∗𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑠𝑡!. Columns 1 – 4 
denote the stratifications. Model 1 includes the full sample of Phase I projects that received a State Match 
(no stratifications). Models 2 – 4 stratify the sample by the level of the firm’s prior Phase I awards – 9 or 
less, 5 or less, and 3 or less, respectively. Rows A – D denote the different imputation techniques. Row A 
reports the complete case analysis (re-reported from Table 4.6). Row B reports the policy coefficient 
using a Dummy Variable Adjustment. Row C reports the policy coefficient using a Mean Imputation 
technique. Row D reports the policy coefficient for Eq. 4.1 excluding the controls derived from the NETS 
database: Year Established and Employment. 
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Appendix F: Cohort Study 
 
The paper considers the effect of the policy for the full sample of projects. This section considers 
the differential effect for each cohort – the Kentucky-based cohort and the North Carolina-based cohort. 
The population of Phase I projects located in KY, AR, and MO defined the former region. For this 
analysis, I included Phase I projects in 2006 and coded them in the pre-policy period. The population of 
Phase I projects whose firms are located in NC, SC, and VA defined the North Carolina-based study. I 
included Phase I projects in 2006 and coded them in the post policy period. 
F.1 Identification 
Tables F.1 and F.2 report the t-tests for the population of small businesses in the treated and 
control regions for the Kentucky and North Carolina regions, respectively. Results for the Kentucky-
based cohort shows no evidence of a difference in means across any of the attributes for the full sample 
and when stratified by NSF, suggesting that this contiguous region defines a comparable control 
population for these stratifications. Firm age, employment, and regional SBIR capacity for the North 
Carolina-based sample, however, reflect the results from the full sample and report a statistically 
significant difference in means with the North Carolina firms being on average younger, smaller (in terms 
of employment), and geographically concentrated compared to those in VA and SC. 
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Table F.1 Identification on firm-level characteristics – KY Sample 
  
	   142 
Table F.2 Identification on firm-level characteristics – NC Sample 
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F.2 DD Analysis (Eq. 4.1) 
Table F.3 Difference in Difference – North Carolina Cohort 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Phase II Phase II Phase II 
        
NC Post-period -0.170*** -0.341*** -0.402*** 
 
(0.051) (0.091) (0.115) 
Treated state -0.153*** -0.151 -0.202 
 
(0.054) (0.103) (0.127) 
NC State Match 0.154** 0.319** 0.365** 
 
(0.069) (0.122) (0.148) 
Woman Owned -0.019 0.156* 0.150 
 
(0.053) (0.090) (0.131) 
HUBZone -0.024 0.615*** 0.619*** 
 
(0.100) (0.097) (0.106) 
Minority Owned -0.061 -0.030 0.125 
 
(0.078) (0.125) (0.142) 
SBIR Capacity (cbsa) 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Year Established -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 
 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006) 
Employment -0.000 -0.004* -0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 1.586 10.504 8.520 
 
(4.963) (10.039) (11.132) 
    Observations 798 233 195 
R-squared 0.023 0.074 0.074 
Sample Full 5 Prior DHHS 5 Prior DHHS 3 Prior 
Notes: Data includes the population of Phase I activity for the North Carolina region (NC, SC, and VA 
(sans Northern VA)) from 2002 to 2010. The post period was coded 1 for years after 2005. The policy 
was passed in 2006 and the first State Match was made that same year. Coefficients are reported from an 
LPM (linear probability model). Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the firm level (*** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Model 1 includes the full sample of SBIR activity for the North Carolina 
cohort for firms with 5 or less prior Phase I awards. Models 2 and 3 report the coefficients for HHS 
projects for firms with less 5 or less prior Phase I awards and 3 or less prior Phase I awards, respectively. 
Complete case analysis is used. 
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F.3 Robustness & Sensitivity Checks 
Table F.4 Robustness Checks – NC Cohort 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Phase II Phase II Phase II 
(A) Logit    
State Match (AME) 0.152 0.322 0.369 
 (0.025) (0.006) (0.010) 
(B) Linear Probability Model    
State Match (ME) 0.154 0.319 0.365 
 (0.026) (0.010) (0.015) 
(C) State Match Difference    
ME – AME  0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
    
(D) Out of Range Predictions     
Percent OOR 0 0 0 
Min 0.292 0.018 0.179 
Max 0.635 1 1 
    
Sample Full 5 Prior DHHS 5 Prior DHHS 3 Prior 
Notes: The coefficients in Row A report the average marginal effects from a logit model estimating 
Equation D.1. The p-values are noted in parentheses and the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
In an effort to compare the two models – LPM vs. Logit – the coefficients on the policy effect reported in 
Table F.3 are re-reported here – Row B. Row C, the state match difference, estimates the difference in 
marginal effect (Eq. 4.1) and average marginal effect (Eq. D.1). Row D provides descriptive statistics for 
the out of range predictions estimated from Equation 1.  
 
Model 1 includes the full sample of Phase I recipients for firms with 5 or less prior awards. Models 2 and 
3 report the coefficients for HHS projects for firms with five or less prior Phase I awards and 3 or less 
prior Phase I awards, respectively. Complete case analysis is used. 
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Table F.5 Sensitivity Analysis – Imputation Techniques for NC Cohort 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Phase II Phase II Phase II 
(A) Complete Case Analysis    
State Match 0.154** 0.319** 0.365** 
 (0.069) (0.122) (0.148) 
    
Observations 798 233 195 
    
(B) Dummy Variable Adjustment 
   State Match 0.060 0.212** 0.210* 
 
(0.062) (0.101) (0.120) 
(C) Mean Imputation    
State Match 0.062 0.215** 0.218* 
 
(0.061) (0.100) (0.119) 
(D) Limited Controls  
   State Match 0.062 0.232** 0.236* 
 
(0.061) (0.100) (0.120) 
    
Observations 1,025 315 275 
Sample Full 5 Prior HHS 5 Prior HHS 3 Prior 
Notes: Data includes the population of Phase I activity for the North Carolina region (NC, SC, and VA 
(sans Northern VA)) from 2002 to 2010. The post period was coded 1 for years after 2005. The policy 
was passed in 2006 and the first State Match was made that same year. Coefficients are reported from an 
LPM (linear probability model). Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the firm level (*** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
 
The coefficient for the State Match in Eq. 4.1 is presented – 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑦𝑟! ∗𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑠𝑡!. Columns 1 – 3 
denote the stratifications. Model 1 includes the full sample of SBIR activity for the North Carolina cohort 
for firms with 5 or less prior Phase I awards. Models 2 and 3 report the coefficients for HHS projects for 
firms with less 5 or less prior Phase I awards and 3 or less prior Phase I awards, respectively. Rows A – D 
denote the different imputation techniques. Row A reports the complete case analysis (re-reported from 
Table F.3). Row B reports the policy coefficient using a Dummy Variable Analysis. Row C reports the 
policy coefficient using a Mean Imputation technique. Row D reports the policy coefficient for Eq. 4.1 
excluding the controls derived from the NETS database: Year Established and Employment. 
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Table F.6 Sensitivity Analysis – Imputation Techniques for KY Cohort 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Phase II Phase II Phase II Phase II 
(A) Complete Case Analysis     
State Match 0.130 0.130 0.232 0.474 
 (0.402) (0.402) (0.460) (0.497) 
     
Observations 60 60 52 39 
     
     
(B) Dummy Variable Adjustment 
   
 
State Match 0.224 0.224 0.251 0.398 
 
(0.236) (0.236) (0.253) (0.285) 
(C) Mean Imputation     
State Match 0.369 0.369 0.394 0.565** 
 
(0.243) (0.243) (0.258) (0.272) 
(D) Limited Controls 
   
 
State Match 0.305 0.305 0.322 0.473* 
 
(0.242) (0.242) (0.253) (0.272) 
     
Observations 75 75 67 52 
Sample Full NSF NSF 5 Prior NSF 3 Prior NSF 1 Prior 
Notes: Data includes the population of Phase I activity for the Kentucky region (KY, AR, MO) from 2002 
to 2010. The post period was coded 1 for years after 2006. Although the policy was passed in 2006, the 
first award was not granted to a Phase I recipient until 2007. Coefficients are reported from an LPM 
(linear probability model). Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the firm level (*** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
 
The coefficient for the State Match in Eq. 4.1 is presented – 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑦𝑟! ∗𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑠𝑡!. Columns 1 – 4 
denote the stratifications. Model 1 includes the full NSF activity for the KY cohort. Models 2 – 4 reports 
the policy coefficients for NSF projects for firms with 5 or less, 3 or less, and 1 or less Phase I awards, 
respectively. Rows A – D denote the different imputation techniques. Row A reports the complete case 
analysis (results available upon request). Row B reports the policy coefficient using a Dummy Variable 
Adjustment. Row C reports the policy coefficient using a Mean Imputation technique. Row D reports the 
policy coefficient for Eq. 4.1 excluding the controls derived from the NETS database: Year Established 
and Employment. 
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